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A New Solution to Market Definition:  
An Approach Based on Multi-dimensional Substitutability Statistics 
By 
Yan Yang 
Juris Scientiae Doctoris 
Washington University School of Law 
Saint Louis, Missouri 
December 2018 
John Drobak, George Alexander Madill Professor of Real Property & Equity Jurisprudence, 
Professor of Economics, Committee Chair 
Market definition is an important component in the premerger investigation, but the models used 
in the market definition have not developed much in the past three decades since the Critical 
Loss Analysis (CLA) was proposed in 1989. The CLA helps the Hypothetical Monopolist Test to 
determine whether the hypothetical monopolist is going to profit from the small but significant 
and non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP). However, the CLA has long been criticized by 
academic scholars for its tendency to conclude a narrow market. Although the CLA was adopted 
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by the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (the 2010 Guidelines), the criticisms are likely still 
valid. 
In this dissertation, we discussed the mathematical deduction of CLA, the data used, and the 
SSNIP defined by the Agencies. Based on our research, we concluded that the narrow market 
conclusion was due to the incorrect implementation of the CLA; not the model itself. On the 
other hand, there are other unresolvable problems in the CLA and the Hypothetical Monopolist 
Test. The SSNIP test and the CLA are bright resolutions for market definition problem during 
their time, but we have more advanced tools to solve the task nowadays. In this dissertation, we 
propose a model which is based directly on the multi-dimensional substitutability between the 
products and is capable of maximizing the substitutability of product features within each group. 
Since the 2010 Guidelines does not exclude the use of models other than the ones mentioned by 
the Guidelines, our method can hopefully supplement the current models to show a better picture 
of the substitutive relations and provide a more stable definition of the market. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Market definition is an important component in the premerger investigation. It is the basis of 
coordinated effect analysis and calculation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Although it does 
not come up with a direct prediction of post-merger price, it is useful in assessing the market 
power on material price, product price, the possibility of collusion, limitation of entry, etc. 
However, new methods in market definition have not been developed for long. The Antitrust 
Division of the United States Department of Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission (in this 
dissertation, we are going to refer them as “the Agencies”) adopted the Critical Loss Analysis 
(CLA) in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, but the CLA itself was proposed in 1989 to 
help the Hypothetical Monopolist Test to determine whether the hypothetical monopolist is going 
to profit from the small but significant and non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP). The 
Hypothetical Monopolist Test and the CLA constitute the current approach in defining the 
relevant product market. 
However, the CLA has been criticized by academic scholars for tending to conclude a narrow 
market. It was also distrusted by the courts in some cases, because of concluding unreasonably 
narrow markets. Even though the CLA was eventually adopted in the Guidelines, the criticisms 
still seem to be valid. However, with research in the deduction of CLA, the data used, and the 
SSNIP defined by the Agencies, we conclude that the narrow market conclusion is not due to the 
CLA model but the problem in its implementation. 
!10
A New Solution to Market Definition                                  
On the other hand, we also find out that there are other unresolvable problems in the CLA and 
the Hypothetical Monopolist Test. The Hypothetical Monopolist Test and the CLA was a 
compromise given the limitation of the data and calculation capacity at the time it was proposed. 
They are bright resolutions in their background, but we have more advanced tools to solve the 
problem nowadays. The quantification of substitutability was believed to be impossible decades 
ago, but it is no longer hard now. In this dissertation, we are going to propose a model which is 
based directly on the substitutability between the products and is capable of minimizing the 
difference of product features within each group. 
In Chapter 2, we discussed about the background of the research and other aspects of the 
premerger investigation, like the unilateral effect and the models used to assess it. We also 
included the coordinated effects, the background of the Hypothetical Monopolist Test, and the 
HHI in Chapter 2 as well. We discussed the background and the mathematic deduction of the 
CLA, and the different data required by different definitions of the SSNIP in Chapter 3. We also 
analyzed some of the incorrect criticisms of the CLA and discussed the limitation of the CLA in 
Chapter 3 as well. In Chapter 4, we proposed a method to define the relevant market based on the 
substitutability. We first introduced the background and the rationality of using quantified 
substitutability as the standard of market definition. We then discussed the data collection and the 
practibility of the models. We conclude Chapter 4 with two example of applying the model we 
proposed to define the relevant product market. The Chapter 5 is the conclusion. 
!11
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Chapter 2: Background of the 
Study 
2. 1 The laws 
Antitrust law seeks to maintain market competition by regulating anti-competitive conduct by 
market participants. Since Sherman Act was enacted in 1890, the United States antitrust law has 
been the trend-leader of the world’s competition law for more than a hundred years. In the 
United States, the federal antitrust laws consist of statutory provisions including Sections 1 and 2 
of the Sherman Act, Section 7 of the Clayton Act, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act. 
The Sherman Antitrust Act was passed by the United States Congress in 1890 is the world’s first 
competition law statute. Congress passed the law as a "comprehensive charter of economic 
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade” . “The antitrust 1
laws proscribe unlawful mergers and business practices in general terms, leaving courts to decide 
which ones are illegal based on the facts of each case.”  Since 1890, the goal of U.S. Antitrust 2
law has been “to protect the process of competition for the benefit of consumers, making sure 
 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 514, 2 L. Ed. 2d 545 (1958).1
 Federal Trade Commission, Guide to Antitrust Laws – The Antitrust Laws, (Dec. 20, 2016, 7:23 PM), 2
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws, url.
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there are strong incentives for businesses to operate efficiently, keep prices down, and keep 
quality up”  3
In 1914, Congress created the Federal Trade Commission by the Federal Trade Commission Act 
and the Clayton Act. The Section 7 of Clayton Antitrust Act sought to prevent anticompetitive 
practices in their incipiency. “To block a merger, the agency must convince a court that the 
merger’s effect [‘]may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
[’]”  This act prohibits a merger if it “in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting 4
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to 
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”  The Hart–Scott–Rodino Antitrust 5
Improvements Act supplemented the Clayton Antitrust Act and stipulated the parties of 
acquisitions which can possibly lessen the competition in its relevant market shall file 
notifications to Federal Trade Commission or the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice pursuant to the requirement of the act thereof . It 6
also sets up threshold for mergers to be reviewed. The threshold is revised annually based on the 
gross national product. 
 id.3
 Federal Antitrust Act (Clayton Act), 63 P.L. 212, 38 Stat. 730, 63 Cong. Ch. 323 (1914).4
 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 1 Overview, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice 5
(2010).
 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 2000, 146 Cong Rec S 10848 (2000).6
!13
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Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act declares unfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are 
unlawful. Meanwhile, it sets the power to prohibit unfair practice and the scope of business 
under that power. 
This dissertation discusses antitrust under the realm of anticompetitive mergers prohibited by 
Section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act. The prohibition results from potential anticompetitive 
effect of a merger, which leads to an inherent need for prediction in the execution of the law. As 
the congress intended, the merger enforcement should “interdict competitive problems in their 
incipiency and that certainty about anticompetitive effect is seldom possible and not required for 
a merger to be illegal.” This makes antitrust premerger investigation a very special field of law, 
contradicting the ex post relief nature of law. 
One of the most important amendment of Clayton Act Section 7 is the Clayton Act Amendments 
1950 (Celler-Kefauver Act). In this amendment the Congress broadened the scope of mergers by 
adding stock acquisition and assets acquisition consideration. Section 8 of the Clayton Act added 
a situation when dealing with people who are directors of both companies that are merging. The 
statute also set up a monetary threshold for review. The threshold value is usually in accordance 
with the threshold set in the Hart–Scott–Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act. The value is set by 
the Federal Trade Commission. 
!14
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“[I]t is highly disruptive to [‘]unscramble the eggs[’] by separating two firms after they have 
joined, merger review is usually prospective.”  Thus, premerger investigation borrows predictive 7
tools from economics and statistics to analyze what will likely happen if a merger proceeds as 
compared to what will likely happen if it does not. 
 Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to 7
Market Definition (unpublished)
!15
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2. 2 The horizontal Merger Guidelines 
Since economic analysis has rationalized the antitrust policies a century ago, quantitative 
analysis has consistently been in symbiosis with antitrust practice. A lot of questions under 
antitrust were analyzed by econometric models under interdisciplinary research. At the same 
time, the court also adopted some of the approaches in academia. To make merger analytical 
techniques more transparent to the public, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission (the “Agencies”) promulgated the first Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 1968. The 
Merger Guidelines were revised for several times, with the most recent version released in 
August 19, 2010.  
The current Merger Guidelines “reflect the ongoing accumulation of experience at the Agencies” 
They are used to clarify existing policy and to reflect new learning in premerger investigation. 8
While the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued in 1992 was replaced by the current one, and 
thus are no longer effective, “[t]he Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by 
the Agencies in 2006 remains a valuable supplement”  to the current guidelines. In contrast with 9
Section 7 of Clayton Act, and the precedents in antitrust, the Guidelines are about the practical 
aspects of the merger review which are done by the Agencies before bringing a merger review 
suit to the court. Two aspects of impact are considered by the Agencies at this stage. They are 
“unilateral effects” and “coordinated effects”. 
 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Footnote 1, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice (2010).8
 id9
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“A picture worths a thousand words.” Before we go further about the unilateral effects and the 
coordinated effects, we provided a figure (Figure 1) to describe the relations between all the 
quantitative models in antitrust premerger investigations.  
!17
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2.2.1 Unilateral Effects and Merger Simulation Models 
Though the Guidelines did not specify the definition of unilateral effect, there are a lot 
definitions we can find in academic scholarship. In “Vertical restraints and the effects of 
upstream horizontal mergers” written by Froeb, Tschantz and Werden in 2007, defines it as 
“effects of a change in the merging firms’ incentives, holding fixed other firms’ reaction 
functions.”  The unilateral effect has been defined more narrowly in many other papers. For 10
example, Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro defined unilateral effect as the effect which will arise 
“if the merger would give the merged entity a unilateral incentive to raise prices (or otherwise 
harm consumers).”  Jonathan Baker and David Reitman defined it as “effects within a static 11
oligopoly model.”   12
The first definition is the most consistent one to the Guidelines. We summarized the Guidelines' 
content and defined the unilateral effects as the possible effect of a merger caused by the merging 
companies alone (without the reaction of the other market participants). In other words, 
unilateral effects are the predicted effects caused by the possible further actions of the merging 
companies, under the condition that all the other market participant keep acting like the status 
quo. Besides unilateral effects on price, the Guidelines also discuss the unilateral effects on 
 Luke Froeb, Steven Tschantz, and Gregory J. Werden, Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream 10
Horizontal Mergers, Contribution to Economic Analysis 282, 369-381 (2007).
 Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to 11
Market Definition, BE J. Theor. Econ. 10, 1-41 (2010).
 Jonathan B. Baker & David Reitman, Research Topics in Unilateral Effects Analysis, Research 12
Handbook on the Economics of Antitrust Law (2009).
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diminishing innovation and reducing product variety, which are neither limited to oligopoly 
situation or effects on price. Therefore a boarder definition is what the Guidelines are intended. 
The Agencies consider more aspects of the unilateral effect than merely the increase in price. 
However, the unilateral effect on price is the primary outcome of merger simulations. Merger 
simulation used to assess the price increase after the merger. Merger Simulation is based on 
several game theoretic models. In most cases, the simulation is about the manufacturers of 
differentiated products changing the product price according to the cost, price-demand relations 
and the other participants’ reaction to their pricing strategy. As a result, a Bertrand oligopoly 
model  is used (market form of oligopoly is assumed). Antitrust Logit Model  (ALM) is one of 13 14
the variations among the Bertrand Oligopoly Model. It uses a Logit regression model to “predict 
price and welfare effects of horizontal merger in differentiated product industries” . We will 15
discuss more about the Logit demand model in the next chapter  since it is also used in 16
assessing the actual loss in Critical Loss Analysis. The Bertrand model is the most widely used 
merger simulation model. Analyzing a merger with a Bertrand oligopoly model requires the 
following steps: 
 The Bertrand oligopoly model is a model derived from the Bertrand duopoly model. The classic 13
Bertrand duopoly model uses price as the variable and calculates the manufacturers' equilibrium price 
when the demand changes along with the price as the demand function suggests. Different demand 
function applied to the Bertrand model will result in different equilibriums. The MLA use a Logit demand 
model within a framework of Bertrand oligopoly model.
 Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb. The Antitrust Logit Model for Predicting Unilateral Competitive 14
Effects, Antitrust L.J. 70, 257 (2002).
 Gregory J. Werden, Luke M. Froeb, & Timothy J. Tardiff, The Use of the Logit Model in Applied 15
Industrial Organization, Int. J. Econ. Bus. 3.1, 83-105 (1996).
 See, Section 2.4.2 Logit Demand Model16
!19
A New Solution to Market Definition                                  
1. Collect High Frequency Purchase data collected from cashers of retailers (the retail profit 
will be deducted from the selling price), manufacturer’s cost data, consumer behavior 
and preference survey data and other data related to the analysis. 
2. Decide the type of demand estimation model being used. It depends on the availability of 
data and the state of the market. In fact, the Agencies will not only use one demand 
model. Although in each simulation only one model can be used, the Agencies will 
conduct the merger simulation with different demand curves, and assess the unilateral 
effect considering all the results. Figure 2  is an example which compares the trace of 17
equilibrium price calculated by different demand curves. The demand curve also involves 
the calculation of actual loss in Critical Loss Analysis; therefore we will discuss further 
about it in Chapter Two.  
 Gregory J. Werden, Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers I: Basic Concepts and 17
Models, Issues in Competition Law and Policy (2010).
!20
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3. Apply the manufacturer’s cost data into the viable cost function and fixed cost function. 
Combine the two functions to deduct a cost function using demand as the independent 
variable. 
4. Use the Bertrand Model to model the price-profit relation. If we set product i’s price as 
Pi ; the vector of prices for its competitors is P-i , the demand of product i’s product is 
Di(Pi, P-i). Therefore the cost of brand i’s production is Ci(Di(Pi, P-i)). Profit of product i 
∏ᴵ will be as shown in Equation 1. 
∏ᴵ(Pi, P-i) = Pi ‧ Di(Pi, P-i) - Ci( Di(Pi, P-i) ) 
Equation 1 
5. Use Equation 1 to calculate the equilibrium price Pi*. The equilibrium will be the place 
where the ∏ᴵ gets its maximum value. Therefore the equilibrium condition will be as 
shown in Equation 2.  
Equation 2 
In the situation where the products are homogeneous or can be regarded as homogeneous (utility 
supply, for example), the products has full elasticity. In this case, the manufacturers can only 
change supply amount to influence the market price and use an upward sloping price-quantity 
!21
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pairs to decide the best strategic quantity ; hence a Cournot and supply function model  is 1819 20
used. In this model, the merger simulation will calculate the equilibrium supply and use the price 
at the equilibrium supply as the effect of the merger. 
The first three steps of performing a Cournot and supply function model will be similar with the 
first three steps to perform a Bertrand model during Merger Simulation, except that in the second 
step we use supply and price function instead of using demand forms. In step 4, we will use a 
different profit function. Here, ∏ᴵ is still the profit of product i. The quantity produced will be qᵢ. 
Therefore the cost function will be Cᵢ(qᵢ) The aggregated production quantity of all the 
homogeneous products like product i is Q. Here, an inverse demand-price function is used. The 
price of the homogeneous products as well as product i is P = D(Q). Thus, we get the profit 
function of this industry as shown in Equation 3. 
∏ᴵ(qᵢ, Q) = qᵢ ‧ P - Cᵢ(qᵢ) = qᵢ ‧ D(Q) - Cᵢ(qᵢ)
Equation 3 
Therefore, the Nash, non-cooperative equilibrium quantity qᵢ can be calculated using Equation 4, 
which maximizes the value of ∏ᴵ. 
 De Maa, Jan, and Gijsbert Zwart, Modeling the electricity market: Nuon-Reliant (2005).18
 Peter A. G. van Bergeijk and Erik Kloosterhuis (eds.), Modeling European Mergers, Theory, 19
Competition Policy and Case Studies, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 150-171 (2005).
 The Cournot and supply function model is a model derives from the Cournot competition model. The 20
classic Cournot competition model uses quantity produced as the variable and calculates the 
manufacturers' equilibrium quantity when the price changes along with the demand as the demand 
function suggests.
!22
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Equation 4 
The Bertrand model and Cournot model mentioned above are in their basic forms. The Agencies 
calibrate them to achieve a better simulation result of the merger according to other data 
collected from the companies and from customer survey. There are also a few papers in academia 
further discussing their application in merger . 212223
There are other industries where the price is decided neither by the amount of supply nor by 
having homogeneous products. Industries fitting the assumptions of the auction model , like the 24
ones involving one-on-one negotiation to decide a personalized service/project or the ones 
involving pure auctions like government procurement, are examples of these. “In many 
industries, especially those involving intermediate goods and services, buyers and sellers 
negotiate to determine prices and other terms of trade. In that process, buyers commonly 
negotiate with more than one seller, and may play sellers off against one another… A merger 
between two competing sellers prevents buyers from playing those sellers off against each other 
in negotiations.”   25
 Daniel F. Spulber, Bertrand Competition When Rivals’ Costs are Unknown, J. Ind. Econ. 43, 1-11 21
(1995).
 Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: 22
Logit Demand and Merger Policy, J. Law Econ. Organ. 407-426 (1994).
 Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, The Entry-Inducing Effects of Horizontal Mergers: An 23
Exploratory Analysis, J. Ind. Econ. 46, 525-543 (1998).
 An auction model is a game where the players are the buyers and the sellers. The bidders place their 24
bids based on certain functions. The utility is the payoff and it follows certain functions as well. The 
players aim at maximizing the utility and place bit according to their best interest. The seller sets up the 
rules to maximize the buyers' bid amount.
 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 6.2 Bargain and Auctions, Washington, D.C.: U.S. 25
Dept. of Justice (2010).
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Buyers’ playing off the sellers is a major way to keep price low in those industries, because the 
negotiation and personalized plan will incur significant cost. Only the “winner” of the auction 
can avoid the loss. Therefore, there is also a strong incentive for the sellers to keep the service/
project price as low as possible and the service/project as attractive as possible. However, this 
also creates a strong incentive to coordinate. The paper “Collusion in second price auctions with 
heterogeneous bidders”  has shown that even when the bidders are heterogeneous, the bidder’s 26
net payoff from participating in collusion is surely positive and independent from the bidder’s 
valuation. Therefore, from the perspective of coordinate effect, since the auction market usually 
will not have a large number of suppliers, a merger can incur a significant increase in market 
concentration and risk of coordination. From the perspective of unilateral effect, a bidder’s net 
payoff means a decrease in the consumer surplus. The Guidelines comment accordingly that 
“[T]his alone can significantly enhance the ability and incentive of the merged entity to obtain a 
result more favorable to it, and less favorable to the buyer, than the merging firms would have 
offered separately absent the merger.”  27
According to different market rules, the auction model being applied varies from ascending oral 
auction model, sealed-bid auction model, second-price auction model, etc. The idea of an auction 
model  is  different  from the earlier  two.  In the auction model,  we assume the probability of 
winning an auction with different prices follows a certain distribution plus error. Therefore with 
 George J. Mailath & Peter Zemsky, Collusion in Second Price Auctions with Heterogenous Bidders, 26
Games Econ. Behav. 3, 467-486 (1991).
 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 6.2 Bargain and Auctions, Washington, D.C.: U.S. 27
Dept. of Justice (2010).
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the company cost and profit from the auction, we can assess the winning probability and price of 
market participants according to the distribution, and calculate the price change before and after 
the merger.
Extreme value distribution is often used in computing the winning probabilities and price. For 
example,  Froeb,  Tschantz  and  Crooke’s  paper  “Mergers  among asymmetric  bidders:  a  logit 
second-price auction model”  used extreme value distribution to predict  a  bidder’s  winning 28
probability and winning price. It used a logit model to estimate the location parameter 𝛈 of the 
distribution  and  a  minimum  distance  estimator  to  recover  the  unknown  parameters  in  the 
distribution, like the scale parameter. With the estimation of the winning probability and price of 
both merging parties, we can estimate their expected value of profit from the auction. We can 
also do the same to assess the expected profit of the merged entity. By comparing the price when 
the maximum expected profit happens before after the merger, we will know the effect of the 
merger on auction product’s price. In “Mergers among bidders with correlated values”  and 29
“The effects of mergers in open-auction markets” , accumulative distribution function is also 30
used in analyzing the winning price and probability in auction models.
 Luke Froeb, Steven Tschantz, & Philip Crooke, Merger Among Asymmetric Bidders: A Logit Second-28
Price Auction Model (1998).
 Luke Froeb & Steven Tschantz, Mergers Among Bidders with Correlated Values, Contrib. Econ. 29
Analysis 255, 31-44 (2002).
 Keith Waehrer & Martin K. Perry, The Effects of Mergers in Open-Auction Markets, RAND J. Econ. 30
287-304 (2003).
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For more details about unilateral effect calculation, see Werden and Froeb’s 2010 paper, 
“Unilateral competitive effects of horizontal mergers I: Basic concepts and models” , and 31
Budzinski and Ruhmer’s 2009 paper “Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey” . 32
Both papers provide clear and detailed merger simulation methods and examples.  
 Gregory J. Werden, Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers I: Basic Concepts and 31
Models, Issues in Competition Law and Policy (2010).
 Oliver Budzinki & Isabel Ruhmer, Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey, J. Compet. Law 32
Econ. 6, 277-319 (2009).
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2.2.2 Unilateral Effects and the UPP test 
The Upward Pricing Pressure Test (UPP) was first proposed by Farrell and Shaprio in their 
paper, “Antitrust evaluation of horizontal mergers: An economic alternative to market 
definition” . It is claimed to be “practical, more transparent, and better grounded in economics 33
than are concentration-based methods” . UPP is designed as a simplified screen to find mergers 34
to be further reviewed based on the theory of unilateral effect in a heterogeneous product market. 
“In the pure form of our test, a merger is flagged for further scrutiny if the net effect of the two 
forces creates upward pricing pressure.”  35
The UPP model compares two forces caused by a merger. One is the “Upward Pricing Pressure”. 
The other is the “Downward Pricing Pressure”. The loss of direct competition between the 
merging parties will definitely create a unilateral effect and cause price increase if the merging 
party’s products are substitute of each other . Therefore, the merger will create an upward 36
pricing pressure. On the other hand, the merger might also decrease marginal cost as a result of 
scale effect and other efficiency considerations, therefore there is also a downward pricing 
pressure. The UPP test assumes the existence of the efficiency. Although there are works in 
 Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to 33
Market Definition, BE J. Theor. Econ. 10, 1-41 (2010).
 id.34
 id.35
 Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition, 36
RAND J. Econ. 16, 473-486 (1985).
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academia questioning the existence of efficiency . The existence of efficiency is a generally 3738
accepted assumption. 
To be specific, in order to calculate the Upward Pricing Pressure, the UPP test uses demand 
models to calculate diversion ratio. It then uses diversion ratio, product price and gross marginal 
cost of the none price increasing product to calculate the Upward Pricing Pressure. The diversion 
ratio is “the fraction of unit sales lost by the first product due to an increase in its price that 
would be diverted to the second product.”  In our context, it’s the ratio between the sale diverted 39
to another product and the total sale loss of one price-raising product. It was first proposed in the 
paper “Mergers with differentiated products”  and has been widely used in Antitrust premerger 40
investigation models. To calculate the Downward Pricing Pressure, it uses demand elasticity and 
gross marginal cost of the price increasing product. The net Upward Pricing Pressure is the 
difference between the Upward Pricing Pressure and the Downward Pricing Pressure. 
Set the diversion ratio from product 1 to product 2 as D₁₂. Set the price of product 1 as P₁ and 
the price of product 2 as P₂. Set the price elasticity of product 1 as E₁. In the final function 
produced by the paper, all the price and cost are price and cost before the merger. The function to 
calculate net UPP is shown in Equation 5. 
 L. H. Roller, J. Stennek & E. Verboven, Efficiency Gains from Mergers (2006).37
 E Ilzkovitz and R. Meiklejohn (eds.), European Merger Control: Do We N1eed an Eficiency Defense, 38
Chapter 4 (2006).
 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 6 Unilateral Effects, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of 39
Justice (2010).
 Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, Antitrust 10, 23 (1995).40
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UPP₁ = D₁₂(P̅₂ - C̅₂) - E₁C̅₁ 
Equation 5 
“A merger between firms selling differentiated products may diminish competition by enabling 
the merged firm to profit by unilaterally raising the price of one or both products above the pre-
merger level.”  The theory behind UPP test is based on the fact that if the merging companies 41
are selling substitutive product of each other, the price increase of one product will “divert” a 
part of its sale to the other merging company. If the two products are close substitutes or they 
together are relatively more different from the other products (hence a big quantity of sale will be 
diverted to the other merging party), the price increase is likely to be profitable. Therefore the 
merged company will have an incentive to increase product price. 
Regarding the Downward Pricing Pressure, since there are various forms of efficiency effect, the 
UPP test therefore is not fixed with the Downward Pricing Pressure factor, i.e., the product of E₁ 
and C̅₁. This form is determined according to the most usual form of efficiency, the decrease in 
production cost. However, some of the products have fixed marginal cost. In those cases, the 
efficiency might result in increase of quantity or product quality. The UPP paper did not discuss 
much about this. 
 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 6.1 Pricing of Differentiated Products, Washington, 41
D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice (2010).
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Like all the other models calculating unilateral effects, the UPP test is a non-structural way to 
investigate the anticompetitive effect of a merger. According to the Merger Guidelines, when it 
comes to the unilateral effect, the Agencies will give more weight to the UPP test than the HHI, 
which will be discussed later in this chapter and in depth in Chapter 4. Since it is not a structural 
approach, it does not rely on market definition to quantify market power. It is also less 
demanding in data than the Hypothetical Monopolist Test. Therefore, the authors claimed that it 
is better than the structural approach of market definition and market share. “This “structural 
presumption” drew on the then-dominant structure-conduct-performance paradigm in industrial 
organization, linking concentration to poor market performance. In recent decades, however, 
industrial organization scholars and the courts have been more apt to stress that high 
concentration can be compatible with vigorous competition and efficient market performance. 
Thus, while Philadelphia National Bank has never been overruled, the strength of its structural 
presumption has weakened over the past 30 years” . 42
However, the wide application of market definition approach is not only due to academic trend. 
As will be discussed in the next session, market definition is an important base of assessing 
coordinate effects. The fact that the non-structural approach is more discussed in industrial 
organizations academia in the past two decades is irrelevant to the choice of legal approach. The 
fruits of those discussions are all used in assessing the unilateral effects after all.  
 Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to 42
Market Definition, BE J. Theor. Econ. 10, 1-41 (2010).
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While most of the premerger investigation models are about price and pricing power, market 
power to a company means more than merely the power of pricing. Merger effect are not limited 
to power of pricing either, it involves the danger of coordination, suppression of entrance, 
discouragement to innovation, which are all relevant to the conclusion of market devision. In 
fact, more of the none quantitative approach done by the court are based on the market 
definition.  43
As will be discussed in depth in Chapter 3, there are a lot of problems in the current method of 
market definition. Since the antitrust academia has widely believed a market definition approach 
beyond a mere artificial “bright line” is not feasible, the methodology of market definition has 
not developed since the invention of Critical Loss Analysis . The work after it is mostly 44
discussing and debating about it . We will discuss this in detail in Chapter 3. However, the 454647
shortage of tools is not a reason why the market definition should not be done. As long as there is 
still a need for such market definition tools in litigation, we should continue improving it. 
 Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, Antitrust Law J. 74, 129-173 (2007).43
 Critical Loss Analysis uses a function to calculate the critical loss. When the price increases, the 44
quantity in demand will decrease. In most case, there will be a point where the decrease in sales is so 
large that the increase in price can no longer maintain profitable. The loss in sales at that point is the 
critical loss. The critical loss analysis compares the actual loss happens when the price increases by a 
SSNIP and the critical loss to determine if the company is going to profit from increasing the price.
 Kenneth L. Danger & H.E. Frech III, Critical Thinking about “Critical Loss” in Antitrust, The Antitrust 45
Bulletin 46, 339-355 (2001).
 Malcolm B. Coate & Joseph J. Simons, Critical Loss vs. Diversion Analysis: Clearing up the 46
Confusion, The CPI Antitrust Chronicle 1, 1-15 (2009).
 Malcolm B. Coate & Joseph J. Simons, Critical Loss v. Diversion Analysis: Another Attempt at 47
Consensus, The CPI Antitrust Journal 1, 1-8 (2010).
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This paper will propose a new way to perform market definition, which is data oriented and 
constant between cases. Since the conclusion is not case specific, we can also use the conclusion 
to set up the threshold of premerger investigation, so as to resolve another concern of the 
arbitrariness of the threshold and make premerger investigation more efficient. 
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2.2.3 Coordinate effect 
Summarizing the Guidelines, coordinate effect means the impact that a merger will cause by 
reducing the hardship or increasing the probability of collusion between the merged firm and its 
rivals after the merger. To be specific, according to the 2010 Guidelines, there are some 
situations where the Agencies need to be more careful about the coordinate effect. They are , 48
1. A market where the “competitively important firm’s significant competitive initiatives” 
can be observed by the competing firms within a relatively short period. 
2. A market where the participant’s “prospective competitive reward” from the consumers 
switching from their competitors will be significantly diminished by the competitor’s 
timely response. Meanwhile, the competitor is also likely to conduct a timely response.  
3. A market where the participants are having “small and frequent” transactions rather than 
“big and long-term” ones. 
4. A market where the participants are having a big stake in the status quo. 
If a market has fewer participants in it, the participants are more likely to observe and react 
according to each other’s action. Also, the participants will also be in relatively large scale, so the 
chance that they have large scale material purchase and sales is also higher. It is self evident that 
if a market has fewer participants, their stake in the status quo will be bigger. Therefore a 
coordinated effect tends to be stronger in a more concentrated market. 
 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 7.2 Evidence a Market is Vulnerable to Coordinated 48
Conduct, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice (2010).
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On the other hand, for the market where the competition is marked by “leapfrogging 
technological innovation" (the response from the other participants cannot significantly affect the 
acted company's interest), the coordinate effect is smaller while the efficiency brought by the 
merger might be more prominent. The Agencies will also take this into consideration. 
Meanwhile, the previous conduct will be considered as well. The Agencies believe that the if a 
high-market-share firm has previously engaged in express collusion, the firm’s merger is 
assumed to be conducive to coordinated interaction. 
The four situations listed all require market delineation to further the analysis. After delineating 
the market, the market share can be calculated, which is a strong indication of market power. The 
assumption of previous conduct also involves calculating the market share. Therefore, to assess 
the coordinate effect, we need to conduct market definition, and find relevant product market. 
This is the major difference between evaluation of coordinate effect and unilateral effect. In the 
following session and chapters, we are going to focus on discussion about market definition 
methodologies. 
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2.2.4 Market Definition and SSNIP test 
The concept of lessening competition was first established in 1948, in the landmark case U.S. v. 
Columbia Steel Co.  The Supreme Court held the steel fabricator to have not violated the 49
antitrust law, because the acquisition of the assets purchase did not unreasonably lessen 
competition or attempt to monopolize the market. 
The case Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S  decided in 1962 was the first merger case to emphasize the 50
concept of the relevant market and confirmed its importance in assessing the competition 
consequence of a merger. The Supreme Court held that “Determination of the relevant market is 
a necessary predicate to a finding of a violation of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 18, because the 
threatened monopoly must be one which will substantially lessen competition within the area of 
effective competition.”  The Supreme Court also decided on the standard of defining the 51
relevant market: based on “reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of 
demand”  between the merging product and the other substitutes. These two aspects have 52
heavily influenced the 1968 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, setting up the framework of the 
relevant market delineation. 
 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).49
 Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).50
 id.51
 id.52
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In Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court also defined submarkets within the product market, which 
may exist in the relevant market defined by interchangeability and cross-elasticity. The 
submarket is defined by “practical indicia” , such as:  53
1. industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity,  
2. the product's peculiar characteristics and uses,  
3. unique production facilities,  
4. distinct customers,  
5. distinct prices,  
6. sensitivity to price changes, 
7. specialized vendors. 
Submarkets will be considered in assessing marketing control and merger consequences. If a 
merger will be “substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly”  in a 54
submarket, it may also be enjoined. However, significantly controlling one aspect of practical 
indicia does not indicate the control of submarket. Like in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co. , 55
Coca-Cola’s involvement in behavior to control “distribution of fountain syrup by independent 
foodservice distributors” did not constitute a significant control to the relevant market. 
Therefore, it was allowed. Although defining a submarket is not necessarily quantitative, it is 
 id.53
 id.54
 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia - 641 F. Supp. 1128 55
(D.D.C. 1986).
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based on the delineation of relevant market. Therefore, market definition is an important and 
necessary component in merger review, even if there are other factors to be considered as well. 
One year after the Brown Shoe, in U.S. v. Philadelphia  National  Bank ,  based  on  the 56
congressional  concern  established  in  the  Celler-Kefauver  Amendments,  the  Supreme  Court 
announced the illegality of a merger which would have caused a significant increase in market 
concentration.  The Supreme Court held,  “[I]n certain cases, with elaborate proof of market 
structure, market behavior, or probable anticompetitive effects… [A] merger which produces a 
firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a significant 
increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition 
substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger 
is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects. ”  57
Since Section 7 of the Clayton Act stipulated that “an acquisition which may be substantially to 
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly shall be prohibited” , the question of how to 58
define an acquisition which fits the description above has been around for decades. This 
landmark cases developed an approach based on the relevant market theory. Following the cases, 
the DOJ established the first Horizontal Merger Guidelines. The 1968 Merger Guidelines, 
establishing the first standard of product market definition based essentially on product 
distinction and substitution. 
 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).56
 id.57
 Federal Antitrust Act (Clayton Act), 63 P.L. 212, 38 Stat. 730, 63 Cong. Ch. 323 (1914).58
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The definition of relevant product market in the 1968 Guidelines is a long and descriptive one. 
“The sales of any product or service which is distinguishable as a matter of commercial practice 
from other products or services will ordinarily constitute a relevant product market, even though, 
from the standpoint of most purchasers, other products may be reasonably, but not perfectly, 
interchangeable with it in terms of price, quality, and use. On the other hand, the sales of two 
distinct products to a particular group of purchasers can also appropriately be grouped into a 
single market where the two products are reasonably inter-changeable for that group in terms of 
price, quality, and use. In this latter case, however, it may be necessary also to include in that 
market the sales of one or more other products which are equally interchangeable with the two 
products in terms of price, quality, and use from the standpoint of that group of purchasers for 
whom the two products are interchangeable.”  Summarizing from this long definition, we find 59
that the market definition at that time is based on two things: 
1. Products in the relevant market should be relatively distinguishable from the products 
outside the relevant market. 
2. Products are reasonably inter-changeable in terms of price, quality, and use from the 
perspective of a group of purchaser. 
The 1968 Guidelines definition was established right after the landmark cases establishing the 
concept of market definition and market control. Compared to the market definition in the 1982 
Guidelines, the one in the 1968 Guidelines is the closest to the definition by the Supreme Court. 
 The 1968 Merger Guidelines, Section 3 Market Definition, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice 59
(1968).
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The idea of “reasonable interchangeability” was first brought up by the Supreme Court in case 
“United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.” in 1956. The Supreme Court commented, 
“[t]he market which one must study to determine when a producer has monopoly power will 
vary with the part of commerce under consideration. The tests are constant. That market is 
composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are 
produced -- price, use and qualities considered.”  In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the 60
Supreme Court held, “[t]he outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the 
reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself 
and substitutes for it.”  The definition in 1968 Guidelines is consistent with the precedents with 61
regard to the application of interchangeability in price, quality, and use. Meanwhile, it is also a 
natural deduction from the concepts of market competition and price mechanism. We are going 
to discuss about this in Chapter 4. 
However, the 1968 definition was widely criticized because of its impossibility in 
quantification . As a result,  the  Merger  Guidelines  of  1982  established  the  Hypothetical 62
Monopolist  Test,  i.e.,  the  SSNIP test  (the  test  of  a  “small  but  significant  and non-transitory 
increase in price”). The DOJ explained in the reprint of the Guidelines that “[t]he logic of this 
approach is that such a group of producers, if they are able to coordinate their behavior, have the 
 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).60
 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).61
 Thomas E. Kauper, The Goals of United States Antitrust Policy-The Current Debate, Zeitschrift für die 62
gesamte Staatswissenschaft/J. Inst. Theor. Econ. H. 3, 408-434 (1980).
!39
A New Solution to Market Definition                                  
joint ability and incentive to lessen compensation and raise prices. By contrast, a proper subset of 
these producers would not have this ability.”  This “logic” is unfortunately not that logical. In 63
the  Hypothetical  Monopolist  Test,  working  with  a  small  but  significant  and  non-transitory 
increase in price can only partially prove that the manufacturers have the incentive to coordinate. 
This test is irrelevant with whether they are capable of doing so or not. We will discuss more 
about this in Chapter 3.
Summarizing the Guidelines , the common approach of Hypothetical Monopolist Test with a 64
SSNIP is as follows.
1. The Agencies will define an as-small-as-possible relevant market containing at least one 
product sold by one of the merging firms, then the Agencies assume that there is only one 
hypothetical firm who is “the only present and future seller of the products” in that relevant 
market. 
2. The Agencies assume that the firm is profit-maximizing, and it will impose a five to ten 
percent increase on product price (a small but significant and non-transitory increase in 
price, SSNIP). 
3. If after the increase, there are too many sales shifted to the product outside the control of the 
hypothetical monopolist, the price increase is not profitable, i.e., relevant market is too small. 
 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines § 2.0. reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4491 et 63
seq. (1984).
 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 4.3 Implementing the Hypothetical Monopolist Test, 64
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice (2010).
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In this scenario, the Agencies will bring the closest substitute product into the relevant 
market and test again. 
4. After adding the new product under the control of the hypothetical firm, the firm will be the 
only supplier and so conduct a SSNIP again. The Agencies will see whether the new firm’s 
SSNIP will be profitable… 
5. This process will be repeated until the price increase is profitable. The products under 
control of the hypothetical monopolist consists the relevant market that the Agencies will 
use. The process above is also know as the SSNIP test. 
It is worthy to mention that the Guidelines did not specify whether the price increase is imposed 
on all the product under control of the monopolist or just one or several product under control. 
This will be discussed in depth in Chapter two. 
The SSNIP test is used to identify a set of products that are reasonably interchangeable with a 
product sold by one of the merging firms. According to the Guidelines, after the market boundary 
is delineated, the Agencies will analyze the impact of the merger on product price in the relevant 
market with specific information of each merger, based on the result of the Hypothetical 
Monopolist Test. The SSNIP test solved the problem in the earlier market definition that the 
interchangeability is not quantifiable—whether the SSNIP is profitable is highly correlated to 
interchangeability, and it’s quantifiable. However, the SSNIP test is only a theoretical 
framework. It did not address how to determine whether the SSNIP is profitable quantitatively. 
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“The Guidelines have been harshly criticized for this omission, with some critics contending that 
such an omission makes the Guidelines unworkable in practice.”  65
As a resolution of this defect, “[w]hen the necessary data are available, the Agencies also may 
consider a [‘]critical loss analysis[’] to assess the extent to which it corroborates inferences 
drawn from the evidence noted above” . When the data is not available, the Agencies will 66
conduct a conceptual analysis to analyze the pertinent evidence and determine whether the 
merger will substantially lessen competition. Although the wording in the Guidelines is “may 
consider”, the critical loss analysis is actually the only quantitative way available to determine 
whether the price increase will be profitable for the hypothetical monopolist, i.e., the only way to 
set up a bright line on market definition and make the Hypothetical Monopolist Test work in a 
less arbitrary way. 
The Critical Loss Analysis asks “whether imposing at least a SSNIP on one or more products in a 
candidate market would raise or lower the hypothetical monopolist’s profits.”  The theorem of 67
Critical Loss Analysis is based on the idea that a price increase will incur loss of sales, while in a 
non-perfect competition market (which is usually the case) some customers will stay. Thus, thus 
if there are more customers staying after the SSNIP, the SSNIP is still profitable. The critical loss 
is defined as the decrease of the number of the unit sale for which the profit remains unchanged. 
 Barry C. Harris & Joseph J. Simons, Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is Necessary, 65
J. Reprints Antitrust L. & Econ. 21, 151-172 (1991).
 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 4.1.3 Implementing the Hypothetical Monopolist Test, 66
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice (2010).
 id.67
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The predicted loss is defined as the decrease in the unit sale after the SSNIP. In the paper first 
proposing the Critical Loss Analysis , it is called the “Actual Loss”. Therefore, if the Actual 68
Loss is less than the Critical Loss, the SSNIP will be profitable. That’s the point where the 
Hypothetical Monopolist Test stops adding new products into the relevant market. 
As was mentioned in the earlier session, Critical Loss Analysis received a lot of criticism in the 
pasts few decades. Despite the criticism, the Critical Loss Analysis was adopted by the 2010 
Merger Guidelines, and become the only quantitative model mentioned in the Guidelines to 
assess the coordinate effects. We are going to explore the Critical Loss Analysis in great details 
in the Chapter 3. We are also going to establish new methodologies to define a relevant market in 
Chapter 4, which can hopefully be a supplement or a substitution of the SSNIP hypothetical 
monopolist test combined with the Critical Loss Analysis. 
It is worth noting that, according to the Guidelines, firms who are considered as “rapid entrants” 
will be regarded as market participants as well as all the firms currently earn revenues in the 
relevant market . Whether a firm will be considered as rapid entrants are based on the 69
commitment of entrance, sunk cost of switching production, possibility of switching geographic 
market to enter, possibility of switching target customers, possession of necessary asset to supply 
into the relevant market, and possession of idle or “swing” capacity which can produce products 
in the relevant market. All those aspects will be considered by the Agencies, and their approach 
 Barry C. Harris & Joseph J. Simons, Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is Necessary, 68
J. Reprints Antitrust L. & Econ. 21, 151-172 (1991).
 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 9. Entry: Timeliness, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice 69
(2010).
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cannot be conducted without the market definition. Therefore, again, it is important to delineate 
the market. Even if the UPP and the merger simulations can predict the post-merger price effect, 
the analysis in Unilateral Effects cannot replace the analysis which is based on the market 
definition. 
A geographic market means “the geography limits some customer[s’] willingness or ability to 
substitute to some products, or some supplier[s’] willingness or ability to serve some 
customers” . If a geographic market exists, the Agencies will examine the market power of the 70
merging firms in a relevant market defined with a geographic dimension and a product 
dimension. In case Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court held, “[t]he criteria to be 
used in determining the appropriate geographic market are essentially similar to those used to 
determine the relevant product market. … Congress prescribed a pragmatic, factual approach to 
the definition of the relevant market and not a formal, legalistic one. The geographic market 
selected must, therefore, both correspond to the commercial realities of the industry and be 
economically significant.”  Therefore, we believe our discussion in relevant product market 71
definition will also be helpful in defining the geographic market. 
2.2.5 Market concentration and HHI 
After we have achieved the conclusion about the market definition, we can calculate Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure the level of concentration in the relevant market before and 
 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 4.2 Geographic Market Definition, Washington, D.C.: U.S. 70
Dept. of Justice (2010).
 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 296, 82 S. Ct. 1502, 1508, 8 L. Ed. 2d 510, 519, 1962 71
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2290, *1, 1962 Trade Cas. (CCH) P70,366 (1962).
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after the merger, so as to assess the effect of the merger on the level of competition. HHI was 
established by the Agencies in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of 2010. “Market shares may be 
based on dollar sales, units sold, capacity, or other measures that reflect the competitive impact 
of each firm in the market.”  HHI measures the overall level of competition in the relevant 72
market. 
The HHI is the sum of the squares of the market share of all the current market participants in the 
relevant market. Therefore, as was mentioned above, HHI is dependent on market definition, i.e., 
for now it depends on a result of the Hypothetical Monopolist Test. It is worth mentioning that 
HHI and the standard applied with HHI are not the only analysis done with the relevant market 
conclusion, even though it is the only further quantitative step following the market definition. 
The court will also consider factors other than market concentration about the coordinate effects 
based on the conclusion of the market definition. 
The Agencies will consider both the post-merger HHI and the increase in HHI resulting from the 
merger. Based on the Agencies’ experience, they classify market into three types: a market in 
which HHI is below 1500 is an Unconcentrated Market; a market which HHI is above 1500 and 
below 2500 is a Moderately Concentrated Market; and a market whose HHI is above 2500 is a 
Highly Concentrated Market. 
 Federal Trade Commission, Mergers – Competitive Effects, Federal Trade Commission (Dec. 21, 2018, 72
12:38 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers/
competitive-effects, url.
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The Agencies use HHI as a preselective method of mergers which require further investigation. A 
small change in concentration (defined as increase of HHI less than 100 points) or mergers 
occurring in an unconcentrated market does not require further analysis. A merger occurring in a 
moderately concentrated market causing an increase of more than 100 points in HHI or a merger 
occurring in a highly concentrated market causing an increase between 100 and 200 points in 
HHI “raises significant competitive concerns and often warrant scrutiny” . A merger that occurs 73
in a highly concentrated market causing an increase in HHI of more than 200 points “will be 
presumed to be likely to enhance market power” , while this presumption is rebuttable.  74
The Agencies use HHI to examine whether a merger is unlikely to raise anticompetitive concerns 
so the Agencies can focus on the ones do raise that concern. Thus, the HHI is not intended to be a 
final say of whether a merger will be permitted or not. The HHI is not perfect, especially so since 
its thresholds are only based on a rule of thumb. In fact, according to the quality of the market 
shares they can very well fit the logarithmic normal distribution: thus the log of the market 
shares, if squared, will fit chi-square distribution. Since we have the distribution, we can have a 
more scientific discussion about the thresholds. 
Although the HHI can very well reflect how concentrated the market is, market concentration is 
only a reflection of the competition level. The Agencies are aware of that so they clarified in the 
Guidelines that high concentration of the market does not necessarily mean a less competitive 
The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 5.3 Market Concentration, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of 73
Justice (2010).
 id.74
!46
A New Solution to Market Definition                                  
market. The Merger Guidelines talk about some qualitative rules in deciding this, while they do 
not address any model which can directly quantify the competition itself. In academia, there are 
some other models to quantify the competition of a market, like the Panzar-Rosse Model  and 75
Status Based model . On the other hand, HHI does not directly quantify the level of pricing 76
power. Therefore, the threshold of HHI increase set by the merger guidelines is arbitrarily. HHI is 
purely indicating the general structure of the market. 
However random as it seems to be, we may regard it as following the Chi-square distribution. 
There is a paper A probabilistic approach of Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) to determine 
possibility of market power acquisition , which discussed “the probability of any market 77
participant acquiring market power” and “a trend for this probability with the changes of HHI” 
based on the assumption above. 
 Jacob A. Bikker, Sherrill Shaffer, & Laura Spierdijk, Assessing Competition with the Panzar-Rosse 75
Model: The Role of Scale, Costs, and Equilibrium, Rev. Econ. Stat. 94, 1025-1044 (2012).
 Joel M. Podolny, A Status-Based Model of Market Competition, Am. J. Sociol. 98, 829-872 (1993).76
 Anil Kanagala et al, A Probabilistic Approach of Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) to Determine 77
Possibility of Market Power Acquisition, IEEE PES Power Systems Conference and Exposition (2004).
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2.2.6 Limitations of the models in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
As we have mentioned for several times, none of the models used in premerger investigation is 
absolutely outcome determinative. Although “throughout the history of U.S. antitrust litigation, 
the outcome of more cases has surely turned on market definition than on any other substantive 
issue” , neither HHI nor the other aspects in coordinated effects can decide the result of a 78
merger review by itself. With regard to the unilateral effects, the merger simulations are not 
outcome determinative either. “The Agencies do not treat merger simulation evidence as 
conclusive in itself, and they place more weight on whether their merger simulations consistently 
predict substantial price increases than on the precise prediction of any single simulation.”  79
Apart from the coordinated effect and the unilateral effect, the Merger Guidelines also talk about 
powerful buyers, entry, efficiencies, and other aspects considered about a merger in a permerger 
investigation. All of them will be considered by the Agencies when deciding whether to submit a 
merger review to the court or not. The court will also consider all the related aspects to decide 
whether to approve a merger or not. 
The Guidelines also emphasiz that the methodology suggested in the Guideline is not a uniform 
application . The investigation is based on fact-specific processes, which is decided by the 80
 Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, Antitrust Law J. 74, 129-173 (2007).78
 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 6.1 Pricing of Differentiated Products, Washington, 79
D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice (2010).
 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 1. Overview, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice 80
(2010).
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nature of the cases. Therefore, we believe that even though our model cannot replace the 
traditional approach, our model can still be a supplement to the traditional approach and help the 
premerger investigation. 
Like the Guideline models, the methodologies proposed in this dissertation will not apply to all 
the cases that can be encountered in mergers either (for example, it cannot be applied in to assess 
the geographic market). However, the nature of our model is such that it can be applied to a 
nationwide market without losing its integrity in “artificial” assumptions. This advantage 
supplements the shortcoming of the SSNIP test that it cannot be extended into a larger market 
without assuming the nationwide market follows from the pattern of behavior of the market 
where the SSNIP is performed in (since the cashier data used to calculate the elasticity is 
collected from some specific states). We will discuss more about the limitation of our models in 
Chapter 4. 
Additionally, as the name suggests, all the Horizontal Merger Guidelines do not give guidance in 
vertical mergers or any other types of non-horizontal mergers even though horizontal mergers are 
not the only type of merger which raises a concern of lessened market competition. While this 
dissertation will only discuss methodology in horizontal mergers, similar technology might also 
be capable of solving problems in non-horizontal mergers, if proper changes are made 
accordingly. 
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As suggested in the Merger Guidelines, the Guidelines are not intended to dictate or exhaust the 
range of evidence to be introduced in litigation. Thus we believe the new methodology proposed 
in the following chapters can be helpful in the investigation and litigation. Correspondingly, the 
new kinds of data required in the proposed methodology can also be acquired by the Agencies 
from the participants of the market in issue. In fact, the data used by our model can be collected 
from the general information of the market participants and from surveys. A survey is a 
traditional method used in merger simulation. The Agencies have enough experience working 
with data collection companies to get the data we require. 
This dissertation is going to discuss the current market definition methodology in details in the 
second chapter, including the Hypothetical Monopolist Test (SSNIP), and the Critical Loss 
Analysis model and the demand elasticity models required to calculate the actual loss. In Chapter 
Three, we are going to establish two new models to define relevant market. In Chapter Four, we 
are going to discuss about the quantification of the competition and our new method to set up the 
threshold of HSR premerger review based on the result of the models proposed in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 5 will conclude this dissertation.  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Chapter 3: The SSNIP Test and 
the CLA 
Ever since the landmark case, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, market definition has been an 
essential task in premerger investigation. The Supreme Court held, “[d]etermination of the 
relevant market is a necessary predicate to a finding of a violation of the Clayton Act, 15 
U.S.C.S. § 18, because the threatened monopoly must be one which will substantially lessen 
competition within the area of effective competition. Substantiality can be determined only in 
terms of the market affected. The area of effective competition must be determined by reference 
to a product market and a geographic market.”  Though the case was decided more than fifty 81
years ago, its holdings are still regularly cited by merger review cases  now, evidencing the 828384
importance of market definition in premerger investigations. 
As we have mentioned in Chapter 2, market definition is the start of the analysis of coordinated 
effects, market power, market concentration, potential entrant and entry barrier. Moreover, “[t]he 
criteria to be used in determining an appropriate geographic market are essentially similar to 
 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).81
 United States v. Energy Sols., Inc., 265 F. Supp. 3d 415, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109663, 2017-1 Trade 82
Cas. (CCH) P80,050 (2017).
 United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23613, 2017-1 Trade Cas. 83
(CCH) P79,906, 2017 WL 685563 (2017).
 Golden Boy Promotions LLC v. Haymon, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29782, 2017-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 84
P79,884 (2017).
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those used to determine a relevant product market”  Therefore the market division methodology 85
is also helpful in the case where a geographic market is involved.  868788
Despite the importance of market division in the legal analysis of merger reviews, the 
development of its methodology framework has not been advanced much since the Hypothetical 
Monopolist Test combined with Critical Loss Analysis was established. The academic 
scholarship of quantitative premerger investigation has been focusing on Unilateral Effects on 
price caused by merger in the past two decades. Although along with the development of merger 
simulation models assessing unilateral effects, the demand prediction models used in both 
merger simulation and Critical Loss Analysis have been advancing, the theoretical framework 
itself remains static. 
Critical Loss Analysis has been receiving criticism for decades . Some economists believe 89909192
it should be replaced by the merger simulation models. “In some cases, more reliable simulation 
analyses could be constructed, but if they are it is likely that they could be used to evaluate 
 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).85
 Allen v. Dairy Farmers of America, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D. Vt. 2010).86
 U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania - 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).87
 U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - 781 F. Supp. 1400 (S.D. Iowa 1991).88
 Daniel P. O’Brien & Abraham L. Wickelgren, A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis, Antitrust 89
L.J. 71, 161 (2003).
 Kenneth L. Danger & H.E. Frech III, Critical Thinking about “Critical Loss” in Antitrust, The Antitrust 90
Bulletin 46, 339-355 (2001).
 Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Upward Pricing Pressure and Critical Loss Analysis: Response, 91
Antitrust Chronicle 1 (2011)
 Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Improving Critical Loss Analysis (2007).92
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competitive effects of firm conduct directly, rendering market definition superfluous.”  93
However, the reliability of the model is what an industrial organization economist considers, and 
it cannot replace what the court believes is necessary to decide a merger review case. What we 
do in premerger investigation research is to provide support to the judge, not to tell the judge 
what he should or should not need. 
Price influence is not the only anticompetitive effect of a merger. Even though the merger 
simulation models can reliably predict the price, it cannot substitute the market definition to 
provide a bigger picture of the market competition. In fact, the Critical Loss Analysis was 
adopted by the 2010 Merger Guidelines despite all the problems and criticisms on the model. 
This fact is strong evidence of the needs for market definition. On the other hand, we also find 
out that some of the criticisms are not correct.
In this chapter, we are going to discuss the current approach to market definition. It will be the 
framework set up by the Hypothetical Monopolist Test (SSNIP test), the quantitative approach 
based on the Critical Loss Analysis, and the demand models required in the calculation of Actual 
Loss, an essential part of the Critical Loss Analysis. In addition to providing a detailed 
introduction, we will also defend the models from the criticisms. We are also going to discuss the 
pros and cons, limitations, conceptual and methodological problems of those models. 
 Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to 93
Market Definition, BE J. Theor. Econ. 10, 1-41 (2010).
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3.1 The SSNIP Test Since 1982 Merger 
Guidelines 
The 1982 Merger Guidelines (the 1982 Guidelines), established by the Department of Justice 
(the Department), was the first official document which announced the application of the 
Hypothetical Monopolist Test, which is also known as the SSNIP test. As the 1982 Guidelines 
elucidates, “the market definition used by the Department can be stated formally as follows: ‘a 
market consists of a group of products and an associated geographic area such that (in the 
absence of new entry) a hypothetical, unregulated firm that made all the sales of those products 
in that area could increase its profits through a small but significant and non-transitory increase 
in price (above prevailing or likely future levels).’”   94
The 1982 Guidelines implemented this definition by assuming that buyers can only switch to 
another product in response to a price increase if there are enough immediate alternatives. In 
aggregate, the alternatives will cause enough loss of sales to the company increasing the price, 
making price increase no longer profitable . Then, the products within the hypothetical 95
monopolist’s “control” cannot consist a broad enough market. As a result, the Department will 
include the substitutions products into the provisional market and test again. 
 The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 2 Market Definition and Measurement, Footnote 1, 94
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice (1982).
 id.95
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It is worth noting that the 1982 Guideline do not mention whether the increase of the product 
price means all the products are under the control of the hypothetical monopolist, or that the 
hypothetical monopolist can increase some or one of the products’ price. This omission makes a 
significant difference. We will discuss it in later sections. 
To make sure that the patterns of the switching between the products won’t change too much 
after the supply and demand changes according to the price increase, the Department will test to 
make sure there is no significant subsequent switch so that the hypothetical monopolist can stay 
profitable for a year.  This arrangement is a response to the concern from academia that the 96
SSNIP test is unreliable because it is not dynamic to the changes in the market.  The Guidelines 97
mentioned that “The potential weakness of such a market based solely on existing patterns of 
supply and demand is that those patterns might change substantially if the prices of the products 
included in the provisional market were to increase. For this reason, the Department will test 
further and, if necessary, expand the provisional market. ”  This is an important modification 98
that the Department made to assure the accuracy. If this arrangement can be done as intended, it 
will make the Hypothetical Monopolist Test significantly more accurate. We are going to discuss 
this in the later sections as well. 
 id.96
 Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of Antitrust Institutions, 97
Antitrust L.J. 78, 1 (2012).
 The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 2 Market Definition and Measurement, A, 98
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice (1982).
!55
A New Solution to Market Definition                                  
The framework of SSNIP set up above remains unchanged since 1982. Although the SSNIP test 
is criticized in a lot of aspects, it was a revolution in premerger investigation that sets up a 
framework to replace the previous demand-elasticity test  and cluster service test , which 99100 101102
are known to be much more arbitrary and without a clear quantitative criterion.  103104
Led by the SSNIP trend initiated by the United States, many other countries adopted the SSNIP 
test into their anti-monopoly legislation. These initiatives include the 1991 Merger Enforcement 
Guidelines of Canada, the 1993 Market Dominance Guidelines of Australia, 1996 Business 
Acquisition Guidelines of New Zealand, 1997 Draft Notice on Market Definition of the 
European Community, and so on. 
The major criticism from academia about the SSNIP test in 1982 Guidelines is that it does not 
address how to determine when the “small but significant and non-transitory increase in 
price” (will also be noted as “SSNIP” in the following content, while being different from the 
 Example case: United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).99
 Paper commenting on this method: William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market power in 100
antitrust cases, Harv. L. Rev. 937-996 (1981).
 Example case: Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 264 F.R.D. 150, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1049, 2010-1 Trade 101
Cas. (CCH) P76,869 (2010).
 Paper commenting on this method: Jonathan B. Baker, Market definition: An analytical overview, 102
Antitrust L.J. 74, 129-173 (2007).
 Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, Harv. L. Rev. 70, 281-318 (1956).103
 Thomas E. Kauper, The Goals of United States Antitrust Policy-The Current Debate, Zeitschrift für die 104
gesamte Staatswissenschaft/J. Inst. Theor. Econ. H. 3, 408-434 (1980).
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“SSNIP test”) will be profitable.  “The Guidelines have been harshly criticized for this 105106
omission, with some critics contending that such an omission makes the Guidelines unworkable 
in practice.”  To be specific, the 1982 Guidelines did not specify how to calculate how much 107
diversion of sales is enough to make the SSNIP unprofitable. The Critical Loss Analysis (CLA) 
with a benefit of low data requirement was proposed to solve this problem. Later, the CLA 
became an important model in the antitrust premerger investigation. We are going to discuss the 
CLA in the following section. 
 Steven C. Salop, Symposium on mergers and antitrust, J. Econ. Perspect. 1, 3-12 (1987).105
 Peter Bronsteen, A review of the revised Merger Guidelines, Antitrust Bull. 29, 613 (1984).106
 Barry C. Harris & Joseph J. Simons, Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is 107
Necessary, J. Reprints Antitrust L. & Econ. 21, 151-172 (1991).
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3.2 The Critical Loss Analysis 
Before the Critical Loss Analysis, the Hypothetical Monopolist Test was widely regarded as non-
operational. G. Stigler and R. Sherwin commented, “This market definition has one, wholly 
decisive defect: it is completely non-operational. No method of investigation of data is presented 
and no data, even those produced by coercive processes, are specified that will allow the market 
to be determined empirically.”  108
More specifically, they questioned about the availability and high requirement of data. “[T]his 
construct is simply impracticable. It would require an enormous number of calculations of cross-
price elasticities between any given provisional product or geographic market definition and all 
possible additions to it. There will virtually never be adequate data to make such calculations, 
and we doubt that the Department has the resources to make the calculations if the data were 
available.”  The test was also criticized by a federal Circuit Court: “a decision based on these 109
Guidelines remains as inexact as the data gathered to make the assessment … [T]hese Guidelines 
are more useful for setting prosecutorial policy than delineating judicial standards.”  110
 G. Stigler & R. Sherwin, The Extent of the Market, J. Law and Econ., 28, 555-582 (1985).108
 R. Harris and T. Jorde, Market Definition in the Merger Guidelines: Implications for Antitrust 109
Enforcement, Cal. L. Rev. 71, 464-481 (1983).
 Monfort of Colorado. Inc. v. Cargill. Inc., 761 F. 2d 570, 579 (10th Cir. 1985), rev'd, U.S. _ . 107. S. 110
Ct. 484 (Dec. 9, 1986). See also United States v. Virginia National Bank-Shares. Inc., 1982-2 Trade Cas. 
(CCH $ 64,871 (W.D. Va. 1982).
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To address the problems above, Barry C. Harris and Joseph J. Simons had proposed a new 
approach, later called, Critical Loss Analysis in paper “Focusing Market Definition: How Much 
Substitution is Necessary”  The Critical Loss Analysis (CLA), “has been a standard method of 111
implementation for the market definition algorithm of the Department of Justice and Federal 
Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines.”  Meanwhile, “[i]t was recognized as one of 112
the major developments of the modern Merger Guidelines era.”113
To better explain SSNIP and CLA, the following section will reiterate the methodology proposed 
in that paper in great details. We want to demonstrate that most of the criticism about the CLA, 
even very recent ones , are in fact caused by bad applications of CLA by the Agencies. They 114115
are not problems with the CLA itself.
 Barry C. Harris & Joseph J. Simons, Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is 111
Necessary, J. Reprints Antitrust L. & Econ. 21, 151-172 (1991).
 Malcolm B. Coate & Joseph J. Simons, Critical Loss vs. Diversion Analysis: Clearing up the 112
Confusion, The CPI Antitrust Chronicle 1, 1-15 (2009).
 David Scheffman, Malcolm Coate & Louis Silvia, Twenty Years of Merger Guidelines Enforcement at 113
the FTC: An Economic Perspective, Antitrust L.J. 71, 277-285 (2003).
 Serge Moresi, Steven C. Salop & John Woodbury, Market Definition (2017).114
 Russell W.  Pittman, Three Economist's Tools for Antitrust Analysis: A Non-Technical Introduction, 115
(2017).
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3.2.1 The Critical Loss Analysis Model 
The Critical Loss Analysis(CLA) was established to offer the SSNIP test a non-arbitrary 
threshold. In this section, we are going to introduce the CLA model with its technical details for 
further discussing. 
CLA was proposed to improve the utility of the SSNIP test. The SSNIP test sets the rule under 
the Merger Guidelines to determine whether the group of products under the control of a 
hypothetical monopolist can have price increase by 5% without producing less profit than before. 
Thus, the critical question asked by the Guidelines is how much is the difference between the 
profit after and before the increase and whether the difference is positive. The Harris and Simons 
paper chose to get the answer in two steps. The first step is “by examining the relationship of 
marginal or variable cost to price, it is possible to determine, for any given price increase, the 
percentage loss in sales necessary to make the specified price increase unprofitable.”  This 116
percentage of loss was named as “Critical Loss” in the paper. The second step is to determine the 
actual percentage of sale loss by the hypothetical monopolist. 
The paper assumed that all the products on the market are homogeneous and set the initial price 
and quantity as P₀ and Q₀. The marginal cost at Q₀ is MC₀. The profit earned at sales of Q₀ is 
Profit₀. Thus the gross revenue of the firm is (P₀Q₀). The paper noted average variable costs as 
AVC₀, which is the part of the cost which goes up as the quantity produced goes up. There are 
 Barry C. Harris & Joseph J. Simons, Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is 116
Necessary, J. Reprints Antitrust L. & Econ. 21, 151-172 (1991).
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also fixed costs to produce the product, the paper noted it as “Fixed Costs”. Thus we have the 
following equation: 
 
Equation 1 
Since Q₀ • AVC₀ is equal to the total variable cost, we can regard it as the aggregation of the 
variable cost of every single product. Thus we have this: 
 
Equation 2 
Here we need to discuss quantity between the aggregation of the margin at quantity Q₀, and the 
product of Q₀ and AVC₀. To get the Equation 2, the paper assumed equation 3 and equation 4. 
We write them out for future use. 
Equation 3 
Equation 4 
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The modeling continues as the price increases. The new price and quantity are designated by P₁ 
and Q₁. The new marginal cost, or variable cost, is denoted as MC₁. The new profit is Profit₁. 
The new average variable cost is AVC₁. The fixed cost remains the same even the price 
increases. So similarly we have: 
Equation 5 
The paper explained that the Critical Loss is the threshold for which if the sales loss gets bigger 
than the Critical Loss, Profit₁ will be smaller than Profit₀. Thus the Critical Loss is the sales loss 
when Profit₁ equals to Profit₀. Thus we have: 
Equation 6 
Then the paper set Y as the proportion that the price increases, which was defined as Y = (P₁ - 
P₀)/P₀. For most of the cases in premerger investigation, Y = 0.05. Set X as the proportion of 
quantity that decreases as the price increases, and we have: 
Equation 7 
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Equation 8 
Now that, as X and Y are set, we notice that the ratio X/Y is the overall elasticity of demand that 
the hypothetical monopolist is facing. Substitute Equation 7 and 8 into Equation 6, we get: 
Equation 9 
The paper then collected the terms and transformed Equation 9, so we can get an equation for X, 
i.e., the Critical Loss, which is: 
Equation 10 
If we substitute Equation 8 into Equation 4, we get: 
Equation 11 
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Then we substitute Equation 3 and Equation 11 into Equation 10, we get: 
Equation 11 
After collecting terms, we get: 
X = (YP₀ + AVC₀ - AVC₁)/(P₀ + YP₀ - AVC₁) 
Equation 13 
The paper elucidated that in this equation, the Y is the percentage that P₀ increased by the 
hypothetical monopolist, which is decided by Department. P₀ is the prevailing price of the 
production in issue. AVC₀ are usually calculated by the companies in their daily accounting 
records. The only variable unknown is AVC₁. The paper suggested using AVC₀ to approximate 
AVC₁, and offered two reasons : 117
1. Many production processes have relatively flat average variable cost curves.  
2. In the long run, the competitive equilibrium Q₀ is to the right of the minimum point of the 
AVC curve. A reduction in Q will first lower and then raise the AVC. This change in the 
direction of AVC attenuates any tendency of AVC₀ and AVC₁ to differ. 
Thus we assume AVC₀ = AVC₁, and substitute this into Equation 13: 
X = YP₀/(P₀ + YP₀ - AVC₀) 
 id footnote 17.117
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Equation 14 
The paper then divided Equation 14 by P₀/P₀, which yields: 
X = Y ÷ (P₀/P₀ + Y - AVC₀/P₀) = Y ÷ [Y + (P₀ - AVC₀)/P₀] 
Equation 15 
The paper defined (P₀ - AVC₀)/P₀ as the contribution margin, which is denoted as CM. We can 
regard it as the ratio of gross profit plus fixed costs, and P₀. So Equation 14 can be rewritten as X 
= Y/(Y + CM). The paper later stated X in percentage terms, so Equation 15 becomes: 
X = [Y/(Y + CM)]*100 
Equation 16 
As the paper suggested , the merit of this model is that it only requires the contribution margin 118
to calculate the Critical Loss. In addition to that, this model can freely change the percentage of 
the price increase as the Department wants. The contribution margin can be calculated by the 
current prevalent price and the average variable cost. In the case of an Hypothetical Monopolist, 
however, there are actually many different ways to mimic the Hypothetical Monopolist’s data 
and action since the monopolist’s data does not exist in real life. 
Note that the calculation of CL in the CLA model is only based on 3 assumptions: the products 
under control of the hypothetical monopolist are homogeneous; the product demand is smooth 
 id.118
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near P₀ (if they want to have the ratio X/Y as the overall elasticity of demand) and AVC₀  = 
AVC₁. Besides, although the paper assumed that the products under hypothetical monopolist’s 
control are homogenous, it is not necessarily required in any part in the deduction of the model 
itself. It only influences the way we get the data required in the analysis, which we will discuss 
later. Also, if we do not assume that the ratio of X/Y is the overall elasticity of demand, we do 
not assume that the demand curve is smooth either. “Other than the fact that it involves an 
estimation of the margin, it is pure arithmetic algebra to be precise.”  This has actually rebutted 119
the widely spread concern that the CLA is inconsistent with classical economics.  Even if 120
sometimes the conclusion is inconsistent with the classical economics, it is at least not caused by 
the CL calculation and caused by the AL calculation instead. 
There are also different ways to implement the term “a hypothetical, unregulated firm that made 
all the sales of those products in that area could increase its profits through a small but 
significant and non-transitory increase in price.” The increase in price can be done with 
simultaneous and identical price increase on all of the products, simultaneous but different price 
increase on some of the products, or price increase on an individual product followed by price 
reset upon the price increase of the next product, etc. There are so many ways to understand this 
term in the 1982 Guidelines. The agencies need to choose the way of implementing the CLA 
 Adriaan Ten Kate & Gunnar Niels, The Concept of Critical Loss for a Group of Differentiated 119
Products, J. Compet. Law Econ. 6, 321-333 (2009).
 The critical loss is relatively big when the contribution margin is small, and the critical loss is 120
relatively small when the contribution margin is big. Some people believe it is against the classic 
economics because when the contribution margin is small, there is usually more competition in the 
market. They believe the critical loss should be smaller so it is easier for the actual loss to be bigger than 
the critical loss. As a result, the relevant market concluded can be broader as well. This is incorrect. We 
are going to illustrate why it is incorrect in Section 2.6.
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model as reliably as possible, given the availability of data. We are going to discuss those 
different understandings in the later sections. For now, we will assume that we have calculated 
the critical loss and proceed to the calculation of the actual loss. 
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3.3 Calculation of Actual Loss 
We cannot find much research discussing the calculation of actual loss. This is probably because 
the crucial question in the calculation of actual loss is demand estimation. There is much 
research discussing demand estimation. We will discuss them in the next section. When we get 
the demand estimation function, the actual loss can be easily calculated by equation 17. Set DA 
as the demand function of product A, and DB as the demand function of product B; they can be 
estimated as linear demand, Logit demand, or AIDS demand model, etc. 
Actual Loss = (DA(P₀) - DA(P₁)) - (DB(P₁) - DB(P₀)) 
Equation 17 
The Merger Guidelines did not set forth any particular method to calculate Actual Loss. The 
paper “A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis” , describes a way to calculate actual loss. 121
The authors of this paper claimed that they are FTC Economist doing premerger investigations. 
They also accredited many other economists in the footnote of the paper. Therefore, this method 
might be one of the methods that the Agencies use. We are going to dig deeper into this. Also, 
since this paper is one of the most cited criticisms to the CLA, exploring the model they use can 
also help us in finding out whether this important criticism is correct. 
 Daniel P. O’Brien & Abraham L. Wickelgren, A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis, Antitrust 121
L.J. 71, 161 (2003).
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The paper claimed that they used a standard economic approach to calculate Actual Loss under a 
hypothesis of two products A and B, where product A and B are both inside the candidate market. 
The actual loss was interpreted as the difference between product A’s loss of sales when SSNIP 
occurs and the product B’s gain of sales in accordance to the price change of A. Under the same 
notation of section 2.2, the actual loss was expressed as Equation 18. 
Actual Loss = Y( EAA - EBA ) 
Equation 18 
Using the same train of thought as was used in CLA, to maximize the profit, a company should 
make the benefit of price increase equal to the loss of sales decrease. So if we set Q₀ - Q₁ = ΔQ, 
P₀ - P₁ = ΔP, we have Equation 19. 
ΔP(Q₀ + ΔQ) = - (P₀ - AVC)ΔQ 
Equation 19 
The author assumed Fixed Costs = 0, so P₀ - AVC = CM. Since EAA = (ΔQ/Q₀)/Y, if we divide 
Equation 19 by Q₀*ΔP/P₀ and, we get Equation 20. 
Equation 20 
Let ΔQ approaches 0, and we get, 
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Equation 21 
If we substitute Equation 18 to Equation 20, we get Equation 22 to calculate the actual loss. 
Equation 22 
We deduced the Actual Loss function above (AL). In contrast with the CL function, this AL 
function assumed the demand curve being smooth to get equation 21 by letting ΔQ approaches 0. 
The criticism in the paper “Critical loss: Let's tell the whole story” , shows that the demand 122
curve can kink near P₀. Therefore the concern on CLA about non-smooth demand curve is in 
reality not about the CL function but the AL function mentioned in the paper. As we have already 
mentioned, this is one of the methods proposed in FTC economists, O’Brien, Daniel P., and 
Abraham L. Wickelgren’ paper. If we still use equation 17 to calculate the AL, this concern may 
not be true because some of the demand forms do not use smooth demand curve. For example, 
the demand is discrete in the Logit demand model. Therefore the concern about smoothness will 
be irrelevant, i.e., the smooth demand curve is not a problem of CLA. 
We found that the equation has another intrinsic problem aside from the smooth demand curve 
assumption. Actual Loss in equation 18 is calculated with the difference between EAA and EBA. E 
is the ratio between ΔQ and Q, so EAA = ΔQAA/QA and EBA = ΔQBA/QB . We should be careful 
about taking the difference in this ratio. ΔQAA and ΔQBA are related because ΔQBA is a part of 
 Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Critical Loss: Let's Tell the Whole Story, Antitrust 17, 49 (2002).122
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ΔQAA. If the purpose of this ratio difference is to calculate the quantity of sales which did not 
switch to B, it can only stand if QA and QB are at least at a very similar scale. Otherwise dividing 
them is a meaningless calculation. For example, if product A loses 1000 sales and it used to have 
10000 sales, EAA is equal to 10%. On the other hand, if product B used to have 3000 sales, and 
500 of A’s 1000 sales loss went to B, EBA is equal to 16.7%. In this situation, equation 18 
concludes a negative AL. 
There is another problem, which is the fact that linear demand EAA = (ΔQ/Q₀)/Y was used to 
produce Equation 20. It was already proven that using a linear demand curve would conclude a 
narrower relevant market.  The reason is that the demand curve is concave near P₀. The 123
customers are mixed with different demand flexibilities. The customers with flexible demand or 
less switching costs are more sensitive to price. They will switch quickly when the price goes 
higher, making the demand slope stiffer for a small price increase. Meanwhile, there are also 
customers whose demand is more rigid. Those customers are much less sensitive to a price 
increase. So the decrease in demand has a steeper slope in the beginning and a flatter slope for a 
greater price increase, i.e., the demand curve is concave. If the demand curve is concave and we 
calculate it as linear, we are going to underestimate AL and eventually end up with a narrower 
market. Therefore, if the actual loss was calculated by equation 22, it will also tend to conclude a 
 Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Improving Critical Loss Analysis (2007).123
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narrower market. There are several papers criticizing the CLA for concluding a narrower market 
than it should have been.  124125126
By going through the CLA model and O'Brien, Daniel P., and Abraham L. Wickelgren’s AL 
model, we can conclude that the CLA function is correct in its deduction and will not incur a 
narrow market conclusion as it was criticized for. At the same time, the AL function should not 
be applied for the calculation of AL in CLA; otherwise, it will bring an unreliable result to the 
market definition. Therefore, we suggest that we should use Equation 17 to calculate the Actual 
Loss if we are going to conduct a CLA and have estimated demand functions. If we have demand 
elasticity, like the situation in the discussed paper, we should use equation 23.   
Equation 23 
On the other hand, the paper “A critical analysis of critical loss analysis”  (the AL model 127
paper) also concluded that the CLA is inaccurate, based on a calculation of AL conducted with 
equation 22. Therefore we can safely say that this criticism is incorrect. 
 Kenneth L. Danger & H.E. Frech III, Critical Thinking about “Critical Loss” in Antitrust, The 124
Antitrust Bulletin 46, 339-355 (2001).
 James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Critical Loss Analysis in Evaluating Mergers, The Antitrust Bulletin 125
46, 299-337 (2001).
 Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Critical Loss: Let's Tell the Whole Story, Antitrust 17, 49 (2002).126
 Daniel P. O’Brien & Abraham L. Wickelgren, A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis, Antitrust 127
L.J. 71, 161 (2003).
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Another influential paper, “Critical Loss: Let’s Tell the Whole story” , written by Michael Katz 128
and Carl Shapiro . The paper proposed a formula to “use aggregate diversion ratio (ADR) to 129
tell the rest of the story”  after calculation of CL. Therefore, the ADR is a way to replace the 130
calculation of AL. The ADR is the ratio of the number of sales switching to the products inside 
the candidate market and the number of sales lost by the price-increase product. According to the 
paper, we only need to compare ADR and CL to see whether it is profitable to increase the 
product price. The aggregate diversion ratio, if there are more than two products, is calculated by 
Equation 24. 
Equation 24 
Let gross margin be M and the elasticity of product A whose price has increased as EA. They 
claimed M = 1/EA . Therefore, they have Equation 25. 
Equation 25 
 Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Critical Loss: Let's Tell the Whole Story, Antitrust 17, 49 (2002).128
 Michael Katz was the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economic Analysis in U.S. Department 129
of Justice when he wrote this paper. Carl Shapiro is well known by having close cooperation with FTC 
about Antitrust.
 id.130
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Let the diversion ratio be D. Based on Equation 24, we know that the proportion of quantity 
which does not switch to product B is 1 - D. Therefore, we have another actual loss function, 
which is Equation 26. 
 
Equation 26 
By comparing Equation 26 and Equation 16, the paper came up with the conclusion, “[i]f and 
only if the aggregate diversion ratio is larger than the critical loss, then the actual loss is less than 
the critical loss and thus a hypothetical monopolist would find a SSNIP profitable.” , i.e., “AL 131
< CL if and only if D > CL”. This is for the case where the product A and B have the same profit 
ratio.  If they do not, the paper concludes that “AL < CL if and only if (PB - CB)/(PA - CA)•D > 
CL”, where C is the total cost of product A and B. 
The whole deduction above was based on the equation M = 1/EA. The reason they gave in 
support of this conclusion was “[a]s any microeconomics textbook demonstrates, an 
economically rational firm acting unilaterally sets its price so that its gross margin is inversely 
related to its elasticity of demand: M = 1/E, where E is the elasticity of demand facing the firm in 
question.”  Other papers claimed that M = 1/EA is based on “Lerner’s condition."  However, 132 133
“Lerner index analysis is not applicable when the market exhibits product homogeneity or 
 id.131
 id page 3.132
 Malcolm B. Coate & Joseph J. Simons, Critical Loss vs. Diversion Analysis: Clearing up the 133
Confusion, The CPI Antitrust Chronicle 1, 1-15 (2009).
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dynamic differentiation.”  Another paper “Critical Loss v. Diversion Analysis: Another Attempt 134
at Consensus”  commented that “[t]hat relationship between the margin and demand 135
responsiveness, however, is a theoretical one, derived from the mathematics underlying the 
classical monopoly model. It has not been demonstrated to reliably predict demand elasticities, 
especially in more competitive markets.”
Not only is ADR based on Lerner’s formula, which may not hold, it also assumes that the fixed 
cost is zero, which is usually not true, either. The paper “The SSNIP test and market definition 
with the aggregate diversion ratio: A reply to Katz and Shapiro”  pointed out an error in the 136
deduction of the ADR formula in 2007, the error also caused a narrower conclusion of relevant 
market products as well. In the years when ADR was used instead of the actual loss, the CLA 
tends to conclude a narrower market, which caused CLA to be less trusted by the court. The 
author of CLA later suggested in his paper “Critical Loss vs. Diversion Analysis: Clearing up the 
Confusion” that we should use AL instead of ADR.  Eventually, the 2010 Merger Guidelines 137
adopted the CLA in the market division. During the introduction to CLA, the Guidelines only 
mentioned AL (as “Predicted Loss”), not ADR. 
 Malcolm Coate & and Joseph Simons, Critical Loss: Modeling and Application Issues (2010).134
 Malcolm B. Coate & Joseph J. Simons, Critical Loss v. Diversion Analysis: Another Attempt at 135
Consensus, The CPI Antitrust Journal 1, 1-8 (2010).
 Øystein Daljord, Lars Sørgard, & Øyvind Thomassen, The SSNIP Test and Market Definition with the 136
Aggregate Diversion Ratio: A Reply to Katz and Shapiro, J. Compet. Law Econ. 4, 263-270 (2007).
 Malcolm B. Coate & Joseph J. Simons, Critical Loss vs. Diversion Analysis: Clearing up the 137
Confusion, The CPI Antitrust Chronicle 1, 1-15 (2009).
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3.4 The demand systems to calculate 
Actual Loss 
There are several commonly used demand models in premerger investigation. The demand 
calculation provides crucial input to both CLA and merger simulation models. As was suggested 
by Figure 2, the choice of demand form will directly affect the estimation of demand even when 
the price increase is the same. As was mentioned in Chapter 2, the Agencies will conduct 
multiple demand estimations according to the availability of data and market status, and then 
consider all the results in merger simulations.  
The choice of demand form will also result in a different result of market definition. Regarding 
the different results of market definition, the 2010 Guidelines committed that, “[t]he hypothetical 
monopolist test ensures that markets are not defined too narrowly, but it does not lead to a single 
relevant market. The Agencies may evaluate a merger in any relevant market satisfying the test, 
guided by the overarching principle that the purpose of defining the market and measuring the 
market share is to illustrate the evaluation of competitive effect.”  Although there is discussion 138
on which product to include when there are similarly “substitutable” ones according to the 
SSNIP test, the essence of this discussion is the attitude towards fuzzy market edges. Therefore, 
the Agencies will likely consider what roughly constitutes the relevant market more to get the big 
picture of the competitive effect.  
 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 4.1.1 The Hypothetical Monopolist Test, Washington, D.C.: 138
U.S. Dept. of Justice (2010).
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Although the Guidelines indicate we can pick any of the results when there are multiple ones, 
meaning using either demand form might work fine, there are discussions questioning if the CLA 
will conclude a too narrow market if a linear demand is used.  Therefore we believe the 139140
antitrust scholars tend to pick the form of demand which is the closest to the circumstance in the 
market. 
In this section, we are going to introduce the most commonly used demand forms and how to 
calculate demand with them. We are going to introduce the linear and log-linear demand model, 
the Logit demand model, and the Almost Ideal Demand System model (AIDS). There are plenty 
of discussions about demand estimation in economics. There are several variations of those 
demand models as well. Because the theme of our paper is not about the demand forms, we are 
not going to go through great details of those demand models. We are going to introduce the 
frameworks, demand functions, assumptions and data required of those models instead.  
 Kai Hüschelrath, Critical Loss Analysis in Market Definition and Merger Control, European 139
Competition Journal 5, 757-794 (2009).
 Daniel P. O’Brien & Abraham L. Wickelgren, A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis, Antitrust 140
L.J. 71, 161 (2003).
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3.4.1 Linear Demand Model 
The earliest demand forms used are the linear and log-linear demand models. They are usually 
just linear regressions using the least squares method to assess the parameters. Let product i be 
the one whose price will increase. There are j products whose data are acquired and used to 
assess the price-demand relation of i, and i ∈ {1, 2, …, j}. Let P be the product price and Qi be 
the quantity product i was sold. Let Vk, k ∈ {1, 2, …, k} be the other demand shifting variables, 
which will also affect the quantity sold. So we have Equation 27 for linear regression and 
Equation 28 for log-linear regression. 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 are the coefficients. 
Equation 27 
Equation 28 
The merit of the linear demand models is that we can get the elasticity directly from the 
estimated parameters. When all the 𝛽 are estimated, 𝛽ij will be the cross elasticity between 
product i and j, and 𝛽ii will be the own elasticity of product i. The prediction is not perfect, but it 
is quite effective and also easy to calculate. When the computational capacity was not very 
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advanced, the linear demand has played a crucial role in the market division and other analysis 
about the market for decades. 
The downside of the linear demand is the constant elasticity as the coefficients. “Own and cross-
price elasticity are usually expected to change with the level of prices.”  “It often results in the 141
prediction of negative quantities for highly asymmetric mergers.”  As was mentioned earlier, 142
linear demand does not fit the reality of the market. The demand is concave near P₀, and using a 
linear will conclude less actual loss. Therefore, the hypothetical monopolist’s profit will be 
overestimated, and the market will be narrower than it should be. Therefore, the linear demand is 
scarcely used by itself nowadays. If the linear demand is applied, there will be caution of 
underestimation of demand loss, and it will mostly be used as a rough indicator in merger 
screening.  143
 Gregory J. Werden, Demand Elasticites in Antitrust Analysis, Antitrust L.J. 66, 363 (1997).141
 Philip Crooke, et al, Effects of Assumed Demand Form on Simulated Postmerger Equilibria, Rev. Ind. 142
Organ. 15, 205-217 (1999).
 Oliver Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey, J. Compet. 143
Law Econ. 6, 277-319 (2009).
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3.4.2 Logit Demand Model 
The most used demand form nowadays is the Logit demand model. Logit demand model is not a 
single model, but a category of the models where logistic regression is used to estimate the 
correlation between demand and price. When another input is added to the model, the output will 
also have an estimation of the correlation between demand and other parameters. It is “a model 
where the log-odds of the probability of an event is a linear combination of independent or 
predictor variables.”  There are many commentaries talking about using Logit demand model 144
in merger simulations.  For example, the Antitrust Logit Model is a merger simulation 145146147
about the heterogeneous products based on the Bertrand model and the logit demand.  The 148
Logit demand model can be used when market-level data on price, quantity, other product 
characteristic data, and consumer characteristics data are available. In a simpler version, only the 
demand, price and product characteristics are necessary.  
The Logit demand model is a discrete choice model using Logistic regression to estimate the 
coefficients and assess the price-demand relation. Logistic regression estimates the probability of 
 RONALD CHRISTENSEN, LOG-LINEAR MODELS AND LOGISTIC REGRESSION, Springer 144
Science & Business Media (2006).
 Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: 145
Logit Demand and Merger Policy, J. Law Econ. Organ. 407-426 (1994).
 Oliver Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey, J. Compet. 146
Law Econ. 6, 277-319 (2009).
 Roy J. Epstein & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Merger Simulation: A Simplified Approach with New 147
Applications, Antitrust L.J. 69, 883 (2001).
 Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, The Antitrust Logit Model for Predicting Unilateral Competitive 148
Effects, Antitrust L.J. 70, 257 (2002).
!80
A New Solution to Market Definition                                  
one certain option chosen among several different options. Therefore, it is used in estimating the 
probability of one product being chosen among several heterogeneous products. However, the 
Logistic regression requires the options to be “[i]ndependent and irrelevant alternatives (IIA).”   149
The IIA assumption is the biggest obstacle of using Logit demand model because the products 
are substitutes of each other. Therefore, the probability of one product being chosen is correlated 
to another product’s price and availability, and the strength of correlation depends on the 
substitutive level between the products. The IIA can only stand if all the products are equally 
substitutable to each other.  It is obviously not true in the context of premerger investigation. 150
Therefore we cannot trust the estimated result. A previous attempt to solve this problem was 
done using the nested logit model . In an application of nested logit model, we need to pre-151152
group the products, so that the products within groups are correlated while the groups are 
independent from one another. This might work in merger simulation, as long as the products 
within each group are substitutable with each other in a relatively equal way. 
However, we cannot use this method in market definition, since this requires an estimation of 
substitution level. The traditional way to assess the substitution level is by measuring the 
demand. If the demand is pre-estimated, it will end up with a circular reasoning. In Chapter 4, we 
 Agresti, Alan. Categorical data analysis. Vol. 482. John Wiley & Sons, 2003.149
 Aviv Nevo, A Practitioner's Guide to Estimation of Random-Coefficients Logit Models of Demand, J. 150
Econ. Manag. Strategy 9, 513-548 (2000).
 Jonas Björnerstedt & Frank Verboven, Merger Simulation with Nested Logit Demand, Implementation 151
using Stata, Stata Journal 14, 511-540 (2014).
 Jonas Björnerstedt & Frank Verboven, Merger Simulation with Nested Logit Demand– Implementation 152
using Stata, Konkurrensverket Working Series Paper 2 (2013).
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are going to propose a new way to divide the relevant market, which is independent of demand 
estimation. Our method may be helpful to the pre-grouping in nested logit demand models so 
that it can further help in merger simulation. 
Since the Logit model and its variations are still commonly used in the market definition,  153 154
we will discuss it further. The Logit model can be used to estimate the probability of an option as 
long as the data and context theoretically meet the assumption of the Logistic model, regardless 
of the interpretability of the coefficients. Regardless, it will still be better to be able to interpret 
all of the coefficients. The paper “Estimating discrete-choice models of product differentiation” 
used an assumption that “consumer utility function depend[s] on observable product 
characteristics, including price as well as individual-specific coefficients.”  Based on this 155156
assumption, the probability of a product being picked is interpreted as the estimation of the 
average utility of a product divided by the sum of all the average utility of all the products 
available for picking. 
Assume we have j products to be picked. i ∈ {1, 2, …, j} is one of the products. Let product i’s 
summarized characteristic be variable Ci, and price of product i be Pi. Let U be the utility 
 Peter Davis & Pasquale Schiraldi, The Flexible Coefficient Multinomial Logit (FC-MNL) Model of 153
Demand for Differentiated Products, RAND J. Econ. 45, 32-63 (2014).
 Daniel P. O’Brien & Abraham L. Wickelgren, A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis, Antitrust 154
L.J. 71, 161 (2003).
 Steven T. Berry, Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation, RAND J. Econ. 25, 155
242-262 (1994).
 Oliver Budzinki & Isabel Ruhmer, Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey, J. Compet. 156
Law Econ. 6, 277-319 (2009).
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function of product i. Let a constant 𝛼 represent the aggregation of the factors that affect the U in 
an unobserved way. In here, the error term 𝜀 is interpreted as the consumer-specific taste 
preference. Let 𝜀 be a universal error term, so in this model, the consumer taste is assumed to 
follow an independently and identically distribution (i.i.d.) across all the product picking. 
Therefore we get Equation 29. 
Uᵢ (Pᵢ, Cᵢ, 𝛼, 𝜀) = 𝛼 - 𝛽 • Pᵢ + 𝛾 • Cᵢ + 𝜀 
Equation 29 
Therefore, the mean utility level of product i, V, will have an expected value, which is Ui without 
the error. We put it in Equation 30. 
Vᵢ (Pᵢ, Cᵢ, 𝛼) = 𝛼 - 𝛽 • Pᵢ + 𝛾 • Cᵢ 
Equation 30 
Based on our assumption, the probability of i being chosen can be represented by Equation 31. 
Equation 31 
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Equation 29 - 31 created a visible link between the probability of product being chosen and the 
relevant qualities of products. This created a theoretical base of application of the model . 157
Since demand models are not the main topic of this dissertation, we are not going to discuss its 
application in merger simulation models. The paper “Merger simulation in competition policy: A 
survey” gave a good summary of this topic.  In this dissertation we are going to use a simple 158
Logit demand model to estimate the required elasticities in Equation 23 to calculate Actual Loss 
so that we can make a full walk-through in using logit demand model to do CLA. 
The data used as the dependent variable in the logit model is a logged odds of whether a certain 
product will be picked. Following the notation earlier in this section, the product whose price 
will increase is i, where i ∈ {1, 2, …, j}. Therefore we let the probability that i will be picked be 
Si. The endogenous variable of this model is Pi, the price of the product i. The exogenous 
variable is the product characteristics Ci. Let the intercept be 𝛼, which indicates the aggregation 
of the factors that affect the Si in an unobserved way. Therefore, we have the simplest version of 
the logistic regression model of demand in Equation 32. 
Equation 32 
 Steven T. Berry, Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation, RAND J. Econ. 25, 157
242-262 (1994).
 Oliver Budzinki & Isabel Ruhmer, Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey, J. Compet. 158
Law Econ. 6, 277-319 (2009).
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Then we can use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the coefficients 𝛼, 𝛽, and 𝛾, and 
get the estimated function of the logged odds ratio. One may notice that a sign change of the 
coefficient 𝛽. Since the value of 𝛽 will be estimated by the logistic regression anyway, using a 
negative sign will only create confusion in further analysis. Therefore we will just use a positive 
sign here. Almost all the regressions are directly done by software today, so we will not look into 
the details of the estimation process. To get it back to the probability of i being picked, we can 
transform Equation 32 and get Equation 33. In the context of market demand, the probability of i 
being picked can be considered at the expectation of market share of product i. 
Equation 33 
Therefore we can substitute P₀ and P₁ of product i into Equation 33, and use the result value and 
Equation 34 to estimate Own Elasticity of product i. In there we also need the total demand in 
the candidate market. 
Equation 34 
To calculate the cross elasticity between i and j, we need to do logistic regression again with 
product j and estimate the expected market share function of product j, Sj. Then we can use 
Equation 35 to calculate Cross Elasticity of Product i with Product j. 
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Equation 35 
Now we can use the calculated Cross Elasticity and Own Elasticity to calculate Actual Loss with 
Equation 23. The merit of this simple model is that it does not make any additional assumptions 
other than the ones made by the logit demand model itself. In the application of models in 
premerger investigation, we should be more careful when making assumptions. Even if those 
assumptions are widely made in economic research, some of those assumptions are still too risky 
to be made because the conclusion will affect businesses worth billions of dollars. We are going 
to discuss this in more details in Chapter 4. 
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3.4.3 AIDS demand model 
The AIDS demand model was created by Deaton and Muellbauer in their paper “An almost ideal 
demand system” . This paper is based on the theorem of PIGLOG class preference , which 159 160161
“are represented via the cost or expenditure function which defines the minimum expenditure 
necessary to attain a specific utility level at given prices.”  It assumes the representation of 162
market demand is the outcome of decisions made by a rational representative consumer. 
Therefore, the cost/expenditure function with utility and price as input is constant between 
different products. The logged cost/expenditure function is the Equation 33. 
Equation 33 
u is a specific utility the rational representative consumer gets from the product. p is the 
minimum price the consumer is willing to pay. a(p) is the cost of subsistence and b(p) is the cost 
of bliss. The AIDS paper formed a(p) as Equation 34. 
Equation 34 
 Angus Deaton & John Muellbauer, An Almost Ideal Demand System, The American Economic Review 159
70, 312-326 (1980).
 John Muellbauer, Community Preferences and the Representative Consumer, Econometrica 979-999 160
(1976).
 John Muellbauer, Aggregation, Income Distribution and Consumer Demand, Rev. Econ. Stud. 42, 161
525-543 (1975).
 Angus Deaton & John Muellbauer, An Almost Ideal Demand System, The American Economic Review 162
70, 312-326 (1980).
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j and k are two products among the products considered in the AIDS model. The logged product 
of j and k’s price will later be the non-linear factors representing the interaction of each pair of 
two products in the regression function; thus it is formed in this way. The bliss cost is formed as 
Equation 35. It is the subsistence cost plus the product of all the prices to the power of another 
coefficient. Again, it is formed in this way to serve the need of the non-linear regression which 
will be performed later. 
Equation 35 
Therefore, we can get the AIDS cost function as Equation 36. 
Equation 36 
The paper explained that the reason for taking all the prices and their interaction into 
consideration. “For the resulting cost function to be a flexible function form, it must possess 
enough parameters, so that at any single point, its derivatives ∂c/∂pᵢ, ∂c/∂u, ∂²c/∂pᵢ‧∂pj , ∂²c/∂u∂pᵢ 
and ∂²c/∂u² can be set equal to those of an arbitrary cost function.”  This is saying that since 163
this function is also arbitrarily made to satisfy the interpretation requirement and no one really 
knows the real correlation of u, p and c to do the regression, we should consider all the possible 
regressors under the framework of the interpretation. This way, our regression of the demand 
 id.163
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price relation will have more accurate estimated coefficients. On the other hand, this arbitrary 
form of Equation 36 also ensures that the derivatives of the AIDS demand Equation 40 and 
Equation 41 are in the form of ∂wᵢ / ∂log x  = 𝛽ᵢ and ∂wᵢ / ∂log pj = 𝛾ᵢj - 𝛽ᵢ𝛼j = 𝛽ᵢΣ𝛾jk log pk, “so 
that at any point, 𝛽 and 𝛾 can be chosen so that the derivatives of the AIDS will be identical to 
those of any true model.”  164
The paper used a theorem from the paper “Intertemporal consumer theory and the demand for 
durables” that concluded that “a fundamental property of the cost function is that its price 
derivative are the quantities demand” . Therefore, we have the Equation 37. 165
∂c(u, p) / ∂pᵢ = qᵢ 
Equation 37 
With a mathematical transformation, the partial derivative of the Equation 34 can be transformed 
as Equation 37, where the wi is the budget share of good i. 
Equation 37 
Then we take the logarithmic differentiation of Equation 36 and get a function of wi , which is 
Equation 38. 
 id.164
 W. Erwin Diewart, Intertemporal Consumer Theory and the Demand for Durables, Econometrica 42, 165
497-516 (1974).
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Equation 38 
Where 
Equation 39 
Then the paper assumes that the consumer is maximizing utility, so his total expenditure x is 
equal to c(u, p). Therefore we can transform the Equation 36 into a function calculating u. At the 
same time, we can substitute u into Equation 38 to get a function calculating wi from p and x. 
The function is in Equation 40. 
Equation 40 
Where P is a price index defined by  
Equation 41 
If we want to use AIDS demand model nowadays, using Equation 40 and cashier data about 
price and demand, we can have the coefficients 𝛼, 𝛽 and 𝛾 be estimated with a maximum 
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likelihood method in statistical software or statistical programming. However, the computational 
capacity was not as advanced when the paper was published in 1980. Therefore, the author 
provided some compromised method to eliminate unnecessary parameters. This is done by 
placing empirically or theoretically plausible restrictions on 𝛾ij parameters, which is offered by 
the paper. However, nowadays, we can apply dimensionality reduction method to the dataset and 
eliminate the variables which are not contributing much to the prediction. 
On the other hand, Equation 40 is a demand function in the form of budget share. The relation 
between budget share and demand is demonstrated by Equation 42. When we have the demand 
function, we can calculate the elasticity using E =  Δqᵢ / Δpᵢ , like what we do to get Equation 34 
and 35. 
Equation 42 
This AIDS model assumes “the demand functions … are first-order approximations to any set of 
demand functions derived from utility-maximizing behavior.” From Equation 36 and the 
deduction after, we can see that the model assumes the utility that the rational consumer gets 
from the products is constant among different goods charging a different price. This is in 
response to the assumption of homogeneous products. However, this assumption is less and less 
applicable in the product market nowadays. At the same time, AIDS also requires significantly 
more data than the linear demand or the Logit demand. Given these two conditions, the 
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application of AIDS demand will be limited to some specific circumstances like supermarket 
goods.  166
Meanwhile, there is also a conceptual problem in AIDS. The regression mostly depends on the 
price change of different products. Nevertheless, the model also assumes u to be constant and the 
consumer who is making decisions in here is totally rational. If so, the consumer will only pick 
the lowest price item at every time and it is not very meaningful to calculate various coefficients 
of different products’ prices anymore. 
However, this AIDS model can still work. As mentioned in the paper, containing as many price 
variables and their interactions will decrease the importance of the arbitrary function form itself. 
Therefore, even if we need to make unrealistic assumptions to get the function from the 
beginning, having enough variables considered in the function will make the assumptions no 
longer be that outcome determinative as long as we have enough data and computational 
capacity to do the estimation. This is different from the Logit demand model’s IIA problem 
because the Logit demand model does not require that many regressors. 
To solve the problem of AIDS, there are other models proposed, like PCAIDS  etc. However, 167
the PCAIDS introduced more assumptions, making its application more restricted too. It assumes 
the proportionality, homogeneity, and symmetry in the calculation of demand. In fact, those 
 Roy J. Epstein & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Merger Simulation: A Simplified Approach with New 166
Applications, Antitrust L.J. 69, 883 (2001).
 id.167
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complex deduction of functions and assumptions all aim to simplifying the calculation of the 
coefficients. However, we no longer need to worry too much about the simplicity of the 
calculation or the demand function because the computational capacity has increased by many 
orders of magnitudes since then.  
The most significant example is machine learning, where we do not try to interpret the prediction 
function at all, but only care about whether the model is making good predictions. In the future, 
we may use machine learning method to assess the price-demand relation. 
It is worth mentioning that almost all the models commonly used in the antitrust premerger 
investigation, including all the demand models, are written in an R package developed by 
Charles Taragin and Michael Sandfort.  We can easily put in data and parameters into the 168
functions pre-written in the packages to get the model results. The CLA was not written in the 
package however, probably due to the uncertainty in a correct way of conducting CLA. We are 
going to discuss this in detail in the next section. 
 Charles Taragin and Michael Sandfort, 168
Resource from R CRAN: https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=antitrust, url. 
Reference manual: https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/antitrust/antitrust.pdf, PDF.
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3.4.4 Conclusion about demand models 
From the discussions above, we know that all of those demand models have their shortcomings. 
The linear model is less realistic. The Logit model assumes the IIA. The nested Logit model 
needs a pre-division of the products. The AIDS can only be applied to products which can be 
regarded as homogeneous. None of them are perfectly applicable. This will result in unreliability 
in the final conclusion of the market division. 
On the other hand, we noticed from reading historical papers that the demand relation discussed 
in market definition research is usually continuous. Discrete selection demand models like logit 
demand model are more often discussed with merger simulation models assessing unilateral 
effects. The reason is that the discrete models involve more computational calculation. When the 
models are available for practical use, there are already less discussions about the market 
division and more discussions about merger simulation. Those models are originally used for 
merger simulation. Demand as their output is ideal since the merger simulation is only about 
predicting the price effect on demand. 
Hypothetical Monopolist Test also uses the demand estimation as the most important input. This 
is likely the reason why the market division method has been largely limited within the 
Hypothetical Monopolist Test framework. Unlike the merger simulation which is focused on 
price effect however, the market division is focused on product substitution. Using demand 
change to estimate substitution is the product of the historical limitation in data resource and 
!94
A New Solution to Market Definition                                  
analytical tools. If the condition permits, we should estimate the substitution directly instead of 
using demand to approximate it. We are going to discuss it more in Chapter 4. 
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3.5 Discussion about the Correct 
Application of Critical Loss Analysis 
Although it seems that the calculation of Critical Loss, Actual Loss, and demand are all we need 
to consider in the CLA model’s application in SSNIP, this is not the completed story. How do we 
conduct the SSNIP as the hypothetical monopolist and how do we get the data required of the 
hypothetical firm, are the real challenges which have not yet been solved by the academia until 
now. The CLA paper offered an example to calculated CL of different products, as an illustration 
of how to apply the CLA model.  Nevertheless, the example only brings confusion to the 169
implementation of the model. The paper calculated the CL of the two products in its example. 
However, all the values in the example are hypothetical so it did not indicate any data acquisition 
criteria. It did not offer further analysis about how will the CL be applied to implement market 
definition either. Most importantly, it did not explain how to calculate CM. In the example 
offered by the paper, the CM was given directly. These are actually the reasons why there are so 
many confusions and misunderstanding about how to apply the CLA. 
The author of the 1989 paper tried to clear up the confusion about the application of CLA in his 
2009 paper, Critical Loss vs. Diversion Analysis: Clearing up the Confusion . However, it did 170
not address all of the questions asked by the critics. Especially, it did not answer how to calculate 
 Barry C. Harris; Joseph J. Simons, Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is Necessary, 169
page 165 section C, 21 J. Reprints Antitrust L. & Econ. 151, 172 (1991) 
 Malcolm B. Coate & Joseph J. Simons, Critical Loss vs. Diversion Analysis: Clearing up the 170
Confusion, The CPI Antitrust Chronicle 1, 1-15 (2009).
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CM and how to apply CL. Later in this section, we will use a few examples to show that it is not 
the CLA model itself which causes the resulting inconsistency with the classical economics , 171
but the wrongful implementation of it. 
 Daniel P. O’Brien & Abraham L. Wickelgren, A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis, Antitrust 171
L.J. 71, 161 (2003).
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3.5.1 How do we define the SSNIP — Three Scenarios  
According to the Merger Guidelines, we learned that the Hypothetical Monopolist Test is to 
hypothetically consider all of the products in the candidate market as being produced by one 
company, and see whether a SSNIP will be profitable. If it is, then the products in the candidate 
market consists a relevant market. If it is not, add more products and re-calculate. Logically, 
there are 3 possible strategies to maximize the profit, if we do not consider the price decrease 
scenario: 
1. If the substitution between the products inside and outside the candidate market is low, the 
profit-maximizing strategy can be by increasing the price of all the products by a SSNIP. 
2. If the substitution is not that high, the profit-maximizing strategy should be by increasing 
some of the product prices but not the others. This way, the sales loss can partly go to the 
other products which price stays the same. 
3. The last strategy is to increase one product price, while keeping the rest of the product prices 
the same like in scenario 2. 
This discussion involves many different scenarios. Chart 1 summarizes the scenarios stating the 
pros and cons of applying each scenario. This chart is a preview of the discussion to follow in 
this section. 
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Chart 1 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Pros 1. Only need to conduct SSNIP 
and CLA once. 
1. Conceptually correct, 
because it is a more 
plausible profit-maximizing 
strategy.
1. Easy to acquire the data 
which is correct to be used 
in CLA. This is the easiest 
way to avoid concluding a 
too-narrow market by CLA. 
2. Conceptually less incorrect 
than the first scenario. 
3. The number of SSNIP to 
conduct is equal to the 
number of products in the 
relevant market (less than 
scenario 2).
Cons 1. Conceptually incorrect, 
because it is hard to say it is 
profit-maximizing strategy. 
2. Insufficient data to conduct 
the CLA. Currently this is the 
reason why CLA will 
commonly conclude a too-
narrow market. 
3. AIDS is a more suitable 
model for predicting demand 
change when there are 
multiple price increases, 
while the use of AIDS is 
limited to specific occasions.
1. Have to conduct a large 
number of SSNIP and CLA. 
2. Insufficient data to conduct 
the CLA. If we use the 
current way to get the 
required parameters, it will 
impose a risk of concluding 
narrow market too. 
3. AIDS is a more suitable 
model for predicting 
demand change when there 
are multiple price increases, 
while the use of AIDS is 
limited to specific 
occasions.
1. Conceptually less correct 
than the second scenario. 
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It is the case that not only the SSNIP is defined differently, but also the approach we do with the 
calculated CL and AL are different in those scenarios as well. 
The Approach of Scenario One 
If we increase the price of all the products in the candidate market, our biggest challenge is 
finding a good estimation for the CM of the Hypothetical Monopolist which is hard because we 
do not know the market's reaction to this hypothetical monopolist at all. However, the steps after 
finding the CM are relatively simpler than the other scenarios. We need to calculate CL with 
Equation 15. Then calculate Actual Loss (AL), and compare AL with CL. If AL is smaller than 
CL, we are done with the test and conclude that all the products in the candidate market form the 
relevant market. If AL is bigger than CL, we add the product to where the most sales loss goes 
into the candidate market and calculate a new CM before performing CLA again. If we simply 
use the product price of the merging firm, we do not need to recalculate CM. 
The Approach of Scenario Three 
Because the third scenario is a relatively simpler version of the second scenario, discussing the 
third scenario before the second one will enable a clearer introduction. If we only increase the 
price of one product, we use the CM of that product to calculate CL. Then we see how much 
sales are diverted to the products outside the candidate market. We regard this part of sales loss 
as AL, instead of all the sales loss of the products which increased prices.  Then we can compare 
CL with AL; if CL is greater than AL, we are done with the test and all the products within the 
candidate market form a relevant market. If CL is smaller than AL, we pick another product 
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inside the candidate market and do it again. If all of the products are checked and none of them 
makes CL greater than AL, we will add the closest substitution outside the candidate market and 
do the whole process again. 
It is worth mentioning that in this scenario, it does not matter whether the product price increase 
is caused by the merging firms because this test is only for the market division. This test is not 
for predicting whether the merging firms will make a profit by increasing the price. According to 
the Guidelines, the Agencies will analyze the possible actions of the merging companies after we 
define the market. 
The Approach of Scenario Two 
The second scenario also contains two situations. One is to increase some products’ prices in the 
candidate market with the same Y%. The other is to increase some products’ prices, with only 
one  product using SSNIP increase rate of Y% and the rest of the products using SSNIP increase 
rate less than Y%. The latter one is called “variable SSNIP”.  By saying “some”, we mean it 172173
contains all and one, so the second scenario is a combination of the first and third one. It will use 
the first scenario’s approach when increasing all of the product prices and use the third scenarios’ 
approach when not increasing all of the products prices. The only difference from scenario three 
is that it will need to combine different products as we do in the scenario one. 
 Oystein Daljord, Lars Sorgard, & Oyvind Thomasseen, The SSNIP Test and Market Definition with the 172
Aggregate Diversion Ratio: A Reply to Katz and Shapiro, J. Compet. Law Econ. 4, 263 (2008).
 Malcolm B. Coate & Joseph J. Simons, Critical Loss vs. Diversion Analysis: Clearing up the 173
Confusion, The CPI Antitrust Chronicle 1, 1-15 (2009).
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Among the three scenarios, which strategy is going to be profit-maximizing for the hypothetical 
monopolist is decided by the substitution level of the products. If we liberally apply the content 
of Hypothetical Monopolist Test from the Guidelines, even if we do not consider the situation 
when the hypothetical monopolist decreases some of the products under his control, we still need 
to make sure that there is really no profit-maximizing strategy in all the scenarios above, 
including increasing all, some, and one product price, before we add one more product into the 
candidate market. 
Decades ago, it was believed to be too complicated and impossible to try every scenario.  It is 174
no longer difficult using today’s technology. For example, with the same price increase of Y%, 
there are only situations we need to consider for a candidate market with n 
products. Although it will still take significant amount of work to collect the demand data and 
calculate it, it is no longer as hard as it was before.  
If we want to be consistent with the idea of the hypothetical monopolist test, we also need to 
consider variable SSNIP. For a variable SSNIP, most of the steps are the same, because we only 
increase the price by a significant percentage of one product (this product is treated the same as 
the SSNIP product). The increase of the other product price is not necessarily a significant one 
(which means it can be a lot smaller than 5%), but as a portfolio of the price increase, it can 
eventually maximize the profit of the hypothetical monopolist.  
 R. Harris & T. Jorde, Market Definition in the Merger Guidelines: Implications for Antitrust 174
Enforcement, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 464, 481 (1983).
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So for a variable SSNIP, we apply the sales loss prediction calculation to all the other products 
which prices also increase, to calculate the sales loss they encounter. For variable SSNIP, we try 
SSNIP on different products one by one.  The major challenge is that the price increase is 175
continuous, so we need to perform some mathematical process on it or simply do the percentage 
in some certain intervals. It is worth mentioning that, in the CLA author’s paper “Critical loss vs. 
diversion analysis: Clearing up the confusion”,  only single SSNIP and variable SSNIP are 176
mentioned, but not the scenarios in which we need to combine products and calculate CM. 
However, the Agencies seem to combine the products and use the first scenario, which is actually 
less desirable. We are going to talk about this in detail soon. 
The variable SSNIP is less often discussed compared with the other strategies because the 
Agencies and the academia in the 1990s believed that it takes too many calculations. From the 
perspective of a law practitioner, it is good enough that the standard is clear and simple. That is 
the reason why in practice, “the market definition test often … takes the form of asking whether 
the hypothetical monopolist would find it most profitable to raise the prices of all of the products 
 Daljord Oystein & Lars Sorgard & Oyvind Thomasseen, The SSNIP Test and Market Definition with 175
the Aggregate Diversion Ratio: A Reply to Katz and Shapiro, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON., 263 (2008).
 Malcolm B. Coate & Joseph J. Simons, Critical loss vs. diversion analysis: Clearing up the confusion, 176
(2009).
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in the candidate market at least 5 percent above prevailing levels.”  It appears that the 177178
Agencies usually only use the first scenario. 
As we know from the CLA model, CL is calculated with CM and Y, while CM is defined as (P₀ - 
AVC₀)/P₀. From the deduction of the model, we know that P₀ is the price of the product whose 
price has been increased by a SSNIP (SSNIP product). AVC₀ is the average variable cost of the 
SSNIP product. In this scenario, other than the situation where one product forms the relevant 
market (so we only increase one product’s price by a SSNIP), the P₀ and AVC₀ are actually 
representing more than one product. As a result, we need to calculate the P₀ and AVC₀ of the 
combined products. “In practice, the gross margins of the merging suppliers are typically taken 
as representative of the industry because the most reliable data on price and cost readily available 
usually come from the merging parties. In practice, then, the prices and costs of the merging 
parties serve as the basis for the hypothetical-monopolist calculations” . From here, we can 179
infer that the Agencies uses the CM of the merging companies as the CM of all of the products 
controlled by the hypothetical monopolist, from which they will then calculate the CL. 
Nevertheless, it is very hard to justify this way of approximating the hypothetical monopolist’s 
cost and price except for its convenience in application. We understand that this approach is good 
enough to non-arbitrarily define the relevant market. However, it does have some serious 
 M. L. Katz & C. Shapiro, Critical loss: Let's tell the whole story, Antitrust, 17: 49 (2002).177
 The cited paper is written by Michael L. Katz while he was the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for 178
Economic Analysis at the U.S. Department of Justice, so we believe it reflects the fact of antitrust 
practice.
 id.179
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problems from the perspective of modeling. There are three major problems with increasing all 
of the product prices controlled by the hypothetical monopolist as the only way to define a 
SSNIP. 
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3.5.2 The Discussion about the Three Scenarios 
The first scenario is the least desirable approach of SSNIP, which caused most of the criticisms 
of the CLA. The author of the CLA paper explained in his paper “Critical loss vs. diversion 
analysis: Clearing up the confusion”  that the SSNIP should be the second (variable SSNIP) 180
and third approach (single SSNIP). In this section, we are going to discuss the data resource and 
the consequence of the first approach, and clear up some wrongful criticism about CLA, which is 
not due to the model, but due to the application of the first scenario. 
1. If we apply the first scenario to all the situations of the market, it is against the profit-
maximizing assumption of the Hypothetical Monopolist Test. 
The mentioned way of setting SSNIP is contradictory to the question asked by hypothetical 
monopolist test in the Merger Guidelines. “[T]he test requires that a hypothetical profit-
maximizing firm, … likely would impose at least a small but significant and non-transitory 
increase in price … on at least one product in the market, including at least one product sold by 
one of the merging firms.”  181
Although whether a hypothetical monopolist’s profit-maximizing strategy is to increase all the 
products in its control or one of the products depends on market features like substitution levels, 
 Malcolm B. Coate & Joseph J. Simons, Critical loss vs. diversion analysis: Clearing up the confusion, 180
(2009).
 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 4.1.1 The Hypothetical Monopolist Test, Washington, 181
D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice (2010).
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we at least know that the former one requires lower substitution between products inside and 
outside the candidate market. As a result, it is harder for the hypothetical monopolist to profit by 
increasing all of the product prices. Even if the hypothetical monopolist cannot profit under this 
strategy, it is still possible to profit by increasing at least one product’s price in the candidate 
market. The CLA can be a threshold because it is the critical point between being able and being 
unable to profit by increasing price. Thus, if CLA is performed in the way stated above, it loses 
its meaning as a threshold. 
Besides, it is also hard to justify increasing the price of all the products controlled by the 
hypothetical company as a good approximation of a profit-maximizing strategy. In business, it is 
a common sense that differentiated products targeting different customers is more profitable than 
a uniformed strategy. CLA is based on the assumption of profit-maximizing companies. If the 
method of applying data into the model is based on a contradictory assumption, it is difficult to 
justify the result as being reliable. 
Thus, using SSNIP to increase all the product prices in the candidate market is inaccurate. Even 
though the 2010 Guidelines stipulated that “merger analysis does not consist of the uniform 
application of a single methodology”,  it does not make it acceptable that the model they use 182
adopts a method which is inconsistent with its own logic. 
 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 1 Overview, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice 182
(2010).
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2. The merging product’s AVC is not representative enough to be used as an 
approximation of AVC₀ of the Hypothetical Monopolist, in the first and second 
scenario. 
CM was defined as (P₀ - AVC₀)/P₀. It is the average variable cost of the product whose price has 
been increased for a small percentage (the SSNIP product). Therefore when we calculate the CM 
of product i, P₀ should be the prevailing price of product i, so it is P₀i. At the same time,  AVC₀ 
also should be the AVC of product i too. Based on those, the CL calculated can be the amount of 
sales loss a company can take when it increases P₀. For a different product j, CL should be 
calculated with P₀j and AVC₀j. 
AVC₀j and AVC₀i are just AVC₀ of single products. The data will probably be available for the 
Agencies since all the market participants have the responsibility to provide data to the Agencies 
as was required by the Guidelines. As we mentioned above however, the Agencies do not 
increase the product prices separately. Rather, the Agencies increase all of the products’ prices 
controlled by the hypothetical monopolist simultaneously. 
On the other hand, we do not have data from the operation of the manufacturing since the 
monopolist is hypothetical. We need to define a way to calculate AVC₀ of the hypothetical 
monopolist to produce the products whose price have increased. It is worth mentioning that as 
long as there is not only one product with an increasing price, we need to find a way to combine 
the AVC₀ of the products which prices have increased. In the first scenario, it is a way to 
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combine the AVC₀ of all of the products controlled by the hypothetical monopolist. In the second 
scenario, when we are not increasing all of the products’ prices together, it is a way to combine 
the AVC₀ of the products which prices are increasing. As we have mentioned before, what the 
Agencies do is use data of the merging firm as data of the hypothetical monopolist. 
We believe it is incorrect to use the data of the merging firms to represent the other companies’ 
AVC₀. In Figure 1, we show how CL changes as CM increases. 
Figure 1 
As we can see in Figure 1, for a SSNIP of 5%, CL drops from above 80% to below 20% percent 
when CM changes from close to 0 to 25%. When CM is roughly above 37.5%, CL no longer 
changes much as CM increases. In reality, CM can have large variations between different 
companies even when the companies are producing similar products. Unless the data shows that 
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all of the companies which are manufacturing the products in the candidate market have CMs 
higher than 25%, it is hard to argue that a randomly occurring merger is done by companies 
which CM are representative enough that it will not produce misleading CLA result.  
Apart from the big influence CM can impose on the result of CLA, companies who plan to 
acquire another company (let’s say in half a year) can be well-prepared by intentionally lowering 
their CM beforehand to get a significantly lower CL. This way, they can mislead the 
investigation into a larger relevant market. Thus, it is also fundamentally risky to use CM of the 
merging companies as the CM of the hypothetical monopolist.  
About the reason why the Agencies use the merging firms data to represent the other products in 
the candidate market, the cited paper explained the reason is the information provided by the 
merging firm is more reliable. This is not a concrete justification. 
First, the merging firms have the incentive to manipulate the submitted data. There was actually 
a case in which the merging firms increased the price to the point of critical loss six months 
earlier than when they filed the HSR documents in order to make the CLA show that the post-
merger SSNIP will be unprofitable for the merging parties. In fact, CLA does not have the 
mechanism to prevent being tricked by this method as long as the merging companies plan early 
enough in advance. The model we will later propose in Chapter 4 can perfectly avoid this 
problem. 
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Secondly, according to the Guidelines, the Agencies have the power to collect data from market 
participants other than the merging companies. The other suppliers will not have early notice 
about the merger. Even if they do have the notice, it is probably too hard and risky to coordinate 
on this. Therefore, their accounting information is both collectible and reliable. If we collect the 
data from the other suppliers, the next step will be to find a way to combine the data so that it can 
be a rational approximation of the AVC and P of the hypothetical monopolist. Then we can 
calculate a more reliable CM of the hypothetical monopolist. 
The first candidate method is to calculate AVC as the average of all the variable costs among all 
the companies producing the product which is included in the candidate market. This way, we 
need to collect the data of AVC from the producers whose products are in the candidate market. 
The quantity to calculate the AVC will just be the current quantity they are producing. Then we 
average the AVC among them. This is an easy way to approximate the AVC of the hypothetical 
monopolist, because AVC in many industries today will not change much along the production 
quantity due to the automated production technology. 
The second candidate method is to calculate the average variable costs of a product in different 
quantities produced, then average with the weight of quantity. If it is an industry where the AVC 
varies significantly as the quantity of production quantity changes, we need to consider the 
production quantity while approximating the AVC of the hypothetical monopolist. In fact, we do 
not know the optimum production quantity of the hypothetical monopolist. To simplify the 
calculation, we can just assume that the product was produced by the hypothetical monopolist in 
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the same quantity that they are currently producing, although his might not be true since the 
hypothetical monopolist might have other options of quantity. Therefore, the second way will be 
using the AVC currently faced by each real-life manufacturers and averaging them with the 
weight of current production quantity. 
The two methods above can improve the accuracy of the current approach of CLA. However, 
finding a better method to calculate the AVC alone cannot solve the fundamental problem of 
CLA. The fundamental problem is that when we are calculating CL of more than one product, 
the CLA forces us to regard them as one product. Otherwise, we cannot insert the parameters into 
the CLA functions. However, when we combine more than one products, neither the current 
product price nor the average of the price can be used as the price of the combined product, 
because none of those prices are the true reflections of the demand anymore. 
3. The merging product’s P is not representative as an approximation of P₀ of the 
Hypothetical Monopolist, in the first and second scenario. 
The CLA uses the interaction of product price and demand to estimate the substitution level. In 
the premerger cases, there will always be a discussion of substitution to check whether the 
market concluded is consistent to the substitutive level we observe without the CLA model. As 
we know from the CLA model, CM = (P₀ - AVC₀)/P₀. Therefore, CM is Fixed Costs + Profit/P₀. 
For a profit-maximizing company, P₀ of a product is directly related to the demand. Thus, CM 
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contains information about profit and demand. Since the demand-price correlation reflects the 
level of substitution, the information of substitution is also contained in CM. 
Since CLA only gives one parameter to fill in CM and the CM function also only has one 
parameter of P₀, too, if we want to increase two products’ price together, the two products have 
to be combined as one. Those two products are not homogeneous in reality. If they are close but 
different products, as is usually the case for candidate relevant market, their demand will become 
more rigid after they are combined as one. Similarly, when all of the products controlled by the 
Hypothetical Monopolist are bundled together, the demand will be significantly more rigid. 
Therefore, the real price of this combined product should be higher than either of the single 
product price according to the new demand. The difference between the single product price and 
the hypothetical product price will be a lot higher when there are a lot of products to be 
combined. Therefore, the hypothetical product price will not be close to any of the single product 
price in the candidate market. 
If the price we use is not a match with the demand it is correlated to, CLA will either conclude a 
too narrow or too broad market. That is to say that if we use the first approach in the chart and 
increase all the prices together, we need to know a P₀ which is consistent with the real demand of 
the bundled “product”. However, none of the single product’s CM is comparable with a 
substitution level of the bundled “product”. Since we cannot get this P₀ from any single price, 
the P₀ has to be calculated from another demand system which is not using P as the independent 
variable. We cannot know this price unless we find a method other than the price-demand 
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correlation to quantify substitution. We are going to propose another method to quantify 
substitution in Chapter 4. Based on our model, and some further calculation, we will be able to 
get an estimation of P₀. Though our model can come up with the market definition directly, if the 
Agencies find the CLA is more desirable, our model can at least be used to calculate the real P₀. 
On the other hand, this underestimation of the product price will cause an underestimation of 
CM. This is the fundamental reason why CLA almost always conclude a narrower market. If we 
increase all of the product prices together while using a single firm’s CM, the CM of the bundled 
“product” will always be underestimated, as the P₀ is underestimated. Since CL = Y/(Y + CM), 
CL will be overestimated. If CL is overestimated, it will be easier to have AL lower than CL. 
Consequently, the SSNIP is easier to be profitable. The hypothetical monopolist test will end 
earlier and conclude a narrower market than reality. This is consistent with the most common 
criticism of CLA. Those criticisms are usually based on evidence that CLA result is contradictory 
to a more reasonable result from other approaches that the market should have been broader.  183184
However, as we can infer from the paper “Critical loss: Let's tell the whole story” , the 185
Agencies use the first scenario to conduct Hypothetical Monopolist test. The P₀ used by the 
Agencies is the price of the merging firms’ products. The paper did not specify how they 
combined or picked from the merging firms’ products. The Agencies are aware of that the CLA 
 Malcolm B. Coate & Joseph J. Simons, Critical loss vs. diversion analysis: Clearing up the confusion 183
(2009).
 D. P. O’Brien & A. L. Wickelgren, A critical analysis of critical loss analysis, Antitrust LJ, 71: 161 184
(2003).
 M. L. Katz & C. Shapiro, Critical loss: Let's tell the whole story, Antitrust, 17: 49 (2002).185
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tends to conclude a narrower market, but they simply regarded it as a shortcoming of 
CLA.  186187188
The reason of misunderstanding CLA is probably that we calculate CM as (P₀ - AVC₀)/P₀—we 
do not see profit in the equation. It is easy to disregard considering whether the profit is a good 
approximation or not, given that AVC₀ does not seem to be a problem. For the hypothetical 
monopolist, AVC cannot be very different from the real companies’ AVC, and thus the Agencies 
might believe there will not be a problem to use the merging companies’ AVC to “represent” the 
hypothetical monopolist’s AVC. As we already discussed, it is not safe to use the merging 
companies’ AVC, because CL can vary largely with a small change in AVC.  
Until now, we know there are three different scenarios (meaning three possible strategies) that 
the hypothetical monopolist can possibly take to maximize its profit. In the ideal world, we 
should try all of the strategies to see whether it is profitable to increase the price. We need to be 
clear about the Hypothetical Monopolist Test being a way to define the market, and not a 
prediction of what the merging company will do after the merger. The merging companies’ action 
will be explored after the relevant market is found. Although the Agencies’ choice of price 
 Gregory Werden & Froeb Luke, Calibrated economic models add focus, accuracy, and persuasiveness 186
to merger analysis (2002).
 Malcolm B. Coate & Joseph J. Simons, Critical loss vs. diversion analysis: Clearing up the confusion 187
(2009).
 D. P. O’Brien & A. L. Wickelgren, A critical analysis of critical loss analysis, Antitrust LJ, 71: 161 188
(2003).
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increase strategy is inaccurate, the test still serves its purpose of creating a less arbitrary standard 
to define the relevant market since the purpose of the test is only to set a line. 
However, it will still be better to avoid the three problems above by applying the third scenario, 
which is the single SSNIP as was mentioned by the CLA author’s paper “Critical loss vs. 
diversion analysis: Clearing up the confusion” . However, the author also mentioned variable 189
SSNIP without mentioning the danger of concluding a narrower market. Since a variable SSNIP 
will also increase product price at the same time as done in the first scenario, the problem in 
estimating P₀ will exist as well. Therefore we recommend using the third scenario. If CL is 
calculated with a single product SSNIP approach, we can use the actual CM and P₀ of the 
products to calculate CL, so the P₀ will be consistent with the real demand. 
The third scenario is not perfect. It is not as complete as the second scenario. However, despite 
being conceptually incomplete, it is the easiest way to avoid the result of a narrow market. It will 
also be a more reasonable strategy for the hypothetical monopolist to increase the price of one 
product rather than increasing the price of all of the products since most of the sales loss of the 
SSNIP product will go to the other products under his control. 
The hypothetical monopolist test is in its essence a way to find the level of substitution because 
the method of quantifying substitution is not available. It is a good idea because it uses the 
switching of the customer to a new product as a measure of substitution. Substitution is a multi-
 Malcolm B. Coate & Joseph J. Simons, Critical loss vs. diversion analysis: Clearing up the confusion 189
(2009).
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dimensional concept, which we will discuss in Chapter 4. It is multi-dimensional so it is hard to 
measure with traditional economic tools. It has to be approximated by its mapping on a one-
dimensional value. In this sense, the switch of customers is probably the best choice because 
customers will automatically consider all the dimensions for us and make a one-dimensional 
decision—switch to something else or not. 
However, to achieve a good approximation of substitution, we need to do the hypothetical 
monopolist test more liberally. We should at least do the single product process, not just simply 
increase all the products’ prices in the candidate market. Otherwise, we will be too far away from 
the original correct idea of either CLA or hypothetical monopolist test. Therefore, although the 
CLA seems to make the hypothetical monopolist test a lot easier, it is in fact not as easy as has 
been done by the Agencies. It can be very complicated and involve significant calculations. 
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3.6 Another Incorrect Criticism to 
the Critical Loss Analysis 
The Critical Loss Analysis has been criticized as being partly inconsistent with classical 
economics.  The reason is based on the shape of CLA curves. If we compare the CL with 190191192
different CM, we will see the CL drops faster when the CM is low. Those researches blames 
CLA for concluding a higher CL giving more space of demand decrease for higher contribution 
margin company (the high-profit company) and lower CL to a lower contribution margin 
company. They believe this is inconsistent to the classical economics. See Figure 2 as a 
comparison of the general tendency. On the right is a closer look at SSNIP price change. 
Therefore, it was concluded that the CLA is more lenient to high CM industry. 
 G J. Werden, Beyond critical loss: Tailoring applications of the hypothetical monopolist paradigm, 190
(2002).
 M. B. Coate, M. D. Williams, A critical commentary on the critical comments on critical loss, The 191
Antitrust Bulletin, 53(4), 987-1025 (2008).
 D. P. O’Brien, A. L. Wickelgren, A critical analysis of critical loss analysis, Antitrust LJ, 71: 161 192
(2003).
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Figure 2 
Since we do not have specific data to draw the demand, we use a normal-looking random 
demand curve to represent the tendency that those economists are indicating in Figure 2. From 
figure 2, we can see that if the CL is compared to a single general tendency of the demand, the 
CLA tend to conclude that CL is smaller than the demand decrease when CM is small, and CL is 
larger than the demand decrease when CM is large. Therefore, we see that the tendency of CL is 
inconsistent with the belief that a company with a higher margin shall be given a more strict 
standard of CL and not a looser one. However, a company with higher marginal profit will lose 
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more money in each sale they lose. Therefore, it is rational to give a higher CL to a higher CM 
company.  193
At the same time, since the function of CLA is just a result of an algebraic deduction, CL and 
CM in fact will always match each other under the logic embedded in the function. Figure 3 
shows a comparison of the change of CL along with the change of CM. To discuss the tendency 
between CL and CM, we should look at Figure 3 instead of comparing a random demand with 
CL like Figure 2. In Figure 3, we can see CL does go down as CM goes up, which is consistent 
with the classical economics. 
 
Figure 3 
 This explanation was rebutted by the paper with an example of comparing AL and CL : D. P. O’Brien 193
& A. L. Wickelgren, A critical analysis of critical loss analysis, Antitrust LJ, 71, 161 (2003) 
However, as we already discussed in the section introducing the calculation of AL, the way they used to 
calculate AL is inaccurate itself. In the following content, we are going to show that this explanation is 
correct.
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Also, when we consider the comparison of critical demand and real demand, we should not just 
consider the general tendency of the demand, but consider it under the context of each CM. 
When the CM is very small like 1%, it means the company is selling at a price near marginal 
cost, the competition is fierce and the substitution level is high. It is a market close to the perfect 
competition market. As we know about the perfect competition market, the reason for such low-
profit margin is that the customer will all switch when the price goes up, since the products are 
homogeneous. Therefore, in the context of CM close to 1%, the demand curve should be like the 
blue line in Figure 4. 
Similarly if a company’s CM is as high as 91%, the profit margin is large if this situation is not 
caused by an extremely high fixed cost This usually happens in a market where the demand is 
very rigid or where the customers are very insensitive about the price change. If so, the demand 
curve should be more like the black line in Figure 4.  
!121
A New Solution to Market Definition                                  
 
Figure 4 
Therefore, the criticism of CLA being contradictory to classical economics is incorrect. In fact, 
since CLA is a pure algebra approach, it is quite accurate as long as the data used is not 
inaccurate. However, CLA has its limits as well. In the next section, we are going to discuss the 
limit of CLA and SSNIP test. 
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3.7 The real problem of SSNIP and CLA 
Up until now, we have finished the discussion about the correct way to perform a Critical Loss 
Analysis. As we have mentioned, different ways of performing CLA can produce different 
results. Some of the results can be quite inaccurate. Although we admit that increasing all of the 
products’ price is one of the possible strategies for maximizing profit, which serves the function 
of making a bright line of market definition, it is inaccurate under the economic theory. In fact, 
most criticisms that CLA originated from the specific way of performing CLA. Those criticisms 
are based on a partial understanding of CLA, causing CLA to be distrusted by the courts. 
On the other hand, although it seems that the CLA equation is simple and the only assumption it 
makes is that AVC₀ is equal or approximately equal to AVC₁, the application of CLA is not as 
easy as it was suggested by the author. An approach with fewer steps and calculations will make 
it more difficult to find the real CM. An approach without the difficulty in calculating the CM 
will involve a lot of steps and calculations. To do a reliable CLA, we need significantly more 
calculations and data collection. However these are not the real problem of SSNIP and CLA; as 
long as we can get a correct estimation of the parameters, these can all be solved. We are going 
to discuss the real problem of SSNIP and CLA in this section. These problems are harder or 
impossible to be solved with the tools we currently have. 
1. A conceptual flaw in the foundation of SSNIP approach. 
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The Guidelines’ Hypothetical Monopolist Test asks whether the whole group of the firms will 
benefit from the SSNIP, as if they are a hypothetical monopolist. We need to note that the result 
of the test does not mean that any particular firm can make a profit on the SSNIP. As a result, if 
there is no conspiracy, those firms will not profit by increasing price with or without the merger 
by themselves. Therefore, it’s not very convincing to use this test. In respond to this concern, the 
DOJ explained the reason for using this test in the reprint of the Guidelines: “[t]he logic of this 
approach is that such a group of producers, if they are able to coordinate their behavior, have the 
joint ability and incentive to lessen compensation and raise prices. By contrast, a proper subset of 
these producers would not have this ability.”194
As we have mentioned in Chapter 2, the Hypothetical Monopolist’s behavior is relevant to the 
market  definition  context  because  if  the  firms  producing  the  product  “controlled”  by  the 
hypothetical monopolist collude in increasing the price at the same time, they will profit, i.e., 
they have the incentive to collude. However, this conclusion is irrelevant to whether they are 
capable of doing so or not. Price fixing is illegal. There are also a lot of practical difficulties to 
collude and unify motion like a “hypothetical monopolist”. Based on game theory, if we assume 
that the products in a group are close substitutes and the manufacturers have a secret deal to 
increase all of the prices by 5%, the payoff for one manufacturer to breach the deal and sell at a 
lower price is larger than the payoff for obeying the deal if we do not consider the other cost of 
the breach and the switching cost. Because of this incentive to breach, it’s difficult to conclude 
that the collusion will happen just because it is theoretically profitable to collude.
 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines § 2.0, reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4491 et 194
seq. (1984).
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Even if the Agencies can use the Hypothetical Monopolist Test to define a relevant market, they 
have  to  analysis  the  merging  firms’ profit  and  demand  pattern  in  the  relevant  market  to 
investigate the effect of a merger because “[d]ifferent firms …  may have different cost functions 
or may face different demand elasticities.”  We need a company-specific analysis after the 195
market definition to determine whether the coordinated effects are severe enough to bring a risk 
of collusion. In this case, neither the reason given by the DOJ nor the reason given by the 
definition of SSNIP provides a foundation to why we should use this specific test.  
However, this one-dimensional demand change as a quantification of substitution is continuous. 
There is no reason provided by SSNIP as why we should draw the line there instead of anywhere 
else. Despite the arbitrariness becoming more obscure and hidden behind a model, the SSNIP 
combined with CLA is no less arbitrary than the former demand elasticity approach. After all, 
there is no solid reason why the line should be there. Meanwhile, a poor application of CLA and 
SSNIP will make the result even worse as we have discussed in earlier sections. 
2. We cannot rely on prediction outside the range of data. 
Calculating the demand curve is the essential and most evidence-based step. As we have 
mentioned in earlier sections, none of the demand models perfectly serves our needs. FTC 
economists mentioned in works that other than linear elasticity, they also use constant elasticity, 
 Barry C. Harris & Joseph J. Simons, Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is 195
Necessary, Footnote 12, 21 J. Reprints Antitrust L. & Econ., 151, 172 (1991).
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Logit, AIDS, semi-log models to predict demand. However, for all the fitted models we are not 
sure whether the model makes good prediction outside the range of data. No matter how much 
data we collect before a merger, none of the models are reliable enough on predicting things after 
the merger. Although this concern will be partially relieved after we take product features or all 
of the product price change in the relevant market into consideration, we still do not know the 
change of production cost after the merger and other resources brought about by a merger. 
However, all of those have the potential to heavily affect the demand after the merger. Therefore, 
theoretically we cannot use the predicted result based on premerger data as its exact value to 
compare with a specific value and get a conclusion, similar to what we do in CLA. 
3. In reality, the consumers do not have perfect information. 
From the history of market division in the Guidelines, we can infer that the hypothetical 
monopolist test is a way to find the level of substitution. In early the 1980s, the method of 
quantifying substitution was not available. In essence, SSNIP is to solve the problem of being 
unable to quantify substitution. SSNIP uses customer reaction as the indicator of substitution so 
that a multi-dimensional substitution can be mapped in one value and be calculated using 
traditional economics tools. 
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Theoretically, this method is more reliable when the customer has perfect information about the 
product so that they can switch to the next best substitution after the price increase.  This is 196
usually true in a material market where the downstream manufacturers usually have enough 
professional knowledge about the materials that they need to spend a fortune on. However, this is 
not always true in a consumer goods market. Customers are not able to see the whole picture of 
all the substitutes in the market. They usually rely on advertisements or personal experiences as a 
resource of information. Advertisements are usually pro-sales and cannot be fully trusted. 
Personal experience usually takes time to gain. Thus unless the switch was tracked for long 
period of time, it won’t be a good reflection of the market. 
The Department was aware of this problem when making the 1982 Guidelines. Because of this, 
the SSNIP test has a non-transitory requirement. The non-transitory period is usually one year. 
We originally believe that this one year period can serve as a social experiment, which makes up 
for the deficiency of customers’ information or the deficiency in predicting things outside the 
range of the data. However, since SSNIP is only a theoretical framework, the calculation is in 
fact done by CLA. Meanwhile, CLA relies on demand prediction models to calculate Actual 
Loss. Although CLA itself does not have a preference in the method for calculating Actual Loss
—the choice of method to calculate Actual Loss decides whether CLA takes the imperfect 
information into consideration. 
 Economic theory assumes consumer sovereignty, in which consumers have perfect information and 196
perfect decision-making capacities. These assumptions are useful in economics, but they are also too far 
away from reality. Market definition is a legal proceeding, if we have other choices, we should not make 
an assumption which is too different from the reality.
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The use of a year of transactional data before the investigation make sense. Although it is not 
exactly what the Guidelines say, the one year period will have a similar effect as if we add 
product feature parameters into the demand prediction model or consider all of the products’ 
prices while making predictions . However, if the product feature is only one of the variables in 197
the model, we will need to single-dimensionalize the product features, after which we will lose a 
lot of information useful to the regression. If we use more than one variable as the product 
features, we can actually get to the conclusion of market definition directly since product 
features are directly related to substitution. There is no necessity to go through the tunnel of 
demand since the demand has to be one dimensional. This is the basic idea behind the model we 
are going to propose in Chapter 4. 
On the other hand, although the agencies use one year’s worth of transaction data, in some 
industries like durable goods one year might not be enough to explore and switch to other 
products and build personal experience. For products which are not quickly consumed or 
products which incur non-minimum switching costs, a one-year period is not enough. For the 
industries where products are quickly upgraded or the industries where new entries occur 
frequently, the change of market share is still not representative enough to depict a picture of the 
real substitution between the goods. 
The hypothetical monopolist test combined with CLA is the winner of all the models available 
now to define the relevant product market. Both the hypothetical monopolist test and the CLA 
 This is the way AIDS uses. By taking all the product price into consideration, the preferences and 197
substitution level can be reflected in the price correlations.
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are bright designs. They have been serving the purpose of market definition for decades. 
However, limited by the technology available at that time, they also have considerable 
unavoidable problems. Although the Guidelines adopted both of the Hypothetical Monopolist 
Test and the CLA, the Agencies are also open to other models proposed to serve the same 
purpose. In the next chapter, we are going to propose a new approach to solve the problem of 
market definition. Hopefully, it will be useful to the future practice of the premerger 
investigations.  
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Chapter 4: A New Approach to 
the Market definition 
4. 1 Background 
— “Substitution” and Its Substitution 
Ever since the market definition and market power test were established by the landmark case 
“Brown Shoe Co. v. United States” , they have been the most important factors considered by 198
the court in merger review cases. As Jonathan Baker has commented in his paper “Market 
definition: An analytical overview”, “[t]hroughout the history of U.S. antitrust litigation, the 
outcome of more cases has surely turned on market definition than on any other substantive 
issue.”  199
We concluded from the discussion in Chapter 3 that the Critical Loss Analysis was wrongfully 
criticized many times. Meanwhile, there are also many undesirable aspects, which will render the 
premerger investigation and merger injunction into a risk of unfair results. As we can see from 
the previous discussion, due to the limitation of the applied models, this risk of unfairness is 
 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).198
 Jonathan B. Baker, Market definition: An analytical overview, Antitrust Law Journal 74.1, 129-173 199
(2007).
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significantly higher than the risk of unfairness normally expected by the parties in the legal 
proceedings. 
We also mentioned in Chapter 3 that on the other hand, a hypothetical monopolist’s motivation to 
increase price is not equivalent to an after-acquisition company’s motivation to increase the 
price. Not considering all the compromises made in the models’ accuracy for the sake of the 
calculation convenience, the CLA can theoretically examine whether the Hypothetical 
Monopolist is able to profit by increasing the product price. However, a positive conclusion on 
this test is not very pertinent to the prediction of the merged company’s post-merger actions. 
Even though the Hypothetical Monopolist Test equipped with CLA is capable of setting up a 
bright line on the level of substitutability to decide how far the relevant market should go, the 
line itself does not have much theoretical significance.   200
We agree that the CLA under the framework of the Hypothetical Monopolist Test is a 
breakthrough, and it is “one of the major developments of the modern Merger Guidelines era” . 201
However, based on the background that the 1968 Merger Guidelines’ substitution rule was 
replaced because it cannot be supported by quantitative methods, it is not hard to see that the 
Hypothetical Monopolist Test and the CLA are both the results of the compromise made due to 
the limited computing technology. Just as Farrell and Carl concluded, “[w]hile much has been 
written in antitrust economics on how best to define markets, the fact is that in many 
 As we discussed in Chapter 3, the reason given by the DOJ to explain why to apply Hypothetical 200
Monopolist Test is also obscure and illogical.
 David Scheffman & Malcolm Coate & Louis Silvia, Twenty years of merger guidelines enforcement at 201
the FTC: An economic perspective, Antitrust LJ 71, 277 (2003).
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differentiated-product industries, there is no absolute right way to draw boundaries that are 
inevitably somewhat arbitrary.”  202
Nevertheless, CLA is still a winner in market definition methods. Despite all the downsides and 
the long-lasting criticisms, the Agencies adopted CLA in the 2010 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines . Compared to the Hypothetical Monopolist Test, CLA waited for an extraordinarily 203
long period to be adopted. The adoption is likely due to the fact that there were not better models 
proposed by the academia to define the relevant market under the theoretical framework of 
Hypothetical Monopolist Test stipulated by the 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. In the paper 
“Antitrust evaluation of horizontal mergers: An economic alternative to market definition”, 
Farrell and Shapiro commented, “[i]t echoes the difficulty of merger investigation itself by 
requiring the analyst to predict price changes by a counterfactual firm. In some cases, it can thus 
fail to provide the desired simple, practical, rapid, and reasonably accurate diagnostic.”   204
Both data science and statistical analysis have been developing fast in the past few decades. After 
CLA was adopted by the Guidelines, many analysis which was unpractical became feasible 
under computational power available today. In this chapter, we are going to propose an 
alternative way to define the relevant market, which is consistent with the spirit of the market 
 Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust evaluation of horizontal mergers: An economic alternative to 202
market definition, The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 10.1 (2010).
 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 4.1.3 Implementing the Hypothetical Monopolist 203
Test, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice (2010).
 Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust evaluation of horizontal mergers: An economic alternative to 204
market definition, The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 10.1 (2010).
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definition once upon “Brown Shoe Co. v. United States”. Our model is not base on any 
assumptions inconsistent with the principle of merger review or the reality. It was built solely on 
substitution theory, which we believe is the essence of the market definition theory. 
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4.1.1 The Substitution Theory in the 1968 Merger Guidelines 
The 1968 Merger Guidelines defines the relevant market based on “product dimension ([‘]line of 
commerce[’])”and “geographic dimension ([‘]section of the country[’])” . It describes the 205
product dimension as “[t]he sales of any product or service which is distinguishable as a matter 
of commercial practice from other products or services will ordinarily constitute a relevant 
product market, even though, from the standpoint of most purchasers, other products may be 
reasonably, but not perfectly, interchangeable with it in terms of price, quality, and use.”  In 206
simple words, the relevant product market should be constituted by products which are 
reasonably inter-changeable considering their price, quality and use. 
This definition is consistent with the landmark case “United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours 
& Co.” decided by the Supreme Court in 1956. In that case, the Supreme Court held “that market 
is composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they 
are produced -- price, use, and qualities considered.”  At that time, the concept of the relevant 207
product was not invented yet. When the concept of the relevant product market was invented in 
another landmark case “Brown Shoe Co. v. United States”, the Supreme Court added “cross-
elasticity of demand” into consideration when delineating market boundary. “The outer 
boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the 
 The 1968 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 3 Market Definition, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of 205
Justice (1968).
 id.206
 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).207
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cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it.”  The 1968 208
Guidelines only used “price, use and qualities” when defining the relevant product 
market.  209
The definition above in the 1968 Guidelines is based on the similarity between the products. In 
regarding each product, the similarity is based on the characteristics of it. The 1968 Guidelines 
further added, “[o]n the other hand, the sales of two distinct products to a particular group of 
purchasers can also appropriately be grouped into a single market where the two products are 
reasonably interchangeable for that group regarding price, quality, and use. In the second case, 
however, it may be necessary to also include in that market the sales of one or more other 
products which are equally interchangeable with the two products regarding price, quality, and 
use from the standpoint of that group of purchasers for whom the two products are 
interchangeable.” 
The main damage caused by limiting market competition is limiting the choice consumers have 
to substitute the product which price has increased due to the market power of the manufacturer. 
If there are not close substitutions, the consumers will have to choose from not purchasing or 
purchasing at a higher price. In this case, some consumers will decide not to buy the product. 
 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).208
 The 1982 Guidelines used “cross-elasticity of demand” instead. The relevant product market in the 209
1982 Guidelines will be discussed in the next section.
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Eventually, there will be fewer people willing to buy and consume the product, meaning there 
will be less social welfare created and less consumer surplus.  In contrast, if consumers have 210
enough close substitute, the price increase will not hurt consumers’ interest. 
The 1968 Guidelines further explained. “In enforcing Section 7 the Department seeks primarily 
to prevent mergers which change market structure in a direction likely to create a power to 
behave non-competitively in the production and sale of any particular product, even though that 
power will ultimately be limited, though not nullified, by the presence of other similar products 
that, while reasonably interchangeable, are less than perfect substitutes. ”  To elucidate the 211
difference between the homogeneous products and heterogeneous but substitutable products, the 
1968 Guidelines further stated, “[i]t is in no way inconsistent with this effort also to pursue a 
policy designed to prohibit mergers between firms selling distinct products, where the result of 
the merger may be to create or enhance the companies’ market power due to the fact that the 
products, though not perfectly substitutable by purchasers, are significant enough 
alternatives to constitute substantial competitive influences on the production, development 
or sale of each.” 
Since the concern of market power is mostly on insufficient substitution, level of substitutability 
is a direct and natural basis to define the relevant market. This is probably the reason why both 
the first landmark case and the first Merger Guidelines chose “reasonable interchangeability” as 
 N. G. Mankiw, Principles of microeconomics (4th ed. 2006).210
 The 1968 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 3. Market Definition, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. 211
of Justice (1968).
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the standard for defining the relevant market. However, this standard was widely criticized by 
academia in the 1970s. The concerns are mainly about arbitrariness involved in deciding the 
case.  At that time, there was not a good method to quantify substitution. The economists 212213
believe there should be a quantitative standard in defining the market. However, the technology 
limited the complexity of economic models accessible at the time. The available data are also 
limited to the routine accounting data . Therefore substitution theory was replaced by the 214
Hypothetical Monopolist Test in 1982 due to the technical reasons. 
 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market power in antitrust cases, Harvard Law Review, 212
937-996 (1981).
 Joseph E. Fortenberry, Definition of Markets in Merger Cases: Developments Since the 1968 213
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, Howard LJ,  25, 595 (1982)
 Donald F. Turner, Observations on the New Merger Guidelines and the 1968 Merger Guidelines, 214
Antitrust LJ 51, 307 (1982)
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4.1.2 The Hypothetical Monopolist Test—A Substitution of the “Substitution 
Theory” 
In 1981, Landes and Posner proposed the Hypothetical Monopolist Test in their paper “Market 
power in antitrust cases” . Soon enough, in the 1982 Merger Guidelines, the DOJ accepted the 215
suggestion from the economists and adopted the Hypothetical Monopolist Test. We have 
discussed the Hypothetical Monopolist Test in great details in Chapter 3. From Chapter 3, we 
learned that a Hypothetical Monopolist Test which functionally reflects the substitution is not as 
simple as it seems to be. The Hypothetical Monopolist Test and the CLA should have been more 
complex and data intensive than the current application. In this section, we are going to compare 
the Hypothetical Monopolist Test and the concept of substitution. 
The 1982 Guidelines stipulated, “[t]aking the product of the merging firm as a beginning point, 
the Department will establish a provisional product market. The Department will include in the 
provisional market those products that the merging firm's consumers view as good substitutes at 
prevailing prices… The Department will add additional products to the market if a significant 
percentage of the buyers of products already included would be likely to shift to those other 
products in response to a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price.”  The 216
Hypothetical Monopolist Test is innovative in using consumer behavior to approximate the 
 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market power in antitrust cases,  Harvard Law Review, 215
937-996 (1981).
 The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section II. Market Definition and Measurement, A. Product 216
Market Definition, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice (1982).
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substitutive relations. This method is based on a reasonable assumption that consumers will only 
switch to the products which they believe are reasonably interchangeable with the price-
increasing product. This assumption is the reason why we can use the change in sales to reflect 
the substitutive relations. 
However, we can infer from the 1982 Guidelines that compared to the 1968 Guidelines, the 
Hypothetical Monopolist Test is an approximation of the actual substitution in the market. To be 
specific, in the 1970s, the multi-dimensional method to quantify and calculate substitutive 
relations was not available. Products features are multi-dimensional. Consumers will also 
consider multiple aspects while buying alternatives when the target product price has increased. 
After considering multiple product features, the consumers will eventually switch to a 
substitution which is close enough or decide to buy the original product with an increased price. 
Since the consumers usually do not have much information about the products that they have not 
used yet, finding the best substitution might take them several switch attemps. Closer 
substitutions will eventually attract more consumers. The one-dimensional demand change will 
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reflect the multi-dimensional substitutive relations. This is the original intention of the 
Hypothetical Monopolist Test . 217
Besides the Hypothetical Monopolist Test, the 1982 Merger Guidelines also stipulated the 
standard of evaluating product substitutability.  Since the Hypothetical Monopolist Test is 218
measuring the demand change, a separate evaluation of substitutability should be independent of 
the Hypothetical Monopolist Test. As we already expounded in Chapter 3, the Hypothetical 
Monopolist Test was “completely nonoperational”  before the Critical Loss Analysis. This was 219
probably the reason why a separate evaluation of substitutability existed. 
 When the high frequency purchaser data was used in estimating demand change, we no longer need to 217
wait for actual sales change to be observed after the price increase, because by taking the historical price-
demand relations into consideration, the change of sales quantity can be predicted by the change of price. 
However, we need to face the common limit to all the predictions based on regressions—the range of data 
acquired. If the product have not incurred an individual 5% price increase, we cannot assume the demand 
will maintain the shape and be predicted through the same model at the 5% price increase. If there is a 
demand theory to explain the correlation, we might be able to justify the prediction outside the range of 
the data. However, as we have discussed in Chapter 3: 2.4 The demand systems to calculate Actual Loss, 
all the demand models used have some significant problems. 
Besides, all the demand models try to find the correlation between demand and price. In those models, 
product features are not regressors. When more complicated substitutive relations, i.e., the products has 
many dimensions of features to be considered, the 5% price change may not be significant enough 
compared to the noise we can get from the real-world.
 Besides the Hypothetical Monopolist Test, the DOJ added, a substitution test in the 1982 Guidelines is 218
as follows: 
“In evaluating product substitutability, the Department will consider any relevant evidence, but will give 
particular weight to the following factors:  
1. Evidence of buyers' perceptions that the products are or are not substitutes, particularly if those 
buyers have shifted purchases between the products in response to changes in relative price or 
other competitive variables;  
2. Similarities or differences between the products in customary usage, design, physical composition 
and other technical characteristics;  
3. Similarities or differences in the price movements of the products over a period of years; and  
4. Evidence of sellers' perceptions that the products are or are not substitutes, particularly if business 
decisions have been based on those perceptions. ” 
The fourth factor can be understood as a mix of intrinsic substitution and extrinsic substitution. When 
considering the quantity of production, the manufacturer will consider the extrinsic substitution. When 
considering the production cost, the manufacturer will consider the intrinsic substitution.
 G. Stigler & R. Sherwin, The Extent of the Market, J. Law and Econ, 28, 555, 582 (1985).219
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The Critical Loss Analysis was first published in 1989 . In the 1992 Merger Guidelines, the 220
level of substitutability test was removed. Although the 1992 Guidelines did not adopt the 
Critical Loss Analysis, the Hypothetical Monopolist Test along with the observation of consumer 
switch became the only standard.  However, we should not disregard the original purpose of 221
the Hypothetical Monopolist Test—to offer a way to quantify the level of substitutability. Neither 
should we disregard the original purpose of the Critical Loss Analysis—to offer an operational 
quantitative model to conduct the Hypothetical Monopolist Test. In the next section, we will 
discuss the quantification of substitutability. We will also explore the reason why despite the 
application of the Hypothetical Monopolist Test and the CLA, a non-arbitrary market definition 
is still believed to be unlikely . 222
 Barry C. Harris & Joseph J. Simons, Focusing market definition: How much substitution is necessary,  220
J. Reprints Antitrust L. & Econ. 21, 151 (1991). 
This paper was first published on “Research in Law and Economics 207” in 1989. It was reprinted in 
1991.
 The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 1.1 Product Market Definition, 1.11 General 221
Standards, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice (1992). 
Besides the Hypothetical Monopolist Test, the DOJ added the following test to measure the reaction of 
consumers: 
“In considering the likely reaction of buyers to a price increase, the Agency will take into account all 
relevant evidence, including, but not limited to, the following: 
1. evidence that buyers have shifted or have considered shifting purchases between products in 
response to relative changes in price or other competitive variables; 
2. evidence that sellers base business decisions on the prospect of buyer substitution between 
products in response to relative changes in price or other competitive variables; 
3. the influence of downstream competition faced by buyers in their output markets; and 
4. the timing and costs of switching products.”
 Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust evaluation of horizontal mergers: An economic alternative to 222
market definition, The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 10.1 (2010).
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Meanwhile, the amount switched reflects how close the substitute product is to the SSNIP 
product . The level of substitutability will affect the profit and the motivation to increase the 223
price. These can be inferred from the 2010 Guidelines: “[w]hen applying the hypothetical 
monopolist test to define a market around a product offered by one of the merging firms, if the 
market includes a second product, the Agencies will normally also include a third product if that 
third product is a closer substitute for the first product than is the second product. The third 
product is a closer substitute if, in response to a SSNIP on the first product, greater revenues are 
diverted to the third product than to the second product.”  224
It is worth noting that the Hypothetical Monopolist Test has a non-transitory requirement. The 
Agencies explained the reason to have the requirement in the 1982 Guidelines. “The potential 
weakness of such a market based solely on existing patterns of supply and demand is that those 
patterns might change substantially if the prices of the products included in the provisional 
market were to increase. For this reason, the Department will test further and, if necessary, 
expand the provisional market.”  The test allows a year to modify the result of market 225
definition due to further changes of demand. 
Theoretically, this one year period will also allow the consumers to change their mind and try 
multiple products in their following purchases. It is a practical mitigation to the inaccuracy 
 The product whose price has a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price.223
 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 4.1.1 The Hypothetical Monopolist Test, Washington, 224
D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice (2010).
 The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section II Market Definition and Measurement, A. Product 225
Market Definition, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice (1982).
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caused by consumers’ limited information about the product that they have not used yet so that 
the model does not have to make the unrealistic assumption of consumers’ perfect information. 
After a year of trying and switching, the new sales volume will indicate the new substitutive 
relations. The change in sales volume indicates the level of substitutability between the products 
in the candidate relevant market, delivering us the result we cannot get by calculation. Therefore, 
the original idea of “small but significant and non-transitory increase in price”(SSNIP) has the 
quality of a social science experiment. 
Since the computing technology in the 1970s does not support multi-dimensional substitutability 
models, the Hypothetical Monopolist Test is a great invention in the history of antitrust 
premerger investigation. Despite the history of being widely misused , the Critical Loss 226
Analysis is also a historical invention in antitrust premerger investigation. It was designed to 
solve the problem of “how much substitution is necessary” in the Hypothetical Monopolist 
Test.  Learning from the path of the Hypothetical Monopolist Test, we may conclude that the 227
test is serving as a “substitution” of the substitution theory. Therefore, if there is a model for 
directly evaluating substitutability, it is theoretically acceptable for usage according to the theory 
of market competition and the theory of the Hypothetical Monopolist Test. Besides, the 
Hypothetical Monopolist Test and the CLA have many problems as we have discussed in 
Chapter 3. There is a need to update or supplement the model used in the premerger 
investigation. 
 See Chapter 3226
 Barry C. Harris & Simons J. Joseph, Focusing market definition: How much substitution is necessary, 227
J. Reprints Antitrust L. & Econ, 21, 151 (1991).
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Three decades have passed since then, computational technology has been developing quickly. 
Data collection and analysis technologies have been predominantly advanced in the past few 
years. Nowadays, social science academia is equipped with better tools to make inference and 
predictions. On the other hand, the Guidelines do not exclude the use of other useful models
—“[t]hese Guidelines should be read with the awareness that merger analysis does not consist of 
uniform application of a single methodology. Rather, it is … the Agencies … apply a range of 
analytical tools to the reasonably available and reliable evidence to evaluate competitive 
concerns … Where these Guidelines provide examples, they are illustrative and do not exhaust 
the applications of the relevant principle.” 
In this Chapter, we are going to propose two unsupervised machine learning method to define the 
relevant market, which involves fewer assumptions and more data. 
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4.2 Quantification of substitutability 
4.2.1 Utility Is Not Substitutability 
From the discussion in Section 3.1, we learned that both the SSNIP test and the CLA use change 
in product demand to quantify the level of substitutability. In this section, we are going to discuss 
further about quantification of substitutability. It is easy to associate substitutability with utility. 
The AIDS demand model we have discussed in Chapter 3 used utility as a quantifiable indicator 
of consumers’ preference. However, although utility has been used in many pieces of antitrust 
research, we believe utility is not the right quantification of substitutability. 
Utility is a commonly used idea in economics. The well-known economics textbook written by 
Paul Samuelson, Economics, defines utility as “… utility denotes satisfaction … it refers to how 
consumers rank different goods and services”  Another famous economics textbook, 228
Economics, written by Gregory Mankiw simply defines utility as “level of satisfaction” . There 229
are other definitions of utility which is different from the general ones. In Kahneman and Snell’s 
paper “Predicting Utility”, utility was defined as “a decision maker's anticipation of the hedonic 
quality of a future experience” . In Higgins’s “Making a good decision: value from fit”, utility 230
was abstractly defined as “worth to some end” . Even though there are so many different 231
definitions, we can still conclude that the idea of utility is to use one abstract value to represent 
 Paul A. Samuelson & William D Nordhaus, Economics, (19th ed 2012).228
 Gregory N. Mankiw, Macroeconomics, (3rd ed 1997).229
 Daniel Kahneman & Jackie Snell, Predicting utility, (1990).230
 Tory E. Higgins, Making a good decision: value from fit,  American psychologist, 55.11, 1217 (2000).231
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the satisfaction and preference over a product. Utility is not a fixed number. It can be quantified 
in many different ways. The value also changes vis-a-vis different consumers. 
Two most common approaches to quantify utility are through ordinal utility and cardinal utility. 
Ordinal utility is an ordinal scale representing the preferences of a person. The ordinal utility 
theory believes it is only meaningful to query which option is better than the other. It is not 
useful to query how much better the option is or how good the option is. In contrast, cardinal 
utility tries to quantify the difference between the utility of different products. Originally, it uses 
one product as a unit, and uses the ratio of satisfaction to quantify the utility of the other product. 
In this method, utility has a tangible meaning. For example, if we use the utility of an orange as a 
unit, the utility of a meal will be 3 units when the consumer gets three times more satisfied to 
have a meal than to have an orange. Cardinal utility function is a utility index that preserves 
preference orderings uniquely up to positive affine transformations.  However, “[f]rom most 232
branches of economics, the concept of cardinal utility has been eliminated as redundant since 
ordinal utility has been found to suffice for doing the job of predicting the choice of consumers. 
Cardinal utility has been kept only in welfare economics to support the demand for a more equal 
income distribution … [and] in risk analysis.”  Utility can be formed in different functions 233
based on the context. There are other functions quantifying the ordinal and the cardinal utilities 
as well. 
 Daniel Ellsberg, Classic and Current Notions of 'Measurable Utility’, Economic Journal, 64 (255), 232
528–556 (1954)
 J. C. Harsanyi, Cardinal utility in welfare economics and in the theory of risk-taking, Journal of 233
Political Economy, 61(5): 434-435, (1953)
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Besides the two traditional types of utility, there are other ways to quantify utilities. For example, 
one method is based on an assumption that the amount of money left with a consumer after 
consumption of goods also creates utility to the consumer, and that the amount of money left is 
correlated to the utility brought by the consumption of goods. The marginal revenue of the 
remaining sum of money owned by the consumer was mathematically proven to be capable of 
representing the marginal utility the consumer get from spending the total cost at the same period 
of time.  This method is called money metric utility. Another example of method will be to 234
infer preference relation from a demand function to calculate utility . This method is to find a 235
sequence of preference rather than to quantify the utility. There are other research on formulating 
utility functions. However, those methods are not widely discussed or applied. 
In economics, utility is usually discussed under the context of describing preference, not 
quantifying substitution. We do not need to know how much more does one prefer a product to 
another to describe preference. Besides, there is not a widely acknowledged way to qualify 
utility. “We only need to know which bunch of product is more preferred… [So] we stick with 
ordinal utility”  Utility is not a fixed number vis-a-vis each product. Ordinal utility only studies 236
the order of choice, so it is not meaningful to compare the quantity of utility. On the other hand, 
although cardinal utility is not a pure sequence, it is not fixed product-wise. According to the 
definition of utility, it should vary between different consumers. In contrast, as specified by the 
 J. A. Weymark, Money-metric utility functions, International Economic Review, 219-232 (1985).234
 Y. Hosoya, Measuring utility from demand, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 49(1), 82-96, (2013).235
 R. Hal, Varian Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach, 4.1 Cardinal Utility (8th Edition).236
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previous sections, substitutability is according to the “price, quality and use”  of a product. It 237
should not change as we switch between consumers or consumer groups. 
There are many pieces of research in quantifying utility, but there are not many pieces of 
research to quantify substitutability. In many discussions about antitrust, the difference 
between utility and substitution is vague. Therefore, before we further discuss defining the 
relevant market by substitution, we need to clearly differentiate substitution from utility. 
For example, the AIDS demand model uses utility as a parameter indicating the difference 
between products.  However, if they aim at describing the quality of a product, substitution 238
should be considered instead.  239
The current research in utility is not relevant to market definition. Utility is a one-dimensional 
value quantifying the level of satisfaction. The level of satisfaction is an intangible concept 
which is interchangeable among different category of products. The utility of a new car and a 
well-designed course might be the same number. Nevertheless, a car and a course are not 
substitutable to each other at all. Even if we analyze utility according to different factors, so that 
 The 1968 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 3. Market Definition, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. 237
of Justice (1968).
 Angus Deaton & John Muellbauer, An almost ideal demand system, The American economic review 238
70.3 312-326 (1980).
 The author of AIDS also realized the idealogical problem that utility varies from person to person. 239
Therefore, it assumes there is a person who is having an average level of satisfaction upon the 
homogeneous products (AIDS also assumes the products are homogeneous). However, it does not solve 
the idealogical problem that two totally non-substitutable products can still give people a same “average 
level of satisfaction”.
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we can have a multi-dimensional utility, its intangible nature as the level of satisfaction does not 
change. Therefore, it is not promising to use utility as a standard of defining a market. 
In contrast, substitutability is a tangible concept. It is based on price, quality and use. Therefore, 
it is product-specific. The price and quality are fixed and tangible characters of each product. 
Although the use of products might vary between consumers, we can still find the typical use. 
Therefore, substitutability is what we should use in market definition. Another merit of using 
substitutability is that we may form it as a multi-dimensional value.  
We will use an example to reinterpret the conclusion that multi-dimensional substitutability 
based on products’ price, quality and use is more suitable in describing substitutional relations 
between products than utility is. Like many pieces of research in utility, we assume the amount 
of money that a person is willing to pay directly reflects utility, so that we can compare the 
tangible individual highest acceptable payments instead of an intangible level of satisfaction that 
a person gets. To simplify the discussion, we only consider the taste of a drink as the quality 
considered by a consumer. We also will not compare the use of drinks because we assume they 
are both used to drink by the majority of the consumers. We also do not consider price in 
substitutability in this case because we are using highest acceptable payment as an indicator of 
utility. Although the definitions are different, we chose to not put product price in yet to avoid 
confusion. 
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Assume there are only two aspects of a drink’s taste — the degree of sweetness and the degree of 
sourness. There are two drinks, A and B. A is very sweet and not very sour; B is very sour and 
not very sweet. We quantify the degree of sweet taste and sour taste on the same scale. If a drink 
is very sweet, we give it 3 points in sweetness. If the drink is a little sweet, we give it 1 point in 
sweetness. We do the same to the level of sourness. Assume nothing else are considered by 
consumers when deciding whether a drink can substitute another. In a Cartesian coordinate 
system, we can quantify the quality of the two drinks as point A(3, 1) and point B(1, 3). These 
are fixed properties of the products. 
Assume a consumer, Jack, likes both sweet taste and sour taste equally, and he prefers strong 
tastes. The ideal drink for Jack is U(3, 3). As we have introduced above, utility can be inferred 
from how much money Jack is willing to pay for the drink. We can get ordinal utility from the 
sequence of the amount Jack is willing to pay. We can also get cardinal utility from setting one 
drink as the benchmark and compare its amount with others. 
A reasonable consumer will decide how much money he is willing to pay according to the 
distance between A/B and the optimum point U. In Jack’s case, the closer the drink is to the point 
U(3, 3), the more satisfied he can get by consuming the drink. Based on the assumptions, we 
formed a simple model to calculate how much money Jack is willing to pay for a drink. Assume 
the ideal taste of sweetness and sourness to a person is U(a, b), and the highest amount that 
person is willing to pay for his favorite drink is p. The decrease in highest acceptable payment is 
in a linear correlation to the drink’s deviation from the ideal taste in sweetness with a slope of -k 
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(so that k is positive). We also add a weight representing the importance of sourness compared to 
sweetness, which is assumed to be the ratio of the ideal taste of sourness and sweetness. Drink i’s 
level of sweetness is xᵢ. Its level of sourness is yᵢ. The amount of money a person is willing to pay 
is M. We get a model to calculate the highest acceptable payment for a drink in Equation 1: 
Equation 1 
For Jack, the ideal taste is U(3, 3), so a = 3, and b = 3. If we substitute A(3, 1) and B(1, 3) into 
the function above, we get M(A) = M(B) = p - 2k. Based on our assumption, the utility of A and 
B are equal. 
We add a third and a fourth drink C(2, 1) and D(1, 2) so that C/D is a good substitution of A/B 
respectively. Among the four, A and B are not good substitutions of each other. Nonetheless, if 
we calculate the money Jack is willing to pay for C and D, we get M(C)  = M(D) = p - 3k. Since 
k is positive, we get M(A) = M(B) ＞ M(C)  = M(D). Therefore, C and D are less preferred by 
Jack. Meanwhile, A and B are equally preferred by Jack. So is C and D. Since Jack’s ideal taste 
is U(3, 3), this sequence of preference is consistent with the assumptions we made. This 
sequence can be regarded as an ordinal utility. If we set A as the unit product, the cardinal utility 
that A brings to Jack is 1. The cardinal utility of B is also 1, because A and B has the same 
distance from U. The cardinal utility of C and D are both (p - 3k)/(p - 2k). Neither the ordinal 
utility or the cardinal utility we get in this example reflects the substitutional relationship 
between A, B, C and D. 
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This example tells us that if the substitutive relationship between A, B, C, and D are measured by 
the utility based on highest acceptable payment, the result will not reflect the true substitutive 
relationship between A, B, C and D. In real life, there are more things to be considered by Jack. 
The highest amount of money Jack is willing to pay is probably not linearly correlated with how 
far the taste of a drink deviates from Jack’s favorite taste. However, this limited example still 
ideologically shows us how misleading the utility can be in indicating the substitutive 
relationship between products. Utility may be useful for finding the sequence of preference, but 
it is not useful in market definition. On the other hand, we can easily find the level of 
substitutability by calculating the distance between A, B, C and D. The distance between A and B 
is 2√2̅. The distance between A and C is 1. The distance between B and D is also 1. Therefore, in 
this example, C is a better substitution of A than B; D is a better substation of B than A. This 
conclusion is consistent with our settings. 
From the example, we see that the utility based on the highest acceptable payment cannot be 
used in quantifying substitutability. There are other methods to quantify utility. We will extend 
this conclusion in the next section to show that due to an over-deduction of dimensions, other 
utility models probably cannot work for market definition either. Moreover, the problem of over-
deduction of dimensions does not only cause utility to be unsuitable to quantify substitutability. 
Although demand is currently used in the market definition, it also has a problem of over-
deduction of dimensions. 
!152
A New Solution to Market Definition                                  
Besides, the example in this section is also intended to preliminarily illustrate the concept of over 
deduction of dimension while preserving part of the information. The consumer considers 
multiple aspects when they decide whether to buy a product or not. Equation 1 is an example of 
getting a one-dimensional value based on multiple aspects of considerations. The decision-
making mechanisms will be more complicated in reality, but they are essentially similar to 
Equation 1 which reaches conclusion which does not sufficiently reflect a complete picture of 
substitutability. In the next section, we are going to use a more general example to illustrate that 
even if we use a more complicated and more accurate method to get the value used in market 
definition, as long as the model has a one-dimensional output, it is hard to avoid the unreliability 
and arbitrariness of its further application in market definition. 
In conclusion, although people mingle the definition of substitution and utility on many 
occasions, we should be aware of the difference between them. The example above is also a 
preliminary illustration of quantifying the level of substitutability with Euclidean distance in a 
space constructed using product quality, price and use. In later sections of this chapter, we are 
going to propose a method to define the relevant product market with a multi-dimensional 
substitution. 
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4.2.2 A Method Using Change in Demand Cannot Avoid Arbitrariness in 
Market definition 
One way to quantify the level of substitutability is to find the pattern of sales change when other 
aspects of the market, typically the product price, is changing. As we have discussed in Section 
1, the Hypothetical Monopolist Test decides how much substitution is small enough to define the 
market. The test uses demand change as a “substitution” of the substitution level. Therefore, the 
change of demand is essentially a quantification of substitutability. 
However, as we have discussed in Chapter 3, a complete Hypothetical Monopolist Test is not as 
easy as the CL formula indicates. It requires a great effort of data collection and calculation to be 
performed. Moreover, we cannot solve the problem that the collectible CM data and demand data 
are not a real match when we include more than one product’s price in the candidate market. 
Ignoring this problem will result in a narrower market definition than the reality. The 
Hypothetical Monopolist Test is still the best method of market definition up to date. However, 
as we have discussed, whether a hypothetical monopolist can profit or not is not informative 
about whether a merger will hurt the competition unless the candidate market only consists of the 
merging companies. Therefore, the Hypothetical Monopolist Test is just a “bright line” rather 
than a correct line. 
In fact, we can probably conclude that even if we come up with a model better than the Critical 
Loss Analysis, as long as we use demand to replace the level of substitutability, the result can 
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never be more than a “bright line”. When we decide whether to buy a product, almost all of the 
products have more than one factor to be considered. These factors constitute multiple 
dimensions of substitutability. Therefore, substitutability is multi-dimensional. If we use a one-
dimensional value to quantify or approximate substitutability, it is a dimension reduction. 
Demand is a one-dimensional value. Using demand change to quantify the level of 
substitutability is to map multi-dimensional vectors on a line. This incurs a massive loss of 
information. 
Figure 1 is an illustration of two-dimensional data projection on one dimension. The green dots 
constitute a cluster. The red dots constitute another cluster. To convert them into a one-
dimensional value, we need to map them on a line, as we can see in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 
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After the mapping, we get a set of converted values in Figure 2. As we can see in Figure 2, it is 
hard to divide Group A and Group B consistent with the correct clusters. This is similar to what 
happens when we use demand as an indicator of substitutability. Consumers consider multiple 
product features while all of the considerations will be reflected on the demand change, with 
which we are unable to divide Group A and Group B in a way consistent to the reality, because of 
the loss of information. 
Figure 2 
In Figure 3, we put the data points back to their original space. We can easily divide them into 
Group A and Group B with the blue line. Market definition is similar to a classification problem 
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in machine learning. In machine learning, a common trick is to increase the dimension of a 
dataset using a kernel function. It is a bit different here from manually increasing the dimensions 
as machine learning does. Instead of using a kernel function, we propose to define the market 
with a different type of data rather than demand. We believe collecting data of multiple features 
of the products is a more accurate way to define the relevant market. 
As we have discussed in Chapter 3, the Hypothetical Monopolist Test and the CLA are 
theoretically functional, but the current method used by the Agencies is problematic. 
Notwithstanding the fact that there is still going to be unsolvable problems as what we have 
discussed in the last sections of Chapter 3, a correct way of performing the Hypothetical 
Monopolist Test and the CLA requires significantly more data and calculation than the current 
application of them. Therefore, even though the model we propose requires collecting another 
type of data, it can still be desirable for the practice of the premerger investigation.  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Figure 3 
On the other hand, the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines stipulates that the level of 
substitutability depends on the amount of switch in sales, i.e., change in demand. The more sales 
increase another product has after the SSNIP; the more substitutable the other product is to the 
SSNIP product. However, this is not necessarily true. For example, in material markets, different 
materials have different efficiency, a lower efficiency material can incur a larger amount of 
switched sales. However, if the original product has relatively higher efficiency, a substitutive 
material with similar efficiency is a better substitution. If we look at the change in sales alone, 
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we will be misled. In fact, according to the HSR annual reports, chemical manufacturing has 
been the industry group with the highest number of HSR cases filed from 2012 to 2016 . It is 240
also an industry where the sales of substitution will be profoundly affected by the material 
efficiency. Therefore, we cannot just omit the problem of using the switch in sales alone. 
On the other hand, the efficiency data might be collected and submitted to the court by the 
parties anyway, if looking at the demand alone will cause injustice. However, even if the data is 
submitted, there is no model considering the additional data along with other factors. The court 
will have to arbitrarily decide how much does each factor matters. Therefore, we need a model 
capable of considering multiple factors at the same time. 
The problem of not considering the efficiency is essentially due to the over-deduction of 
dimensions. Efficiency is an important aspect of substitutability. It is also a crucial feature of 
consumable materials. Not considering factors other than demand is therefore problematic. There 
are other problems caused by over-deduction of dimensions as well — the Hypothetical 
Monopolist Test cannot model versatile materials.  
This problem is also prominent in the chemical material market. We use an example to illustrate 
this problem. This example is summarized from real chemical material substitutive information 
 Federal Trade Commission, Annual Competition Reports, 34th Report FY2011, 35th Report FY 2012, 240
36th Report FY 2013, 37th Report FY 2014, 38th Report FY 2015, 39th Report FY 2016 (Aug. 18, 2017, 
17:30 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/policy/reports/policy-reports/annual-competition-reports, PDF.
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in "Solutions for critical raw materials under extreme conditions: a review” . Therefore, the 241
problem in this example is not a theoretical problem. To avoid confusion, we omitted the real 
names of the materials. We name them material A, B, and C. They are the substitution of each 
other as additions to alloys. There are two qualities being considered — improving the fluidity 
and increasing the tensile strength. In each unit of material A, B and C, the effect on fluidity and 
tensile strength are quantified by numbers. We are using simplified numbers while keeping the 
essence of the substitutive relations between the materials. Therefore, we assume the qualities of 
the three materials are A(3, 1), B(1, 4) and C(4, 1). 
In Hypothetical Monopolist Test, we need to track how much B and C’s sales increase when A’s 
price has increased to find the best substitution of A in improving fluidity. Three units of B are 
required to take A’s place, while only 3/4 units of C are required to. Therefore, if all the other 
conditions are the same, when A’s price has increased, B will have more sales increase than C. 
However, if we look at the quality directly, it is easy to see that C is a better substitution of A. 
Using B will cause a twelve-time increase in tensile strength, which is a significant change in the 
property of the alloy. In the chemical manufacturing industry, there are different products being 
made while using the same feature of A. The tensile strength is not essential to some of the 
products. However, it is important to some other products. In the situation where we care about 
tensile strength, C is the only reasonable substitution. However, this fact may not prevent B from 
 Maria Luisa Grilli, et al, Solutions for critical raw materials under extreme conditions: a review, 241
Materials 10.3, 285 (2017).
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getting the most significant increase in sales and end up being concluded as the best substitution 
of A in the model currently used by the Agencies. 
The industry of chemical manufacturing is different from the industries of consumer goods. It is 
common that one material has dozens of usage based on many properties of the material. 
Looking at demand relationship only is unlikely to result in a reasonably realistic result. In this 
case, the court has to look at the substitutive relations without a model.  Chemical 242
manufacturing, and computer and electronic products manufacturing rank the first and the eighth 
in the number of premerger investigation cases last year . In both of the industries, versatile 243
materials are widely used. Therefore, this problem regarding the versatile materials should not be 
omitted. 
On the other hand, if one material has multiple usages in manufacturing, the Hypothetical 
Monopolist Test cannot tell us which usage is to be used as the basis for measuring the demand. 
Facing multiple usage materials, the Hypothetical Monopolist Test only results in multiple 
candidate markets, while the only solution the Guidelines provides to this situation is to pick any 
one of those. The essential reason for this problems is still an improper dimension reduction — 
demand is a one-dimensional value, it cannot correctly reflect all the relevant aspects of 
multiple-quality objects. The Hypothetical Monopolist Test is based on the assumption that the 
 The other models used in premerger investigation all associates with demand and price as well.242
 Federal Trade Commission, Annual Competition Reports, 39th Report FY 2016 (Jan 18, 2017, 5:30 243
PM), https://www.ftc.gov/policy/reports/policy-reports/annual-competition-reports, url.
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closer substitution the product is, the more sales will switch to the product. However, when the 
assumption no longer stands, the result is no longer reliable as well. 
These two problems of Hypothetical Monopolist also restated our conclusion that products 
substitute each other on different features. Most of the time, there is more than one feature 
considered. If we use a one-dimensional value to quantify the level of substitutability, the loss of 
information will make it difficult to get meaningful segregation other than drawing a "bright 
line”. 
To summarize, if we quantify substitutability with a one-dimensional value without information 
preserving technics, many different data points will be mapped to the same value, losing some 
essential information. Therefore, the one-dimensional demand may not be desirable to all types 
of markets. Based on our discussion, what we can do to improve the market definition model is 
clear—instead of using a number, we should use a vector to quantify substitution. The 
dimensions of the vector should be what actually constitutes substitutability, which according to 
the Supreme Court’s decision on United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.  is the 244
product’s price, quality and use. 
In later sections of this chapter, we are going to propose a new method to define the relevant 
product market based directly on substitutability. In our model, the quantified substitutability 
level will be stable as long as the product features do not significantly change. The result of 
 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).244
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market definition can be reused as long as the product features do not significantly change and 
there are no new products available in the relevant market. Even if there is a new product, the 
previous data is still valid and does not need to be recollected. All we need is to do is get the 
features of the new product and re-run the model to get a new result of division directly from the 
model result. Our model is especially good for the material market. It solves the versatile 
material problem and the efficiency problem, both of which are common in the material market. 
Data collection in the material market is also easier because personal preference is not crucial in 
purchasing decisions. Moreover, the products in industries other than consumer goods are 
relatively stable, especially the chemical material industry. In these industries, market definition 
results can be valid for long. 
Hypothetical Monopolist Test only gives out case specific result while it is not able to help in 
further antitrust practice. In contrast, our method offers a more stable market definition which 
can be used in future premerger cases and in deciding the annual HSR report threshold. With our 
method, the threshold for HSR filing no longer has to be a cross-industry rough estimation. Our 
result can be applied along with HHI or other competition measuring methods. Based on our 
result, HHI can be used to determine industry-specific standards, and save the efforts of HSR 
filing of high-target-amount mergers in high-competition markets. This will be discussed further 
in Chapter 4. In the following sections, we are going to introduce our market definition model 
which is directly based on a multi-dimensional quantification of substitutability. 
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4.3 K-Means Clustering 
We have discussed in Section 3.1 that the relevant market should be defined based on the 
substitutability between the products. We concluded in Section 3.2 that we should quantify the 
substitutability as a multi-dimensional vector instead of a number. Logically, if two products are 
close to each other in one dimension, they are more substitutable to each other in that dimension. 
Therefore, the Euclidean distance of the products in all dimensions measures how much they are 
substitutable to each other. If two products have small Euclidean distance between each other, 
they are overall close substitutions. Product within the same market should have similar qualities 
to be measured. Substitutability measured by Euclidean distance should be universal among the 
products as long as we use the same qualities. Therefore, we should put the products which are 
close to each other in Euclidean distance into the same market, and put the products which are 
far away from each other in a different market.  
In statistics, dividing products into different relevant markets is a classification question. It 
overlaps with some of machine learning algorithms which do cluster analysis. “Clustering 
(Anderberg, 1973; Jain and Dubes, 1988; Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 1990) is a popular approach 
to implementing the partitioning operation. Clustering methods partition a set of objects into 
clusters such that objects in the same cluster are more similar to each other than objects in 
different clusters according to some defined criteria. ”   245
 Zhexue Huang, Extensions to the k-means algorithm for clustering large data sets with categorical 245
values, Data mining and knowledge discovery 2.3 283-304 (1998).
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By definition, cluster analysis is finding objects which are “similar” to each other. Therefore it 
seems that most of the models doing clustering analysis will suffice for our task of dividing the 
relevant market. However, this definition only defines the general task of the analysis. We need 
to look into the algorithm to see what the model actually does and whether what the model does 
is what we are theoretically looking for. For example, how do they define “close” in the model; 
how does the model measure the closeness, etc. Market definition is a legal question. The answer 
provided by the model may have a substantial legal effect on a merger. We need to make sure 
that the method within the model is also consistent to the market theory and the antitrust purpose. 
Cluster analysis is a multi-objective optimization problem in machine learning. “It can be 
achieved by various algorithms that differ significantly in their notion of what constitutes a 
cluster and how to efficiently find them.”  Several decades ago, the computation capacity is 246
still quite limited in most of the industries. Therefore “clustering has been effectively applied in a 
variety of engineering and scientific disciplines such as psychology, biology, medicine, computer 
vision, communications, and remote sensing.”  In the past few decades, the calculation capacity 247
has been developing quickly. Cluster Analysis has been widely used in machine learning, 
artificial intelligence, advanced computer graphics, and bioinformatics. 
 Cluster analysis, Wikipedia (Jan. 21, 2017 11:10 AM) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cluster_analysis, 246
url.
 K. Krishna & Murty M. Narasimha, Genetic K-means algorithm, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, 247
and Cybernetics, Part B (Cybernetics) 29.3 433-439 (1999).
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Unlike most of the clustering analysis applications and research, efficiency is not essential in our 
task. Our data size is small compared to big data programs like bioinformatics. Neither do we 
need to calculate the result fast like it is in computer graphics or smart device. However, we have 
our own challenges. Since there is no absolute right answer in market definition, our model has 
to be an unsupervised machine learning model. Unsupervised machine learning models do not 
have training dataset to compare the result and recalibrate the model. However, the market 
definition model is influential in the legal progress of mergers with anti-competitive concerns. 
Therefore, in the context of market definition, the model we use should be not only able to 
produce a result of market definition but also be consistent to the antitrust theory and the logic of 
jurisprudence. 
Currently, the more advanced clustering technologies are usually uninterpretable. Therefore they 
are not what we are looking for. Instead, we should use fully interpretable methods, so that we 
can discuss the rationality of the model result like we always do in normal legal proceedings. The 
most widely used methods of clustering analysis are grouping with small distances between 
cluster members; grouping with dense areas of the data space, and grouping with intervals or 
particular statistical distributions. As we mentioned earlier, the market definition shall put the 
products which are close to each other in the Euclidean distance into the same market, and the 
reverse to a different market. Grouping with small distances between cluster members can fit our 
purpose the best. In the context of premerger investigation of multi-dimensional vector space of 
substitutability, being dense is similar to being close in distance, Therefore, in some cases, 
grouping with dense areas of the data space can also be rational under the logic of law. In this 
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Chapter the first algorithm we are proposing is a method of grouping with small distance 
between cluster members. The second algorithm we are going to suggest is a method of grouping 
with dense areas of data space. 
In this session, we are going to propose to use the K-Means++ Clustering to define the relevant 
product market. We will explain the algorithm in this session, and apply it with some examples 
in the next session. When we are doing our clustering analysis, we need to not only consider 
which algorithm to choose, but also what distance function to use, the number of expected 
clusters, and whether we need to set a threshold for product density, etc. 
On the other hand, we need to figure out which type of data is available or at least collectible 
under the law, and which data we are going to collect and apply to our model. These will be 
discussed according to the top 20 most frequent premerger investigation industry groups because 
products satisfy consumers’ needs in different ways across different industries. 
K-means ++ clustering algorithm  is an improved algorithm of K-means clustering. K-means 248
clustering was initially proposed by Holland in his paper “Adaptation in Natural and Artificial 
Systems”.  It tried to find a given number of clusters which minimizes the average distance 249
between the data points and the center of each cluster. 
 David Arthur & Sergei Vassilvitskii, k-means++: The advantages of careful seeding, Proceedings of 248
the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, Society for Industrial and Applied 
Mathematics (2007).
 J. H. Holland, Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems, Univ. of Michigan Press (1975).249
!167
A New Solution to Market Definition                                  
More specificly, we are given a set of n data points X ⊂ Rᵈ and the number of clusters, k. We use 
the algorithm to find the centers C, in a number of k, which satisfies Equation 2. In Equation 2, 
⌀ means the total distance left between data points and the center, after each calculation of the 
minimization. After finding those centers, we group the data points according to which center is 
closest to them. 
Equation 2 
We can infer three problems from the description of the algorithm's goal, considering we are 
aiming to use it in market definition. 
The first problem is that the result of K-means clustering is slightly different from the result we 
are looking for. Our goal is to find a way to group the products so that the difference in each 
aspect of substitutability between the products are smallest.  
In the space of substitutability, we can naturally use the Euclidean distance between the products 
to represent the overall substitutability between the products. Therefore, there is not a place for 
centers in our definition. However, all the points being close to the center point of each cluster is 
equal to all the points within each cluster are closest to each other. It can be proven by the 
following lemma. 
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Let z be any arbitrary point in Rᵈ, and S be some points in Rᵈ within the group whose center is 
c(S). We have Equation 3. 
Equation 3 
Therefore, when the distance between x and c(S) and the distance between z and c(S) is 
minimized, the distance between x and z are also minimized. Thus, if c(S) exists, z and x belong 
to the same group, in which the distance between x and z is also minimized. Therefore, according 
to the formation of our vector space Rᵈ, the goal stated above is exactly the goal of market 
definition. 
The second problem is what k we are going to use. This is a practical question. In statistics, there 
are four most common methods used by researchers. Three of them are relevant to our task. They 
are: 
4. Find the most representative two or three dimensions of the data (which is usually the two or 
three dimensions which explain the most variations), then graph them in a figure. Observe 
the figure to tell how many clusters are there. The number of clusters we can see is the k we 
are looking for. This method is not that useful in high dimensional data, because we can only 
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look up to three dimensions, which will not effetely reflect the whole dataset. Our data is 
relatively high dimensional. Therefore the usage of this method will be limited. 
5. Use a method called the elbow method. K is usually an integer within a range. Therefore, we 
can run the data multiple times with different k. Then calculate the sum of the total distance 
within each group and compare it with different k, and find the best k. 
For a dataset {x₁, … xN}, when we apply K-means clustering on it, we will get k clusters 
and each cluster Ck has nk data points. We define the sum of distance within each group 
as Dk, so we have: 
Equation 4 
Since || ‧ || is a 2-norm, when the number of cluster is K, we have the sum of the distance 
within each group as WK: 
Equation 5 
We can link the points and calculate the inflection point, where the angle changes fastest, 
and it will be the best k for our clustering analysis. Or, we can simply graph k as x axis 
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and WK as y axis, and find the inflection point from the figure directly. For example, in 
figure 3, we should pick 3 as our k. 
 
Figure 3 
This method works because as we increase the number of k, Dk will always decrease. At 
the same time, WK will also decrease. After a more appropriate k was reached, we will 
over-divide within an appropriate group. Therefore, the decrease of WK will significantly 
slow down when we start to over-divide the data points because the distance between the 
products within a group is relatively small. Therefore, the k on the inflection point is the 
k we are looking for. After the inflection point, the change of WK is no longer significant, 
meaning we are only doing over-division. In the context of market definition, the elbow 
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method is to make sure that we stop dividing the market when the products are close 
substitution of each other. The K-means clustering will do the rest of the work to make 
sure all the closely substitutable products are grouped into the same relevant product 
market. 
6. The gap-statistics method is another method to find an appropriate k. It was first proposed in 
the paper “Estimating the number of clusters in a data set via the gap statistic” . WK was 250
defined the same as above. The gap-statistics was defined as Equation 4.  
Gap(K) = E(log(WK)) - log(WK) 
Equation 6 
In Equation 4, E(log(WK)) is the expected value of logWK. It was usually calculated in a 
Monte Carlo method. This method is first to simulate data points in the same number 
(we set it as B) of the data points we need to do clustering analysis. The simulated data 
points are in a uniform distribution. Each set has simulated uniformly distributed points 
in a number of B. We make, for example, 20 simulated sets for each k and do K-means 
clustering for all the simulated sets. Again, k is usually between 1 to 10. We do it from k 
= 1 to k = 10. Therefore, there will be 200 sets, and each set will have simulated points 
in a number of B. We then average log WKb calculated from each simulated sets, so we 
 Robert Tibshirani & Walther Guenther & Hastie Trevor, Estimating the number of clusters in a data set 250
via the gap statistic, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Statistical Methodology) 63.2, 
411-423 (2001).
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get E(logWK) in Equation 6. Log(WK) was calculated as the log of WK in Equation 5. In 
this way, the Gap(K) can be calculated as Equation 7.  251
 
Equation 7 
We then calculate Gap(k) with different k and find the maximum of Gap(k). The k which 
enables the maximum Gap(k) is the k we are looking for. 
In essence, this method compares the distance between data points, Dk, within each 
group, with the Dk in the situated groups where all the data points evenly spread in the 
vector space. Since our data is clustered and the evenly spread data is not, the clustered 
data will have a smaller Dk. On the other hand, if we over-divide the data into even 
small groups, i.e., the k is too large, we are going to make the Dk of the evenly spread 
simulated points smaller as well. At the same time, the Dk of the real data will not 
decrease significantly anymore. Therefore, finding the maximum Gap(k) will help us 
find the best number of clusters we need. 
 Equation 7 is not the only way to calculate E(logWK).251
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A more intuitive way to explain gap statistic is that it ensures the largest “gap” between 
groups. When we are not dividing data into enough clusters, the data which should have 
belonged to other clusters are put together enlarging the range of data points within each 
cluster. Therefore, the “gap” between clusters will be smaller. Also, when we are over-
dividing the data, the data points which belong to the same group will be divided. 
Therefore, the “gap” between them must be small. As a result, the number of clusters 
ensures the largest “gap” will be the best number of clusters. 
Gap-statistics method is widely used in high volume dataset analysis. We also like to use 
it in our approach because it is not subjective. Besides, a wider “gap” means a more 
significant difference between products, i.e., we are making sure that the products in 
different groups are not closely substitutable to each other. 
Although K-means clustering has been around for a long time, the methods of finding k are still 
evolving in research. There are plenty of papers discussing this topic. The mentioned four 
methods to find the k are the most widely used by statisticians and scientist. We can find 
meaningful rationale to use the third and fourth method in market definition context. Therefore, 
we suggest to use them in the context of market definition. We will have some examples of 
applying these methods in the next section. 
The paper “Integration of self-organizing feature map and K-means algorithm for market 
segmentation” proposed a two-step approach to do K-means clustering in market segmentation. 
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Market segmentation has a similar task with market definition. “Market segmentation is the 
activity of dividing a broad consumer or business market … into sub-groups of consumers based 
on some type of shared characteristics. In dividing or segmenting markets, researchers typically 
look for common characteristics such as shared needs, common interests, similar lifestyles or 
even similar demographic profiles. The overall aim of segmentation is to identify high yield 
segments so that these can be selected for special attention.” Unlike the market definition, market 
segmentation aims at grouping consumers and finding a target market. In the commercial 
process, market segmentation is closely related to the product features, because the products 
were designed according to the need of the target market. Therefore, market definition may also 
learn from the market segmentation. As a result, we will also discuss the two-steps approach in 
the context of market definition in this and the next section. 
In the two-steps approach, the first step is to use hierarchical clustering to figure out the number 
of k. The second step is to do the K-means clustering with the k found in the first step. The paper 
used two examples as experiments to illustrate the merit of the two-step approach. One example 
used simulated data and the other used real data. The examples show the two-step approach 
produces a better result than using hierarchical clustering only. Since the examples show K-
means clustering produces a better result than the hierarchical clustering, even if we can already 
get a clustering result in the first step of the two-step approach, it is still meaningful to perform 
the k-means clustering as the second step. Moreover, hierarchical clustering uses the same data 
structure as K-means clustering does. Therefore it will not take too much time or resource to do 
the second step. This might be another reason why the two-steps approach is popular. 
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It is worth mentioning that since we are discussing this under the context of legal proceeding, we 
need to consider the rationale of using an algorithm. The algorithm of hierarchical clustering 
produces a tree-structured result. It does not calculate the distance between two products which 
are not within the same branch.  Therefore, even if the hierarchical clustering eventually 252
produces a similar result as K-means clustering does, theoretically we still have to perform the 
two-step approach and limit the function of hierarchical clustering in finding a proper k.  
There are even more methods available to find k. The approaches we mentioned above can help 
us to solve the technical problem of finding k. They do not affect the rationality of using K-
means clustering to the market definition as we discussed. However, we have one more problem 
to solve before we conclude that we can use the k-means clustering in market definition. 
The third problem of using K-means clustering is that the algorithm only “tries” to find the result 
which satisfies Equation 2. There is no guarantee of getting the best result. As we can see later 
from the steps of the algorithm, the start point is random in the genetic k-means clustering 
method. Since the algorithm will only end up with a local optimum result, if the random start 
points are not in the range of a theoretically preferable area, the result may not be the one we are 
looking for. Meanwhile, we do not know where the global optimum is. Furthermore, finding the 
Lior Rokach & Maimon Oded, Clustering Methods,  Data mining and knowledge discovery handbook 252
(2005)
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universal optimal result using K-means clustering is proven to be NP-hard  in the paper "The 253
planar k-means problem is NP-hard.”  At the same time, the k-means clustering has been 
improved by many papers in computer science, including the paper proposing k-means++ 
clustering. 
K-means++ is one of the most popular modified k-means clustering algorithms. The method we 
are proposing to use in market definition also includes K-means++ clustering. It can “yield a 
much better performing algorithm and consistently finds a better cluttering with a lower potential 
than K-means.”  254
In computational complexity theory, NP (for nondeterministic polynomial time) is a complexity class 253
used to describe certain types of decision problems. Informally, NP is the set of all decision problems for 
which the instances where the answer is "yes" have efficiently verifiable proofs. More precisely, these 
proofs have to be verifiable by deterministic computations that can be performed in polynomial time. 
—— Complexity, Wikipedia (Mar. 12, 2018, 15:30 PM), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NP_(complexity), 
url  
NP-hardness (non-deterministic polynomial-time hardness), in computational complexity theory, is the 
defining property of a class of problems that are, informally, "at least as hard as the hardest problems in 
NP”. 
Therefore, saying K-means clustering is an NP-hard question means that solving it is as hard as solving 
an NP complexing question, which means, in a simple language, one has to calculate all the possible 
outcomes to see whether one outcome is the answer we are looking for.
 David Arthur & Vassilvitskii Sergei, k-means++: The advantages of careful seeding, Proceedings of 254
the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, Society for Industrial and Applied 
Mathematics (2007)
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Table 1 is the comparison of k-means and k-means++ methods provided by the paper proposing 
it.  In fact, we only need to look at the situation when k is equal to 10 in table 1. Since we are 255
facing a relatively small volume of data, and over-dividing the data will always end up 
minimizing ⌀, we are almost sure that a k which is more than 10 can end up with a small ⌀ , no 
matter which variation of K-means clustering we are choosing. We can see from table 1 that the 
minimum ⌀ decrease significantly. The T value also decreased significantly, meaning the result 
produced by the k-means++ is a lot better. 
On the other hand, even though finding the optimum result of k-means clustering is NP-hard in 
computer science, it might not be a problem in the context of premerger investigation. Unlike 
most of the NP-hard” problems concerns, our dataset is relatively small, we can run the model 
for many times to make sure we are actually getting the smallest ⌀. Therefore, having k-means++ 
can suffice our need. 
Since we are discussing a model's application in a legal context, we do not need to know the 
underlying calculation done by the computer. Rather than that, we need to scrutinize the main 
steps done in the computation and what type of data we are using. We are going to look into the 
main steps in this section and talk about the data in the next section. 
 Id.255
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A k-means++ clustering algorithm will also do the same steps as a genetic k-means clustering 
does. The genetic algorithm does several steps of work. Since this is a law dissertation, we would 
like to put it in more intuitive words. 
1. Randomly choose k points from the space Rᵈ as centers of clustering. Name the centers 
in a set of C = {C₁, C₂, … , Ck} 
2. Calculate the distance between the centers Ci . If a point is closer to one center Ci then 
that point belongs to Ci’s cluster. Repeat this process with all the data points in X 
between all the candidate centers Ci for each i ∈ {1, 2, …, k}. 
3. Change the candidate center Ci from the original spot in the average of all the points in 
each dimension within the cluster Ci. Repeat this process with all the candidate centers 
Ci for each i ∈ {1, 2, …, k}. In mathematical terms, Ci is 
Equation 5 
4. Repeat step 2 and step 3 until all the centers Ci no longer changes. 
As we have mentioned, the reason the model does not come up with a universal optimum is due 
to the randomness of choosing the starting point. The K-means++ clustering algorithm uses the 
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steps above to find better start points, which replaced the first step of the genetic K-means 
clustering algorithm. Denote D(x) as the shortest distance from a data point to the closest center 
we have chosen. The steps are: 
1. Choose one data point from X as our first center C₁. When choosing, each data point has 
the same probability of being chosen. 
2. Calculate the shortest distance between all the data points left and the chosen centers, 
which we denoted as D(x). (For now, we only chose C₁, so we do not need to compare 
and get the shorter distance.) Then we give each data point left a probability of being 
chosen, which is calculated by Equation 6. Then we use a roulette wheel selection 
method  to pick one data point as the next center. 256
Equation 6 
3. Repeat step 2 until selected the number of centers required. 
The essence of the three steps above is to spread the starting points as far away from each other 
as possible. We will illustrate this with an example below. In the example, we assume there are 
 The roulette wheel selection, which is also known as the fitness proportionate selection, is an 256
algorithms for selecting potentially useful solutions for recombination. — Adam Lipowski & Dorota 
Lipowska, Roulette-wheel selection via stochastic acceptance, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its 
Applications, 391.6, 2193-2196 (2012).
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nine data points in our data frame as is in Figure 4.  Assure the point we picked in step one is 3, 257
the relevant values were calculated is in table 2. Meanwhile, instead of choosing random points 
in the space as the centers, K-means++ chooses data points as the centers. 
 
Figure 4 
Table 2 
Point 
number
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
D(x) 2 1 0 1 2 2 1 1 2
D(x)² 4 1 0 1 4 4 1 1 4
P(x) 0.2 0.05 0 0.05 0.2 0.2 0.05 0.05 0.2
Sum(P) 0.2 0.25 0.25 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.75 0.8 1
 To make it easier to calculate the distance and see how the probability of data point being chosen is 257
calculated, we did not use a clustered example. The read data will not be unclustered like the Figure 4.
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As we have mentioned earlier, K-means++ clustering algorithm was proven to help ensure that 
we have a much higher probability to get the universal optimum result, which ensures that all the 
products are close substitutions of each other inside the relevant market. In practice, K-means++ 
can get us to the optimum result almost for sure if we have enough repetition, which does not 
take much time with a small data size like ours. In contrast, as we have mentioned before, the 
Hypothetical Monopolist Test does not have a safeguard to make sure the bright line they draw is 
indeed meaningful to separate the closely substitutable products into relevant markets in one way 
but not another. Again, the Guidelines does not provide us any better suggestion than picking 
randomly from similar results. 
Since our goal is to find the substitutive relations of the target product , we should better make 258
sure the target product is in the center of the substitutability comparison. Therefore, one more 
merit of using the K-means++ is that instead of randomly picking the first data point as C₁, we 
can simply pick the target product as C₁, in which case, we can ensure that in one of the clusters, 
the target product is in the middle of the cluster. Meanwhile, all the other centers are not to close 
to the target product, so that we can have one more safeguard that we are not over-dividing the 
products which are close substitutions to the target products into different relevant markets. 
On the other hand, although the Hypothetical Monopolist Test starts from the target product, and 
add the other products in the sequence of the closeness of the substitution (which is measured by 
the change of demand), after adding the first product other than the target product into the group 
 According to the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the target product is a product of either of the 258
merging parties.
!182
A New Solution to Market Definition                                  
which will increase product price, the center of the substitutive relations will be somewhere 
between the two products, because the sales of the second product is considered as well. In this 
case, if the first several products happen to be on a similar “direction", the center will be 
"dragged" far away from the target product by the other products. Therefore, even if in the 
beginning we are finding the substitution according to the demand of the target product, we will 
no long do so after the second round of analysis, and what we eventually find is no longer the 
sequence of closeness to the target product. This is incorrect because in reality, only the target 
product and the other merging company’s product is facing a real danger of price increase. 
Another merit of using the K-means++ is avoiding the risk of bad execution of the model.  259
When the start points are by chance badly chosen in a random process, and the people 
conducting it does not do enough repeat to ensure a better result, the result we get from k-means 
clustering might be very different from the universal optimum. When we use k-means++, the 
repetition needed decreases significantly.  Therefore, the risk of not conducting enough 260
repetition will significantly decrease as well. Another risk will be choosing a k which is too 
large. With k-means++, even if the k is too large, the model will not over-divide the cluster near 
C1, which means at least the relevant market we need in the premerger investigation is not over-
divided.  
 We concern bad conduct of the model because the Agencies has conducted the CLA in a very 259
unreasonable way in regarding the data used and the definition of SSNIP as we have mentioned in 
Chapter 3.
 We get this conclusion from the examples in the next section. The results of twenty repetitions of k-260
means++ have many repetitive values of ⌀ in a small value, which indicates that even twenty repetitions 
are redundant. However, the standard k-means gives less repetitive results in twenty repetitions, which 
means in the specific example there is a risk of not repeating the experiment for enough time to get the 
optimum result.
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There are additional points necessary to address about using K-means++ clustering algorithm to 
do market definition based on substitutability. 
The first point is that the Euclidean distance is not the only distance we can use with K-means 
clustering. Different definitions of distance are widely used in clustering algorithms in similarity 
measurement. K-means clustering works with all the commonly used types of distance. 
However, according to the property of the vector space we defined — the space Rᵈ with d 
dimensions which are the major aspects that the consumers look for from the product, Euclidean 
distance serves our purpose the best. 
In our method, we use Euclidean distance in the multi-dimensional space to measure 
substitutability. There is a paper—A measure of utility levels by Euclidean distance , which 261
talked about using Euclidean distance to measure utility. This paper has a similar but different 
idea from ours based on money metric utility. As we have discussed, utility is different from 
substitutability in many features. Like the majority of the papers talking about utility, the purpose 
of this paper is getting the preference sequence, not doing clustering analysis or defining the 
relevant market. The data used to calculate the distance is also different from ours. 
One other thing we must discuss is the input of data. We can form a high dimensional space of 
substitutability with data collected from product features and well-designed surveys to run the 
 J. C. R. Alcantud. A measure of utility levels by Euclidean distance, Decisions in Economics and 261
Finance. 25(1): 65-69 (2002)
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model and perform market definition. Detailed instructions of data collection will be discussed in 
the next section. On the other hand, K-means clustering takes numeric input. There is no upper 
limit of the dimensions of data. Technically, the more dimensions we use, the more accurate the 
result will usually be. However, a too flat data input might introduce too much noise to the 
model, which might badly affect the performance of the model too. Besides, collecting too much 
data will also waste the resource. Although data mining and dimension reduction are both 
important and hot topics in machine learning, it is not that relevant to the purpose of market 
definition. In session 3.4 and section 3.5, we will talk about the data required to perform the 
model proposed to define the relevant market and how we are going to collect it. 
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4.4 Intrinsic Substitutability and 
Extrinsic Substitutability 
We would like to address another issue about the substitutability before we discuss the data 
collection in the next section. As we have discussed in Section 3.1, the 1968 Guidelines 
following the Supreme Court case use United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co . "price, 262
use, and qualities" as the standard of "reasonable interchangeability". On the other hand, the 
1968 Guidelines also stipulated a second standard -- "the sales of two distinct products to a 
particular group of purchasers can also appropriately be grouped into a single market where the 
two products are reasonably interchangeable for that group regarding price, quality, and use. In 
the second case, however, it may be necessary to also include in that market the sales of one or 
more other products which are equally interchangeable with the two products regarding price, 
quality, and use from the standpoint of that group of purchasers for whom the two products are 
interchangeable." 
Although the second standard seems to be simply setting up the standard of interchangeability 
from the perspective of consumers, it is essentially different from the first definition — the 
second standard excludes the characteristics which the consumers do not appreciate. This 
distinction is important to the data collection in our model. For the convenience of discussion, 
we call the first one, the substitutive relation in price, quality, and use between the products itself 
 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956)262
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"intrinsic substitutability”. We further define it as the objective difference between products in 
product features. We call the second one "extrinsic substitutability", which means the product 
features from the perspective of consumers. We define the extrinsic substitutability as the 
subjective difference between products in product features. 
The 1968 Guidelines do not explicitly differentiate the intrinsic and extrinsic substitutability., but 
there is some content describing how it considers the difference between products. “In enforcing 
Section 7 the Department seeks primarily to prevent mergers which change market structure in a 
direction likely to create a power to behave non-competitively in the production and sale of any 
particular product, even though that power will ultimately be limited, though not nullified, by the 
presence of other similar products that, while reasonably interchangeable, are less than perfect 
substitutes. ”  To elucidate the difference between the homogeneous products and 263
heterogeneous but substitutable products, the 1968 Guidelines further stated, “[i]t is in no way 
inconsistent with this effort also to pursue a policy designed to prohibit mergers between firms 
selling distinct products, where the result of the merger may be to create or enhance the 
companies’ market power due to the fact that the products, though not perfectly substitutable by 
purchasers, are significant enough alternatives to constitute substantial competitive influences on 
the production, development or sale of each.”  From these explanations, we may infer when 264
defining the relevant market, the difference between products is considered from the perspective 
of consumers, i.e., the extrinsic substitutability is more likely to be used. 
 The 1968 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 3 Market Definition, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of 263
Justice (1968)
 id264
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However, since the Guidelines did not explicitly differentiate the two concepts, intrinsic 
substitutability and extrinsic substitutability were mingled while defining the relevant market in 
practice. In most of the case, the two concepts are so highly correlated that they are sometimes 
interchangeable. However, when they are not interchangeable, their difference will affect the data 
collection, which will further affect the result of most models. 
We will use three examples to illustrate where the intrinsic and extrinsic substitutability should 
be distinguished. The first example will be evaluating the substitutability of two cellphones 
which both have high definition digital camera, while one has voice assistant, and the other does 
not. The voice assistant technology is currently not mature yet. Most of the voice assistants, like 
Siri in iPhone and Alexa in Amazon devices, have very limited functions. Even if in most of the 
time they are featured by the manufacturers, they are not considered important by most of the 
consumers. If we use intrinsic substitutability, both the camera and the voice assistant should be 
considered. If we use extrinsic substitutability, the voice assistant will probably not be 
considered. In the context of premerger investigation, since we care more about whether the 
consumers have enough choice, we should use extrinsic substitutability. 
The second example is the ingredients of the food. Different people's sensitivities to taste are 
different. The same type of materials, like sugar, have different tastes as well. Using the exact 
amount of ingredients added, which is intrinsic substitutability, is less meaningful because the 
difference in the number might not produce an exact or a sensible difference in substitutability. 
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Even if there is a difference in the number we collected, the difference might not affect 
consumer's decisions at all. Moreover, the taste of the food will be affected by the other 
ingredients, for example, the amount of sugar added is not always in direct ratio with how sweet 
the food is. A bitter taste can reduce the sweetness of the food, while a vanilla taste will not. In 
this situation, we should also use extrinsic substitutability and take a survey to have the 
consumers rate the taste of sweet by a one-to-ten scale. An averaged value of data collected with 
extreme values taken away may reasonably be regarded as one variable of the extrinsic 
substitutability of one product of food. 
In contrast, there are also situations where the intrinsic substitutability is appropriate to describe 
a product. When we deal with product features which are essential to the products and hard to 
judge without expertise and parameters, the CPU frequency of a laptop or the photosensitivity of 
a camera for example, we should use intrinsic substitutability because the difference cannot be 
sensed at the beginning of using the product. Most of the products are designed to accommodate 
the current usage. The difference will be sensed in the long term or in some extreme cases. To 
protect the consumers and the good competitor who does not only aim at selling the product, we 
should consider what is actually inside of the products. 
To summarize, we should differentiate the situations in the three examples. In the first case, the 
standard is whether this feature is influential to the consumers' choice. In the second case, the 
standard is whether the data on intrinsic substitutability we collect can scientifically reflect the 
reality of the substitutive relations. The third example established the standard of whether 
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consumers can reasonably sense the reality of the substitutive relations. From these examples, we 
can also summarize some rules to guide our choice of data: 
1. If there are unimportant features to the consumers, we pick extrinsic substitutability and 
collect data on what the consumers believe to be important. 
2. If there are non-essential differences which cannot be measured meaningfully in a standard 
of intrinsic substitutability, we should use extrinsic substitutability. 
3. If there are essential differences which is hard to be noticed by the consumers, we should use 
intrinsic substitutability. 
We can also find support for the selection rules above in the theory of market competition. The 
primary damage caused by limiting market competition is limiting the choice consumers have to 
substitute the product which price has increased due to the market power of the manufacturer. If 
there is not close substitutions, the consumers will have to choose from not purchasing or 
purchasing at a higher price. In this case, some consumers will decide not to buy the product. 
Eventually, there will be fewer people willing to buy and consume the product, meaning there 
will be less social welfare created and less consumer surplus . In contrast, if consumers have 265
enough close substitute, the price increase will not hurt consumers’ interest. Since what we care 
about is the choice available to the consumer, product features which are less considered by the 
consumers or does not produce an essential difference will not have a strong impact on 
consumers' choice. On the other hand, we may also consider the fact that there are things that 
 N. G. Mankiw, Principles of microeconomics (4th ed.) (2006)265
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consumers value, but cannot tell the difference without product features. In this case, we will 
consider the intrinsic substitutability directly. 
It is worth mentioning that although we tried to differentiate the two concepts and use them on 
different occasions when they are not interchangeable, there are still a lot of situations where 
these two concepts are interchangeable with respect to a market definition process. Since the 
extrinsic substitutability is consumers' opinion towards the products, we can only collect the data 
from a survey. As a result, in most cases, the intrinsic substitutability, i.e., the product feature 
data is easier to collect. Therefore, when the two types of substitutability are interchangeable, we 
will use intrinsic substitutability. 
To summarize, differentiating the two concepts of intrinsic substitutability and the extrinsic 
substitutability can help us make sure the multi-dimensional space we form to do the clustering 
analysis reflects the true substitutional relations the consumers face when they make purchase 
decisions. It can also scientifically help us save resources during data collection when it is 
appropriate to use intrinsic substitutability instead of extrinsic substitutability. In the next section, 
we are going to discuss the data collection process for the model we propose. 
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4.5 the data to be collected to form a 
vector space of substitutability 
Data collection is the cornerstone of the data analysis. No model can work without proper data. 
Data mining and data cleaning are also important topics in statistical modeling and machine 
learning. As the technology advances, there are more types of data available in larger sizes too. 
However, what we look for from the data is different from what data analysts usually do. As we 
have emphasized many times in this dissertation, all the steps in defining the market should have 
a factual and legal basis. Assumptions, especially non-realistic ones, should be avoided in the 
market division.
The problem of data collection had been a problem in the market definition between the 1960s 
and the  1980s.  This  is  also  a  period when antitrust  models  were  a  widely  pursued topic  in 
academia. However, at that time, antitrust models had to set many unrealistic assumptions to 
simplify  the  calculation  and  accommodate  the  availability  of  data.  Models  which  were 
theoretically  good  could  be  severely  criticized  as  unrealistic  if  the  data  required  were  not 
available or involved a large amount of computation. One of the reasons why the hypothetical 
monopolist test along with CLA can stand out from the models proposed in the two decades after 
the establishment of 1968 Merger Guidelines is that it is a method with a low requirement of data 
quantity and computation.
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However, the situation has changed significantly over the past three decades. Both computational 
and statistical methods have been developing fast. It is a good time now to review the conclusion 
made three decades ago that it is impossible to quantify substitutability. As we have discussed in 
section 3.1 and section 3.2, the most logical way to divide the relevant product market is using a 
standard  based  on  the  level  of  substitutability.  The  most  reasonable  way  to  quantify 
substitutability is to use a multi-dimensional vector to represent each product’s features because 
substitutability itself is a multi-dimensional concept.
On the other hand, the data for substitutability in our market definition model is collected as 
intrinsic substitutability or extrinsic substitutability. The intrinsic substitutability data is collected 
from the  parameters  of  products  features.  The  extrinsic  substitutability  data  is  collected  by 
carefully designed surveys. We need first to figure out what do consumers consider when they 
are making purchase decisions. Most of the consumer goods manufacturers nowadays collect this 
information on a regular basis. Therefore, we can probably get it from the merging companies or 
the other competitors in the candidate market. According to section 2.2 of the 2010 Guidelines, a 
premerger  investigation  can  collect  information  from  the  source  of  the  merging  parties, 
consumers, and other industry participants and observers. Therefore, other competitors also have 
the duty to provide information to the Agencies upon request, although the easiest way is still 
collecting  the  data  from  the  merging  parties.  In  a  rare  case  where  this  information  is  not 
available, we can find the information from commercial data company or collect it with a survey. 
If we use a survey, we need to make sure the sample is random enough and find the features 
which, for example, 95% of consumers care about when purchasing the product.
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When we get to know the feature that the consumers care about, we will decide if we need to use 
intrinsic or extrinsic substitutability on each feature based on the standard we established in the 
last section. We will use some examples to explain how to collect the data and form our multi-
dimensional  substitutability  space.  There  are  several  important  aspects  of  data  collection 
generally important to all the models. Instead of discussing them all together abstractly then raise 
examples, we discuss them along with the examples so that it can be more intuitive. The first 
example is the features of printers. Table 3, 4, and 5 are some printer features comparisons we 
get from amazon.com.
Table 3: Jet-ink printer features
HP 3830 HP 4650 HP 5255 HP 6968
Functions Print, Scan, Copy, 
Fax
Print, Scan, Copy, 
Fax
Print, Scan, Copy, 
Fax
Print, Scan, Copy, 
Fax
Print speed 8.5 ppm black, 6 
ppm color
9.5 ppm black, 6.8 
ppm color
10 ppm black, 7 
ppm color
18 ppm black, 10 
ppm color
Auto 2-sided 
printing
No Yes Yes Yes
Auto document 
feeder
35-sheet 35-sheet 35-sheet 35-sheet
Wired/wireless 
networking
802.11b/g/n 802.11b/g/n 802.11b/g/n 802.11b/g/n, 
Ethernet
Display(inches) 2.2 mono 
touchscreen
2.2 mono 
touchscreen
2.2 mono 
touchscreen
2.65 color 
touchscreen
Dimensions(inche
s)
17.72x14.33x8.54 17.53x14.53x7.5 17.52x14.45x7.52 18.26x15.35x9.0
Input/output 
capacity
60 sheets, 25 
sheets
100 sheets, 25 
sheets
100 sheets, 25 
sheets
225 sheets, 25 
sheets
Cartridge yield black 190, color 
165
black 190, color 
166
black 190, color 
167
black 480, color 
330
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Table 4: colored laser printer features
ET-2750 ET-3700 ET-3750 ET-4750
Functions Print, Scan, Copy Print, Scan, Copy Print, Scan, Copy Print, Scan, Copy, 
Fax
Print speed 10.5 ppm black, 5 
ppm color
15 ppm black, 8 
ppm color
15 ppm black, 8 
ppm color
15 ppm black, 8 
ppm color
Auto 2-sided 
printing
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auto document 
feeder
No No 30 sheets 30 sheets
Display(inches) 1.44 color 2.4 color 2.4 color 2.4 color touch
Input capacity 100 sheets 150 sheets 150 sheets 250 sheets
Connectivity 
technology
USB, WiFi, WiFi 
Direct
USB, WiFi, WiFi 
Direct, Ethernet
USB, WiFi, WiFi 
Direct, Ethernet
USB, WiFi, WiFi 
Direct, Ethernet
Cartridge yield 6500 black, 5200 
color (Bottles)
14000 black, 
11200 color 
(Bottles)
14000 black, 
11200 color 
(Bottles)
14000 black, 
11200 color 
(Bottles)
DCP-L2550DW MFC-L2710DW MFC-L2750DW MFC-L2710DWXL
Functions Print, Scan, Copy Print, Scan, Copy, 
Fax
Print, Scan, Copy, 
Fax
Print, Scan, Copy, 
Fax
Print speed 36 ppm 32 ppm 36 ppm 36 ppm
Auto 2-sided 
printing
Print Print Print, Scan, Copy, 
Fax (all two-sided)
Print, Scan, Copy, 
Fax (all two-sided)
Auto document 
feeder
50 sheets 50 sheets 50 sheets 50 sheets
Display(inches) 2-line LCD 2-line LCD 2.7 color 
touchscreen
2.7 color 
touchscreen
Input capacity 250 sheets 250 sheets 250 sheets 250 sheets
Connectivity 
technology
WiFi, Ethernet, Hi-
speed USB 2.0
WiFi, Ethernet, Hi-
speed USB 2.1
WiFi, Ethernet, Hi-
speed USB 2.2
WiFi, Ethernet, Hi-
speed USB 2.3
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Table 5: monochrome laser printer features
Some product features like the LCD display and the input/output capacity are probably non-
essential to most consumer’s choice. The print speed is essential to office users but less important 
to home users. The color print is essential to some but not all of the users. However, product 
features such as how many papers each cartridge can print and the price of the cartridge are 
probably important to all  users because they directly affect the cost of printing. Most of the 
printers  have the scan and copy function and wireless  print  function,  so we do not  need to 
consider these features. Printers do not give much perceptual feelings to consumers. The look of 
the  printers  is  usually  not  considered  important  either.  Therefore,  data  for  intrinsic 
substitutability is good enough, and we can form the substitutability space only using the product 
features data.266
There is another point worth raising about using the consumer preference to decide the variable 
features we consider. The k-means clustering model does not have a limit on the number of 
dimensions. Generally, the more dimensions we use, the more accurate the result we can usually 
get. However, a too-flat data input might introduce too much noise, which in extreme cases will 
lead to a bad performance as well. Besides, collecting too much data will cost extra resources. 
Cartridge yield 1200 1200 1200 1200
DCP-L2550DW MFC-L2710DW MFC-L2750DW MFC-L2710DWXL
 The weight and size might still have significance to some home users. However, we can quantify the 266
size easily. A non-significant difference in size is perceptible as well. Therefore it is still more appropriate 
to use intrinsic substitutability.
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Although data mining and dimension reduction are both important and widely pursued topics in 
machine learning, the application of those advanced methods cannot be supported by a legal 
basis in the context of premerger investigation. They can also result in less interpretability. As we 
have  previously  mentioned,  our  model  incurs  legal  consequences,  so  the  requirement  on 
interpretability  should  be  higher  than  in  other  fields.  Therefore  it  is  more  useful  and 
straightforward for us to use consumers' preference to limit the dimensions of our substitutability 
space. However, we might still want to use a principal component analysis (PCA)  or another 267
method to eliminate the correlations between the features because the k-means clustering will 
have a more accurate result if we assure the independence of each variable used.
Another  important  aspect  of  data  collection is  the  form of  data.  K-means clustering and its 
variances take numeric input only. There are product features which are naturally numeric and 
ready to be compared, like the maximum print speed and the number of paper each replacement 
toner yields, and the printer/toner price. Those product feature data is numeric but on different 
scales and units. To avoid the result being affected by the scales and unites, we need to normalize 
the data.  On the other hand,  some of the features that  the consumers care about are binary. 
Product features such as whether the printer has double-sided scanning and whether the printer 
can print from a USB storage directly are some of such examples. For these binary variables, we 
put having the function as 1 and not having the function as 0, then we normalized them, so the 
“Principal component analysis (PCA) is a statistical procedure that uses an orthogonal transformation 267
to convert a set of observations of possibly correlated variables into a set of values of linearly 
uncorrelated variables called principal components. If there are n observations with p variables, then the 
number of distinct principal components is min(n−1,p). This transformation is defined in such a way that 
the first principal component has the largest possible variance (that is, accounts for as much of the 
variability in the data as possible), and each succeeding component in turn has the highest variance 
possible under the constraint that it is orthogonal to the preceding components. The resulting vectors are 
an uncorrelated orthogonal basis set. PCA is sensitive to the relative scaling of the original variables.” — 
Mahmood, Deeman. (2018). Principal Component Analysis (PCA). 
!197
A New Solution to Market Definition                                  
binary value is on a reasonable scale. There are other ways to deal with the binary values, but we 
believe this one serves our purpose better because we can consider the variables in the same 
dimensions just like what the consumers do.
In premerger cases, the court will also consider some of the product features to investigate the 
substitutive relations between the products, as well as to make decisions on submarkets, as we 
have mentioned earlier in this chapter. The SSNIP model only provides information about the 
demand. Therefore, the court still has to weigh different features manually based on the specific 
case fact. Our model is a quantitative way to consider all the product features together. The data 
processed for the usage in our model can also scientifically filter out the distracting part of the 
data, and be presented to the court. Therefore, not only our model result but also our processed 
data can help the court get a better picture of the substitutive relations in the candidate market. 
We also use the example of printers to explain why our model can help the court in deciding the 
substitutional rations of the products. Table 3 is the features of jet printers. Table 4 is the features 
of color laser printers. Table 5 is the features of the monochrome laser printer. As we can roughly 
see from the tables, when it comes to the maximum print speed, the color laser printers and the 
jet printers are similar. However, the pages yielded per cartridge is very different between the 
color laser printers and the jet printers. The pages yielded per cartridge is closer between the 
color laser printers and monochrome laser printers, but there is still a significant difference. The 
prices of those three types of printers are also very different. As we have discussed in Chapter 3, 
when there are multiple products being sold by one manufacturer, the SSNIP product is hard to 
define. To do a complete and reliable SSNIP, we need to perform CLA on multiple combinations 
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of products. In each combination, there are different ways of increasing the price by 5%. If we 
manage to collect the data and run the model for all the situations we need to consider, the result 
of the relevant market will no longer be abnormally narrow as we have usually observed. 
However, it will take a lot of effort in both data collection and calculation. Nevertheless, we can 
simply put all the product features of all the products available in the market and get a market 
definition. Then analyze the market share and the effect of the merger based on which products 
are produced by the merging parties. The data collection is especially easy with non-perceptual 
products because only intrinsic substitutability is used to form the substitutability space. 
Another merit of doing so is that we can avoid the arbitrariness in the decision. As we can see, 
the substitutability relations are complex between different products. If we simply define the 
market based on commercial types or our impression, we will probably define the jet printer, 
monochrome laser printer, and color laser printer as different relevant markets. We might miss 
the fact that some of the cheaper color laser printers may be highly substitutable with a jet 
printer, and eventually falls into the same cluster with the jet printers. The clustering analysis 
based on substitutability can avoid this type of error and define the market in a quantitative way 
where substitutability is the only standard. 
Insurance 
plans
Relative 
value
Ordinary 
visit fee
Deductible Coinsurance Out-of-
pocket 
maximum
Rx. Out-of-
network 
coverage
Silver plan 1 0.81 $45 $2500 20% $7150 15/65/50% 
Rx Ded. 
applies Tiers 
2-3
None
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Table 6: Health insurance plan benefits
As we have mentioned before, the choice of a printer is usually not perceptual. There are other 
types of products or services like this, for example, health insurance programs. Table 6 is a 
fragment of a health insurance company’s benefit table. Again, we need to figure out what the 
Silver plan 2 0.84 Ded. 10% $2800 10% $6000 15/65/50% 
Rx Ded. 
applies to all 
tiers
None
Silver plan 3 0.82 $45 $3000 30% $7350 15/65/50% 
Rx Ded. 
applies Tiers 
2-3
None
Silver plan 4 0.84 $45 $2500 30% $7350 15/65/50% 
Rx Ded. 
applies Tiers 
2-3
None
Silver plan 5 0.88 Ded. 10% $2800 10% $6550 15/65/50% 
Rx Ded. 
applies to all 
tiers
None
Bronze 1 0.61 Ded. 50% $5400 50% $6550 15/65/50% 
Rx Ded. 
applies Tiers 
2-3
None
Bronze 2 0.69 Ded. 50% $3750 50% $7350 15/65/50% 
Rx Ded. 
applies Tiers 
2-3
None
Bronze 3 0.75 Ded. 30% $4500 30% $7150 15/65/50% 
Rx Ded. 
applies Tiers 
2-3
None
Gold 1 0.97 $30 $1000 10% $3500 15/65/50% 
Rx Ded. 
applies Tiers 
2-3
None
Gold 2 1 $30 $1000 10% $6000 15/65/50% 
Rx Ded. 
applies Tiers 
2-3
None
Relative 
value
Ordinary 
visit fee
Deductible Coinsurance Out-of-
pocket 
maximum
Rx. Out-of-
network 
coverage
Insurance 
plans
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consumers or employers care about when making health insurance decisions. The most important 
features of the health insurance programs are listed. We can use the monthly premium, deductible 
amount, ordinary visit rate, coinsurance rate, out-of-pocket maximum amount and the 
reimbursement rate of each tire of medication as the numeric variables we use to form our multi-
dimensional substitutability space and apply them to our model after being normalized. There are 
some binary variables like whether the out-of-network service will be reimbursed, whether the 
reference from the ordinary visit doctor is required, whether service covers out of state visit, etc. 
Those binary variables can be normalized and be analyzed with the other numeric variables as 
well. After collecting and processing the data, we can define the relevant product market directly 
based on product substitutability. 
We can use intrinsic substitutability in all the aspects important to the consumers when we deal 
with non-perceptual products or services. In fact, the vast majority of the top 20 industry groups 
which file the most HSR premerger investigation cases each year in the past six years are 
industries producing non-perceptual products or services. We collected the data of the industry 
groups which have high percentages in the total number of HSR premerger investigation cases 
filed in Table 7. The data is collected from the HSR annual report  from 2011 to 2016. We then 268
predicted the expected percentages of the fiscal year 2017 and found the top 20 industry groups 
which have the highest predicted percentage in Table 8. 
 Federal Trade Commission, Annual Competition Reports, 34th Report FY2011, 35th Report FY 2012, 268
36th Report FY 2013, 37th Report FY 2014, 38th Report FY 2015, 39th Report FY 2016 (Aug. 18, 2017, 
17:30 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/policy/reports/policy-reports/annual-competition-reports, PDF.
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Table 7: Percentage of HSR case filed (entity standard)
Industry Group 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Oil and Extraction 1.7 1.8 2.4 2.2 1.5 2
Utility 3.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.4 3
Food and Kindred Products 2.2 1.9 2.3 3.2 3.1 2.2
Chemical Manufacturing 5.4 4.4 6.1 6.6 6.5 5.6
Machinery Manufacturing 2.8 3.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2
Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 3.5 4.3 3.8 3.3 2.5 3.7
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 2.6 3.0 2.9 2.5 2.7 1.9
Merchant Wholesales durable goods 6.9 5.3 5.3 6.0 5 4.7
Merchant Wholesales nondurable goods 5.2 5.4 4.5 5.2 5 6.4
Publishing Industry Except for Internet 4.2 4.7 3.7 4.4 3.9 4.7
Telecommunications 1.9 2.0 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.5
Internet Service Providers, Web Search Protals, 
and Data Processing Services
2.4 2.4 1.9 2.6 3.2 3.4
Credit Intermediation and Related Activities 1.7 1.6 2.8 1.5 1.5 2.5
Securities, Commodity Contracts, and Other 
Financial Investments and Related Activities
3.0 2.4 2.5 2.7 1.4 2.6
Insurance Carriers and Related Activities 3.6 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.7 2.5
Funds Trusts and Other Fiancial Vehicles 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.1 0.2
Professional,Scientific, and Technical Serivces 9.0 7.9 7 7.6 8.7 8.7
Administrative and Support Service 2.2 2.5 2.4 1.7 2.9 2.4
Ambulatory Health Care Services 3.2 1.6 1.5 2.0 2.7 2.5
Hospitals 2.0 2.1 3.8 1.7 2.2 1.8
Rank Industry Group Prediction of 
FY2017
1 Chemical Manufacturing 7.39
2 Professional,Scientific, and Technical Serivces 7.17
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Table 8: Predicted top 20 in HSR case filed
However, there are still industry groups producing products which are considered in a perceptual 
standard by the consumers. The most typical example will be food, which is among the top 10 
industries groups which file the most HSR cases. As we have discussed earlier in this chapter, we 
should not  use intrinsic  substitutability  on products  which are weighed perceptually because 
3 Securities, Commodity Contracts, and Other Financial Investments and 
Related Activities
6.74
4 Merchant Wholesales nondurable goods 5.18
5 Merchant Wholesales durable goods 3.74
6 Publishing Industry Except for Internet 3.18
7 Insurance Carriers and Related Activities 3.15
8 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 2.95
9 Food and Kindred Products 2.68
10 Administrative and Support Service 2.51
11 Utility 2.31
12 Internet Service Providers, Web Search Protals, and Data Processing 
Services
2.21
13 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 2.14
14 Hospitals 2.04
15 Funds Trusts and Other Fiancial Vehicles 2.04
16 Credit Intermediation and Related Activities 1.9
17 Machinery Manufacturing 1.89
18 Telecommunications 1.77
19 Ambulatory Health Care Services 1.71
20 Oil and Extraction 1.48
Industry Group Prediction of 
FY2017
Rank
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some differences  in  intrinsic  substitutability  are  not  significant  enough  to  be  sensed  by  the 
consumers. For example, in the food industry, the amount of sugar added is not always in direct 
ratio with how sweet the food is. The sweet taste will be affected by the other ingredients and the 
kind of sugar used. Moreover, the ingredients do not have a uniformed quality even if they are 
technically the same. Therefore, it will be more reasonable to use extrinsic substitutability.
In this dissertation, we propose to design surveys for consumers to rate the product's perceptual 
functions in different features by numbers. For example, in the food and kindred product industry 
group, the products usually have two purposes -- the functional purpose and the recreational 
purpose.
We will  analyze cereal  as  an example to  show how we form a space of  substitutability  for 
perceptual products like food. Consumers of cereal usually have both purposes. There are some 
features in the nutrient fact which many consumers will  consider. They are calories, protein, 
carbohydrates,  fat,  and fiber.  These nutrition facts  are  numeric.  Therefore,  we can use them 
directly. These functional features can be measured by intrinsic substitutability as we usually do. 
It is worth mentioning that we need to consider the unit price as a necessary numeric factor. 
Products are not substitutable to each other if their price is very different. Therefore, the price 
should also be a factor in our substitutability space. There are also binary features which might 
either affect the taste or affect the health aspects, like whether the cereal is deeply processed, 
whether the cereal has raisins or almond in it, and whether the cereal is organic. These features 
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are also essentially intrinsic substitutability. They should be processed in the same way we do the 
other binary factors.
However, the recreational function of cereal should be measured by extrinsic substitutability. The 
data is collected by survey. The survey should be sent to the consumer who has purchased and 
used the cereal. The survey should contain questions to let the consumers rate the taste they 
experienced. In the case of cereal, we should typically have the level of crunchiness, creaminess, 
chewiness, sweetness, bitterness, sourness, and saltiness, diversity in taste. The consumer can 
rate from, for example, 0 to 10 on each factor. We will not use the data which is more extreme 
than the first and last 5% in distribution to avoid the effect of extreme samples. 
The sample size does not have to be large to be sufficient for our purpose. According to central 
limit theorem  and the law of large numbers , the sample size needed is decided by the type 269 270
one error  rate  allowed and the estimated standard deviation of  the population.  The standard 
deviation of the population is estimated by sample means. When estimating the population mean, 
we need to make sure the data points in the sample(s) are independent of each other, and the data 
points are from identical distributions. Let the sample variance be σ². The standard error of the 
sample means will be Function 15.
 In probability theory, the central limit theorem (CLT) establishes that, in most situations, when 269
independent random variables are added, their properly normalized sum tends toward a normal 
distribution (informally a "bell curve") even if the original variables themselves are not normally 
distributed.
 In probability theory, the law of large numbers (LLN) is a theorem that describes the result of 270
performing the same experiment a large number of times. According to the law, the average of the results 
obtained from a large number of trials should be close to the expected value, and will tend to become 
closer as more trials are performed. 
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Function 15
The sample means will follow a normal distribution. The mean of the distribution will be the 
population mean. Therefore, we have Function 16 to calculate the sample size.
 
Function 16
The most commonly applied confidence interval is 95%. What interval to choose will be decided 
by  the  Guidelines  or  by  the  judge.  Then  the  sample  size  can  be  estimated  based  on  an 
experiential estimation of sample standard deviation and the inferential interval. Since we are 
estimating the same population which is all the consumers in the market who is interested in 
certain kind of product, we can get a good estimation of the population after conducting the first 
survey for each type of product. Moreover, our estimation will get better as we conduct more and 
more premerger investigation cases about the type of product.
On the other hand, the cereal manufacturers including the merging company might have already 
collected the data of the cereal taste for the purpose of marketing. According to the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines,  the  merging  companies  have  the  responsibility  to  truthfully  provide  information 
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required  by  the  agencies.  Therefore,  we  can  use  their  data  to  find  the  population  standard 
deviation with regard to the cereal taste.271
There might be a concern regarding the cost of the survey. In fact, the merger simulation models 
in the premerger investigation also need consumer survey to calibrate the consumer behavior 
parameters. Although we do not know precisely what is the sample size required in the cases, a 
rule of thumb in research is that 40 data points will usually be good enough. Therefore, our 
estimation is the survey will not cost more than a couple of thousand dollars. Compared the 
target amount of the premerger investigation cases, and how much more precise our model is 
compared to the SSNIP, the cost of the survey is trivial. Additionally, as we can see from Table 8, 
the top 20 industry groups are mostly producing non-perceptual products. Collecting the data of 
product  features  is  a  lot  cheaper  than  the  survey  since  the  merger  parties  and  the  other 
competitors all have the responsibility to provide the data for their product.
According to the common practice of data collection, there are two ways to collect data from 
costumers. One is to assemble volunteers, who are going to be paid by a proper amount for a 
long survey. We can provide them with samples of all the products we might put in the relevant 
market and have them to rate all the aspects of the taste. In this way, the criteria hold by one 
person will be the same, so the products are rated more fairly. We need to pay attention to the 
sample  randomness  of  this  method because  the  volunteers  might  get  the  information of  the 
survey from a certain path which will affect the randomness of the people surveyed. The people 
 Since we never really know the population standard deviation, it is always estimated by sample 271
standard deviation when it is theoretically required. Therefore, this is not an approximation without basis. 
Besides this is just the sample size, with correspondence to how many people will be surveyed. This 
approximation will not affect the result of the model as long as we collect enough data.
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who are willing to spend the time on the survey are also limited to the groups of people who 
have more free time. The fortunate aspect of this case is the taste of human beings might not be 
affected by their occupation. Therefore, as long as we can manage to get people of different age 
and gender groups to do the survey, the data will not be affected.
Another  way  to  collect  perceptual  data  is  through  online  data  collection  companies.  Those 
companies  usually  have  websites  and  programs to  track  consumers,  and  sent  questionnaires 
giving  out  a  small  amount  of  money  or  benefit  to  incentivize  people  to  participate.  In  this 
method, we send the survey of different products to different consumers. Each product has a 
certain amount of data, and different products' data comes from different people. In this way, the 
randomness aspect of the survey answers might still create a problem. Nowadays using online 
behavior to track the purchaser's information is common. The data companies also have their 
way to make sure that we collect the survey data from people of different age and gender.
We introduced the cereal example to illustrate how to collect extrinsic substitutability data on 
perceptual products. For the industry group: Other food and kindred products, a similar method 
can be used. A survey tailored to a specific product can help us get the data on perceptual aspects. 
Similarly, there are also non-perceptual factors we need to consider if it is something consumers 
generally believe as being important. For food in general, examples of non-perceptual factors 
will be the amount of preservatives added and the amount of fibers provided. Since the data 
collected  via  surveys  is  numeric  as  well,  we  can  simply  put  the  data  together  as  parallel 
dimensions  in  the  substitutability  space.  There  are  also  non-perceptual  binary  factors,  for 
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example, whether the food is organic, whether the food is artificial-hormone-free, etc. Again, we 
can normalize the data and put it together with the other dimensions.
There are other  products  which involve perceptual  aspects.  For  example,  the industry group 
"Publishing  Industry  Except  for  Internet"  which  is  also  among the  top  10  HSR cases  files, 
involves perceptual products like newspapers and magazines. Similarly, there are also perceptual 
and non-perceptual features in newspapers and magazines. The non-perceptual features will be 
the price, the number of topics they cover, the number of articles in each issue, typical length of 
the articles, the number of days between each issue's release, the percentage of advertisements in 
each issue, the age of their target readers, the income of their target readers, etc. There are also 
binary non-perceptual features like the popular topics covered (each topic will be one variable, 
so the data is binary), whether the content is colored, whether the content is for academic or 
other  professions,  etc.  The perceptual  data  will  also  be  collected  by surveys,  similar  to  our 
previous example on cereals. The survey will ask rating for features such as in impartialness, 
factual report, being interesting to read, being useful to the reader, vision of the articles, depth of 
the analysis, etc.
It is worth mentioning that intrinsic substitutability is not as absolute as the number shows in 
some rare cases. For example, some high-quality CPU with a lower frequency might have a 
better  performance than a  low-quality  CPU with  a  higher  frequency.  In  this  case,  since  the 
market definition is not outcome-decisive in court, the parties can submit evidence suggesting a 
different conclusion. The court may weigh the fact accordingly, or change the data accordingly 
based on expert opinions. There might also be some non-perceptual factors which are hard to be 
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measured by its actual parameters. In this case, we can take a survey among the experts and get 
the relevant data.
Additionally, we did not discuss the geographic market in this chapter,  while the geographic 
market is more crucial than the relevant product market in some specific industry groups, like 
merchant wholesalers, internet service providers, hospitals, and ambulatory health care services. 
The Agencies have other methods to define the geographic market. Since our purpose is to find a 
supplementary model  to  assist  the SSNIP and the CLA, we will  limit  our  discussion in  the 
product market. In any case, according to the Merger Guidelines Section 4.2 Geographic Market 
Definition, the geographic market will be considered as a premise of product market when the 
Agencies detects the existence of it. Our approaches can be used based on the conclusion of the 
geographic  market.  The  agencies  could  apply  our  model  to  the  products  available  in  each 
geographic market. The rest will be the same. 
In summary, we can collect the data of substitutability with our method, as long as we stay aware 
of the fact that the substitutability is a combination of product features and the opinion of the 
consumers. We need to make sure the data collected about the substitutability is an accurate 
reflection of what the product can offer and what the consumers care about.
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4.6 Examples of Applying K-means 
Clustering 
Due to limited funding, we are going to use simulated dataset in our desired format for the first 
example. For the second example, we will use real data, even though it is not in the exact format 
that we desire. Nevertheless, we find it close enough to illustrate our purpose in market 
definition. 
The industry group of Merchant Wholesales on durable and non-durable goods are both among 
the top 5 in the number of HSR cases filed. To give more illustrations of how the data will look 
like, we simulated our first example as the features of wholesalers. 
It is less intuitive to consider collecting data about what consumers are looking for from services, 
and the industry group Insurance Carriers and Related Activities is among the top 10 in the 
number of HSR cases filed. Our second example will be about industry group of car insurance. 
We picked this example also because there are only three major aspects being considered in a car 
insurance service. The three aspects can all be measured by the premium. The premium is 
numeric, and there are only three dimensions. Therefore, we can visualize it in a 3D figure, and 
offer a direct view of how the clustering works. 
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4.6.1 Example 1, Merchant Wholesales durable goods 
In this example, we simulated 30 motor vehicle and motor vehicle parts and supplies merchant 
wholesalers. The choice of the wholesaler is usually non-perceptual. Therefore, we only 
simulated the features of the wholesalers and used them as the intrinsic substitutability. After 
simulating the features of the wholesalers, we standardized the data to make sure the dimensions 
are on the same scale. Since it is simulated data, what we are looking for from the model result is 
whether k-means clustering can find the pattern we embedded in the simulated data. 
When we simulate the data, we imagine that the motor vehicle and motor vehicle parts and 
supplies merchant wholesalers varies in three different scales: big franchised wholesalers, 
medium-sized local wholesalers, and small local wholesalers. The patterns in the simulation will 
be built based on this setting.  
The simulation and its code are below. For the sake of typeset, we have knit the instruction, code 
and the figures with a markdown file. The following are segments of the code. For more details 
of this simulation and analysis, see the appendix or my post on Rpubs website.  272
 Yan Yang, K-means examples, Rpubs (May 11, 2018, 8:30 AM), http://rpubs.com/AnnYang/388225, 272
url.
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After we get the data frame,  we will conduct k-means clustering in different methods. As we 
discussed in the earlier section, there are several methods to find the k. There are different 
techniques to avoid the unwanted effects caused by the random start points as well. We are going 
to try all of them on our simulated data. Since we do not know how many clusters are there in 
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real life, we will apply the clustering model as if we do not know how many patterns are hidden 
in our simulated data, even though we know how the data was generated. 
The first method we use to find the k is the two-step method. After using the two steps to find the 
possible k, we are going to conduct the k-means clustering for one hundred times with each 
possible k we find in the first step. During the one hundred times of running the model, we will 
use different sets of random numbers provided by R to make sure the start points of K-means 
clustering are all different each time. In this way, we can make sure that we have tried different 
start points to cover our multi-dimensional space. 
After the two-step analysis, we are going to use the Elbow Method and the Gap Statistic Method 
to find the best k. If they come up with results different from the k(s) concluded by the 
hierarchical clustering, we will also run the model with that k with the same one-hundred sets we 
used earlier, so we can avoid having the comparison be affected by the randomness of the start 
points. We will not use k-means++ in this stage, so we can make sure the comparison is not 
affected by the better choice of start point provided by k-mean++. 
Now, we perform the clustering and see what happens. First, we need to do the first step of the 
two-steps analysis — hierarchical clustering to find out the k. 
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Figure 5 
From Figure 5, we can see the hierarchical clustering result is not very good. The difference 
between the three, four and five groups are not very significant. We have discussed in previous 
sections that the consumer products and services are usually clustered. Therefore, in real life, the 
hierarchical clustering will probably produce a better result. However, for natural materials, the 
features are not necessarily clustered. In this case, it is common to get a bad result from 
hierarchical clustering as well. In a typical desired result of hierarchical clustering, there will be 
some clusters which are relatively more significant than others. That number of cluster is the k 
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we are going for. In some case, there might be one level which is significantly wider than others. 
If so, we should pick that level, and use the number of clusters as our k. 
Since there is not a significant difference between having three, four and five groups, we will set 
our k as 3, 4 and 5. We are going to conduct k-means with k equals to 3 from 100 sets of start 
points. Then we find the result with the smallest within-group sum of squares and plot the result 
of the clustering with the smallest within-group sum of squares. The plot is shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 
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In Figure 6, since we are looking at the clustering results of nine-dimensional objects from a 
two-dimensional picture, there are overlaps of the clusters in Figure 6. In fact, the 30 wholesalers 
are divided into three groups without overlap. We can see this from the other relevant aspects of 
the result below. From the tags given to each data points, we can see that if we divide the 
wholesalers into three groups, it is roughly close to the sequence we intentionally put in the 
simulation (10 points for each type of data), except that the second group has largely shrunk and 
many the points go to the first group. 
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We did not change the sequence of the intended level in generating the data points. The first ten 
wholesalers are big franchised wholesalers, the second ten wholesalers are medium-sized local 
wholesalers, and the third ten wholesalers are small local wholesalers. However we also added 
two variables in which the first twenty data points belong to the same distribution and the last ten 
data points belong to another. These two variables interfered with the first three patterns while 
not destroying it. The result of our k-means clustering reflected the interference. Therefore, some 
data points were grouped into group 3 while it was intended to be in group 2. 
This is a good reflection of real-life conditions. Since we used a more random way to generate 
the data compared to generating certain-shaped data and add errors to it, we have less control 
over the actual pattern. This is similar to what happens in real life. We intuitively divide the 
wholesalers based on the scale of them while not knowing that there are more complicated 
patterns underneath the substitution. There are other imbedded factors which might affect the 
reality of the substitutive relationship in a stronger way. The computation helped us to find the 
truth of the market by considering a broader range of things simultaneously and doing it 
quantitatively. As we have mentioned earlier in this chapter, the court will manually consider the 
substitutive relations between the products. Some of the underneath substitutive relations are 
hard to see. Just like us, the judges may not be able to find the pattern synthesized under the 
surface. Therefore, our model can help the court in making more informed decisions on the 
substitutive relations. 
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On the contrary, we can also see that the result of applying hierarchical clustering alone was 
totally fooled by the 2 interfering variables. When dividing by 3 groups, hierarchical clustering 
put the first twenty data points into the first group altogether, which means it failed to recognize 
the pattern of grouping we are actually intending. Therefore, we believe k-means clustering is 
more reliable to define relevant product market. 
Now We look at the clustering when k is equal to 4. Again, we conduct k-means with k equals to 
4 from 100 different start points for 100 times and plot the result with the smallest within-group 
sum of squares. The figure of the clustering is below. 
Figure 7 
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The result of grouping and other relevant aspects of the results are as follows: 
As we can see from the clustering, the first one third still roughly belongs to the first group. The 
rest are incorrectly clustered. It is due to the fact that there were only three real patterns, so the 
fourth group comes from the two interfering variables. 
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We can see that the two groups on the right of Figure 6 and Figure 7 are the same regardless of 
the difference in k. By adding one more group to divide, the algorithm only divided a less 
desirable group without destroying the integrity of a relatively accurate clustering.  It means the 
clustering of the two groups on the right is reliable. 
As we can see from the simulation, the first two variables are simulated in the three patterns we 
are intending. Therefore it makes sense that they explain more variations (56.08%) within the 
grouping result. We can also see from Figure 7 that the green group was relatively slim when 
looking from the first two dimensions. That is because the first two dimensions do not have 
much influence in differentiating the fourth group from the other three. It is reasonable because 
the fourth group is “created” from the interference in other variables, so the difference cannot be 
reflected from the first two dimensions. 
Now we conduct k-means with k equals to 5 from 100 different starting points for 100 times, and 
plot the result with the smallest within-group sum of squares. The plot is below. 
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Figure 8 
The other relevant aspects of the clustering result when k = 5 is as follows. 
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From Figure 8, we can see that the two groups on the left are the same as the two on the left in 
Figure 7. However, when the model had to divide the clusters further, it divided the larger groups 
on the right. Again, we can indicate from Figure 8 that the two clusters on the left are relatively 
stable. Which means the solution of minimizing the in-group distance is probably a universal 
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optimum. On the other hand, Figure 8 also suggests a similar conclusion as Figure 7 does that the 
first two dimensions do not provide much information about the green group . 273
The result also indicates that the five clusters are probably too many because the clustering is no 
longer reflecting the patterns embedded in the simulated data frame. Therefore, it is crucial to 
find the most appropriate k. The result also tells us that the two-step clustering method is not 
desirable in the context of premerger investigation, even though it is a useful method in market 
segmentation. The market segmentation helps the manufacturers and other service providers to 
find the target consumer and design their products accordingly. It does not have to be as accurate 
as the market definition. In contrast, the market definition has legal power. It impacts the result 
of the premerger investigation and the fate of a merger. 
In the following content, we are going to use the Elbow Method to find the k. We wrote a 
function according to the Equation 4 and Equation 5 of Chapter 4 to calculate Wk in the elbow 
method with the input of a dataset, and the largest meaningful k. The code can be found in the 
appendix. The output of the elbow function is the Wk we want to calculate. The k-means 
clustering runs within the elbow function with each k with random start points. Therefore, it will 
be better if we run the model multiple times. Since our data size is small, it will not take long. 
We calculate Wk from 100 different start points when k changes from 1 to 20 to avoid the effect 
of randomness. 
 The green group is label as group 1 this time.273
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Then we plot it with k as the x-axis and the mean of the 100 Wk calculated as the y-axis. Our 
code is published on Rpubs to make sure the other researchers can check its reproducibility . 274
The code can also be found in the appendix of this dissertation. 
Figure 9 
We know from the plot that 3 and 4 are desirable k because the change of Wk is still larger than 
the ones after the 4th k. However, starting from the 3rd point, the slope is already relatively flat 
compared to the decrease after the data was divided into two groups. Therefore, according to the 
elbow method, 2, 3, and 4 are all relatively good k, but the best k suggested by the Elbow 
Method is 2. 
 Yan Yang, K-means examples, Rpubs (May 11, 2018, 8:30 AM), http://rpubs.com/AnnYang/388225, 274
url.
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Then we are going to use the Gap Statistic to determine the best k. Since R already has a package 
to calculate Gap Statistic, we will use the function from package cluster directly. The code is in 
the Appendix and the Rpubs. We set the maximum k as 20 and the result of the Gap Statistic 
suggested the best k is 2, which is the same as the result of Elbow Method. 
The Elbow Method tries to make sure we are not over-dividing the dataset. The Gap Statistic 
tries to leave an as-large-as-possible gap between each cluster. Both of the models tell that the 
best k we should use is 2. As we have mentioned earlier, the Elbow Method is based on the 
distance between products, and the Gap Statistic is based on the space (gap) between each 
product. They both fit our purpose of finding the close substitution of the target product without 
wrongfully dividing less substitutable products inside of the market. Therefore, we should trust 
the result of these two methods, even more so because they both produce the same result. 
Therefore, we are going to conduct the K-means clustering with repeating it for 100 times with 
different initial points again, using K = 2 as the input of clusters, and plot the result with the 
smallest within-group sum of squares. The plot of the result is shown in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10 
The other relevant aspects of the result are as follows. 
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We noticed from the labels that this method detected the fact that the last ten elements are by all 
means following the same pattern. The result of the clustering is the most stable if we divide the 
data into two groups. Therefore, we should consider using the best k suggested by the two 
methods which both comply with our context of market definition. If the two methods do not 
produce the same result, the Gap-statistic is more reliable, because it does not involve subjective 
opinion.  
On the other hand, we should be aware that if the market requires a higher level of 
substitutability, for example, the chemical material market, we should pick among relatively 
large k and choose a relatively large k using the Elbow Method and the Gap Statistic. In this 
case, according to the Elbow Method, either 4 or 5 can work. According to the Gap Statistic, 4 
should work. Therefore, we should pick 4 as our k. 
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4.6.2 Example 2, Insurance Carriers and Related Activities 
The second example uses the data from Auto Insurance Database Annual Report 2013-2014. We 
know from the report that there are three major concerned aspects of car insurance, Liability 
Premium, Collision Premium, and Comprehensive Premium. “Liability insurance is a part of the 
general insurance system of risk financing to protect the purchaser from the risks of liabilities 
imposed by lawsuits and similar claims. It protects the insured in the event he or she is sued for 
claims that come within the coverage of the insurance policy.”  Collision insurance is the 275
money that the insured can get when his vehicle is involved in a crash with another vehicle or 
rammed into a fixed structure, he can rely on collision insurance to offer you coverage. 
“Comprehensive car insurance covers damages from an "act of God," or events that are not 
caused by a car driving into something else. An "act of God" can include things like damage 
from a heavy tree branch falling on your car. Since you have no control over when or why a tree 
branch would fall on your car, this kind of accident would be covered under your comprehensive 
policy.”  Premiums were defines by Function 7. 276
Average Premium = Written Premiums/Written Exposures 
Function 7 
 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Auto Insurance Database Annual Report 275
2013/2014, (Dec. 20, 2017, 10:50 PM) https://www.google.com/url?
sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwj8gP-
J9f3aAhUL4YMKHa32BgAQFggxMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.naic.org%2Fprod_serv%2FAUT-
PB-13_2016.pdf&usg=AOvVaw12fsK6pdOcy0A1qW-0Wtwm, PDF.
 id.276
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We averaged the premiums in five years from 2010 to 2014. In the perfect scenario, the data 
should be the three types of premiums of different companies. We cannot find this data. 
However, our data is sufficient for the purpose of illustrating the clustering model. Our data is 
about the average of the three types of premiums in different states. We can treat states as 
“insurance providers” so that we can define the relevant market with k-means clustering among 
states. 
We averaged the premiums between years so that we can get an overall tendency among states. 
Here we also standardized the data. It can help to avoid the effect of the difference in the mean 
among different variables, which can cause unbalanced effect between the features on the 
grouping. We will do the two-step approach first. After processing the data, we do perform a 
hierarchical clustering to find k. 
!231
A New Solution to Market Definition                                  
 
Figure 11 
As we can see in Figure 11, the hierarchical clustering result is a lot better than the one we get 
from simulated data, because the real data of substitutability is usually more clustered. From the 
result of hierarchical clustering, we know that we should either pick 4 or 7 as our k in the next 
step of the analysis. 
As a result, we will first conduct k-means clustering with k equal to 4 from 100 different initial 
points for 100 times, and plot the result with the smallest within-group sum of squares. As we 
have mentioned earlier, we should regard the result as the market definition among 52 insurance 
providers, not 52 states. The code and plot are below. 
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Figure 12 
Other relevant aspects of the result are included below. 
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We are dealing with real data, so we do not know much about the true pattern beneath it. 
Therefore, we cannot discuss the result from the perspective of generating data. We are going to 
conduct the analysis with different methods and compare the results and find the most reliable 
conclusion of market definition. Again, the court can use legal reasoning and other facts in the 
case to make a final decision, if there are multiple results. 
Now We conduct k-means with k equals to 7 from 100 different initial points for 100 times, and 
plot the result with the smallest within-group sum of squares. The plot is shown in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13 
The relevant aspects of the result is below. 
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Now we conduct the Elbow Method to find the K. We used the function written earlier to 
calculate Wk and the plot we generated to find the “elbow” is below. 
Figure 14 
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We find from the plot that the Wk is still significantly decreasing after k = 3. Therefore we 
should pick 3 as our k. Then we use Gap Statistic to find the K. Again, we will use the function 
provided by package “cluster”. The result it provided is also 3. Again the code and the Gap-
statics calculated is in the appendix and Rpubs. 
We learned from the result that the best k is 3. We are going to repeat k-means clustering 100 
times with different initial points and plot the result with the smallest within-group sum of 
squares while k is set as 3. The code and plot are shown below. 
Figure 15 
Other relevant aspects of the result are shown below. 
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When we compare the results, we find that clusters do not have a lot in common. However, since 
the first tow dimension explains 89.57% percent fo the point variance, we can look at the plot 
direct to get some sense of the actual distance between the points. The result with k = 3 has more 
significant gaps between each cluster. However with k = 4, we have smaller distance between 
data points within groups. As a result, I believe k = 3 and k = 4 are both relatively reasonable. 
However, since k = 3 is suggested by the methods which fit our context better, we should set k 
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equals to 3. Again, in a legal context, we can decide between the result with legal reasonings 
based on specific situations. 
Here, the insurance providers are repetitive service providers. They have more reason to bind 
unnecessary terms when there is less competition. In the context of premerger investigation, we 
know that all of the cases we get in HSR premerger investigation are reaching a threshold that 
indicates the danger of less competitive market. Therefore, we should use a more strict standard. 
In the context of premerger investigation, a more strict standard means a smaller relevant market. 
Therefore, we should pick a bigger k. 
One may wonder if we are still not sure about which result to take, then how could we 
recommend our model to the practice. It is important to remember we are not sure if the result of 
a Hypothetical Monopolist Test is right either. In fact, we can even say we are sure it is wrong, 
based on how many different SSNIPs we should try to actually perform the Hypothetical 
Monopolist Test as intended. Not even mentioning all of the unrealistic assumptions and the 
other problems we have mentioned in Chapter 3, compared to the Hypothetical Monopolist Test, 
our approach at least has many ways to verify and re-examine the result, not leaving the 
Agencies with no choice. Our method can also ensure that we come up with the most scientific 
result based on the need of different market facts. 
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3.3 Conclusions based on the examples  
We can learn from the two examples that: 
1. K-means clustering can find the pattern underneath the data and group the data points 
accordingly, in a more accurate way than the Hypothetical Monopolist Test with CLA. 
2. From the application of the data to k-means clustering we verified the fact that we do not 
need to make assumptions to perform this model. Everything is based on our purpose 
according to the facts of the market. 
3. The elbow method and the gap statistic are more reliable methods to find the best k, because 
they are consistent to our purpose as well. 
4. Hierarchical clustering might work for market segmentation, but it does not work well in the 
context of premerger investigation. 
5. When the k-means clustering concludes multiple results that we cannot choose via a 
technical way, we can still use legal and factual reasoning based on our context to pick a 
result. 
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6. Since the Merger Guidelines permits the usage of models other than hypothetical monopolist 
test, we may at least try to use k-means clustering as a supplement in the legal proceedings to 
define the relevant product market along with the Hypothetical Monopolist Test. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
In the first part of Chapter 1, we introduced the background of the premerger investigation. 
Coordinated effects and unilateral effects are both considered when analyzing the possible effects 
of a merger. We then illustrated the framework of the premerger investigation and the major 
aspects of unilateral effects and the coordinated effects.  
The methods used to assess the unilateral effects have been developing in the past 20 years. In 
regarding the unilateral effects, we summarized the upward pricing pressure test (UPP) and the 
merger simulation models. In contrast, the model used to assess the coordinated effects have not 
evolved for decades. The 1982 Merger Guidelines stipulated the Hypothetical Monopolist Test 
(SSNIP test) as the test for the range of products belonging to the relevant product market. The 
SSNIP test was not well implemented until the Critical Loss Analysis (CLA) was established in 
1989 to solve the problem of how to determine when the SSNIP (price) is profitable. 
The critical loss analysis was adopted by the 2010 Merger Guidelines and officially becomes a 
part of the premerger analysis when necessary data is available. However, the current way to 
perform the SSNIP test and the CLA by the Agencies has several problems, which also caused 
the criticism on CLA for many years. The essential error in the application of the models is that 
the contribution margin (CM) used in the CLA model is not a match with the price increase in 
percentage (Y), due to the fact that if the hypothetical monopolist does exist, its profit margin 
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should be significantly wider than the merging parties’s. An abnormally small CM induces an 
abnormally big critical loss(CL), which will result in a narrower market. Another major problem 
is the definition of SSNIP. It is unreasonable to define the SSNIP as a price increase of all the 
products in the candidate market, and in this case, the real CM of the hypothetical monopolist is 
hard to estimate as well. 
In Chapter 2, we clarified some problematic criticisms against the CLA and suggested better 
ways to define the SSNIP and conduct the models based on a progressive analysis of the SSNIP 
test and the CLA. We further introduced the frequently used demand models and analyzed the 
strength and limit of them. Nevertheless, there are still some unresolvable problems in the SSNIP 
test and CLA. We addressed those problems at the end of Chapter 2 and proposed another model 
in Chapter 3. 
In Chapter 3, we first discussed the course and progress of the SSNIP test and the CLA's 
development, and found the essential purpose of the SSNIP test -- quantifying the substitutability 
of the products. The SSNIP cleverly used the change in demand to reflect the substitutive 
relations, but this way has unavoidable problems as well. We then introduced a new model based 
on the substitutive relations directly and ensured the level of substitutability within each group to 
be as small as possible. We also discussed the data collection for our model and used simulated 
and real data to perform the models. The results are reasonable under our context and flexible 
based on the specific needs of the product type. 
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Based on Chapter 2's elaboration of the practical problems of the SSNIP test and the CLA and 
Chapter 3's expounding on the limited function of a one-dimensional substitutability level on 
market definition, we conclude that the SSNIP test is not easy to apply or as accurate as it seems 
to be. The conclusion it intends to reach is that the hypothetical monopolist can profit from the 
SSNIP, but the implementation of the model cannot properly get to this conclusion. On the other 
hand, the conclusion itself is not meaningful since the merging parties may not profit from the 
SSNIP even if the analysis shows that the hypothetical monopolist can profit from the SSNIP. 
Our method can make sure every product in the same group is a close substitute of each other. It 
compares all the aspects of product features at the same time. It clusters the products in a way 
that the substitutability inside each group is a local optimum result in every single run of the 
model. We also summarized the methods available to help us get a universal optimum result, 
which is certain to divide the market in a way that the substitutability within each group is the 
maximum. Our method to define the relevant market does not rely on any unrealistic 
assumptions. After the definition of the relevant market, we can use the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) or other methods to measure the effect of a merger. 
The significance of our method is that it gives an alternative approach to define a relevant 
product market which is directly based on substitutability between the products. Our method 
does not directly predict if the merger will cause a price increase because this is the purpose of 
the models assessing the unilateral effect. In contrast, our method helps to show a big picture of 
the market structure and to analyze the merging companies' market power on both demand and 
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supply. On the other hand, since the Guidelines does not preclude the application of models other 
than the ones suggested by it, our method can at least participate as a supplement to help the 
Agencies and the court to get a better understanding of the substitutive relations between the 
products in the candidate relevant product market. 
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Appendix: Code used in 
examples 
K-means example 1: Wholesales durable goods

industry group: Motor Vehicle and Motor Vehicle Parts and Supplies 
Merchant Wholesalers: NAICS 4231

Genetic K-means clustering with two-steps approach 
Simulation Example of Merchant Build the simulated dataset 
set.seed(1)
The first variable we simulate is the number of categories of products 
available in each wholesaler. We put 3 patterns in the data. In each 
pattern, we put 10 simulated values. The code is:

ctgr <- c(sample(1:50, 10, replace = TRUE), 
          sample(100:200, 15, replace = TRUE), 
          sample(250:300, 5, replace = TRUE))
ctgrscore <- (ctgr - mean(ctgr))/sd(ctgr)
The second variable we simulate is average number of products in each 
category available in each wholesaler. We put 2 patterns in the data. In 
each pattern, we put 15 simulated values. The code is:

nCtgr <- c(sample(1:10, 15, replace = TRUE), 
           sample(20:30, 15, replace = TRUE))
nCtgrscore <- (nCtgr - mean(nCtgr))/sd(nCtgr)
The third variable we simulate is the number of brands usually used by 
customers. We put 2 patterns in the data. In the first pattern, we put 20 
simulated values. In the second pattern we put 10 simuated values. The 
code is:

nBrnd <- c(sample(10:30, 20, replace = TRUE), 
           sample(1:10, 10, replace = TRUE))
nBrndscore <- (nBrnd - mean(nBrnd))/sd(nBrnd)
The forth variable we simulate is the number of models used by 
customers. We put 2 patterns in the data. In the first pattern, we put 20 
simulated values. In the second pattern, we put 10 simuated values. The 
code is:

nMdl <- c(sample(50:100, 20, replace = TRUE), 
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          sample(1:50, 10, replace = TRUE))
nMdlscore <- (nMdl - mean(nMdl))/sd(nMdl)
The fifth variable we simulate is the price deviation from average of a 
product which has an around-average number of sales. We put only 1 
pattern in the data. The code is:

pPrdct <- sample(1:300, size = 30, replace = TRUE)
pPrdctscore <- (pPrdct - mean(pPrdct))/sd(pPrdct)
The sixth variable we simulate is price deviation from average of a 
category which has an around-average number of sales. We put only 1 
pattern in the data. The code is:

pCtgr <- sample(1:100, size = 30, replace = TRUE)
pCtgrscore <- (pCtgr - mean(pCtgr))/sd(pCtgr)
The seventh variable we simulate is the percentage of non-parts sold. We 
put 2 patterns in the data. In the first pattern, we put 20 simulated values. 
In the second pattern, we put 10 simuated values. The code is:

pNp <- c(sample(30:70, size = 20, replace = TRUE), 
         sample(1:100, size = 10, replace = TRUE))
pNpscore <- (pNp - mean(pNp))/sd(pNp)
The eighth variable we simulate is percentage of uncommon transportation 
products & parts. We put 3 patterns in the data. In each pattern, we put 10 
simulated values. The code is:

larget <- sample(c(rep(0, times = 5), 
                   sample(10:30, size = 5, replace = 
TRUE)), size = 10)
mediant <- sample(c(rep(0, times = 6), 
                    rep(100, times = 2), 20, 10), size = 
10)
smallt <- sample(c(rep(0, times = 6), rep(100, times = 4)), 
size = 10)
pUt <- c(larget, mediant, smallt)
pUtscore <- (pUt - mean(pUt))/sd(pUt)
The ninth variable we simulate is percentage of used products. We put 3 
patterns in the data. In each pattern, we put 10 simulated values. The 
code is:

largeu <- sample(c(rep(0, times = 8), 3, 5), size = 10)
medianu <- sample(c(rep(0, times = 7), 3, 5, 8), size = 10)
smallu <- sample(c(rep(0, times = 6), 
                   sample(1:20, size = 4, replace = TRUE)), 
size = 10)
pUp <- c(largeu, medianu, smallu)
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pUpscore <- (pUp - mean(pUp))/sd(pUp)
Now we build our simulated data into a data frame, so it can be later used 
in clustering analysis.

simMV <- cbind(ctgrscore, nCtgrscore, nBrndscore, 
nMdlscore, 
               pPrdctscore, pCtgrscore, pNpscore, pUtscore, 
pUpscore)
set.seed(Sys.time())
Step 1: hierachical clustering to find a proper k. 
library(cluster)
hcMV <- hclust(dist(simMV))
plot(hcMV, main = "Hierarchical Clustering to find K (MV)", 
     xlab = "Numbered Wholesalers")
abline(h = 4.6, col = "blue")
abline(h = 5.1, col = "red")
abline(h = 5.5, col = "green")
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Step 2: Genetic k-means clustering 
Conduct k-means with k equals to 3 from 100 different starting points 
for 100 times

## k-means with k = 3
## repeat k-means clustering for 100 times with different 
start points
totWithinSq <- vector()
for (i in 1:100){
        set.seed(i)
        kmMV3 <- kmeans(simMV, 3)
        totWithinSq <- c(kmMV3$tot.withinss, totWithinSq)
}
## find the result with the smallest within-group sum of 
squares
sed <- c(1:100)[totWithinSq == min(totWithinSq)][1]
## redo the one with the smallest within-group sum of 
squares
set.seed(sed)
kmMV3 <- kmeans(simMV, 3)
Plot the result with the smallest within-group sum of squares

## plot the result with the smallest within-group sum of 
squares
clusplot(simMV, kmMV3$cluster, color=TRUE, shade=TRUE, 
labels=2, 
         lines=0, main = "Market division of Motor Vehicle 
while K = 3", 
         xlab = "Number of product categories available", 
         ylab = "Number of products in each category")
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Other relevant aspects of the result

## label of clusters
kmMV3$cluster
##  [1] 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
2 2 2 2
## cordinates of centers
kmMV3$centers
##    ctgrscore nCtgrscore nBrndscore  nMdlscore 
pPrdctscore pCtgrscore
## 1 -0.7217317 -0.9487876  0.4389097  0.6538996 
-0.10778829 -0.2323299
## 2  0.8701004  0.8935854 -1.1928434 -1.2187335 
-0.07775567  0.6471109
## 3  0.4249945  1.0591919  1.0689576  0.4757683  
0.47887620 -0.5972322
##     pNpscore   pUtscore    pUpscore
## 1  0.3242067 -0.3780789 -0.27590332
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## 2 -0.6220715  0.3780789  0.38459250
## 3  0.2715231  0.3780789  0.05852495
## total squared distance from data points to their centers
## it is equal to sum of squares because the center is the 
mean 
## in each dimensions
kmMV3$withinss
## [1] 56.57548 73.02529 21.88084
## total within-cluster sum of distances
kmMV3$tot.withinss
## [1] 151.4816
Conduct k-means with k equals to 4 from 100 different starting points 
for 100 times

## k-means with k = 4
## repeat k-means clustering for 100 times with different 
start points
totWithinSq <- vector()
for (i in 1:100){
        set.seed(i)
        kmMV4 <- kmeans(simMV, 4)
        totWithinSq <- c(kmMV4$tot.withinss, totWithinSq)
}
## find the result with the smallest within-group sum of 
squares
sed <- c(1:100)[totWithinSq == min(totWithinSq)][1]
## redo the one with the smallest within-group sum of 
squares
set.seed(sed)
kmMV4 <- kmeans(simMV, 4)
Plot the result with the smallest within-group sum of squares

## plot the result with the smallest within-group sum of 
squares
clusplot(simMV, kmMV4$cluster, color=TRUE, shade=TRUE, 
labels=2, 
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         lines=0, main = "Market division of Motor Vehicle 
while K = 4", 
         xlab = "Number of product categories available", 
         ylab = "Number of products in each category")


Other relevant aspects of the result

## label of clusters
kmMV4$cluster
##  [1] 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 
4 3 4 3
## cordinates of centers
kmMV4$centers
##    ctgrscore nCtgrscore nBrndscore  nMdlscore 
pPrdctscore pCtgrscore
## 1 -0.7217317 -0.9487876  0.4389097  0.6538996  
-0.1077883 -0.2323299
## 2  0.4249945  1.0591919  1.0689576  0.4757683   
0.4788762 -0.5972322
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## 3  0.9389722  1.0747176 -1.2406279 -0.9498455   
0.8065608  1.0074191
## 4  0.8241858  0.7728306 -1.1609870 -1.3979922  
-0.6673000  0.4069054
##     pNpscore   pUtscore    pUpscore
## 1  0.3242067 -0.3780789 -0.27590332
## 2  0.2715231  0.3780789  0.05852495
## 3 -0.8165955  1.9039576 -0.49328169
## 4 -0.4923888 -0.6391737  0.96984197
## total squared distance from data points to their centers
## it is equal to sum of squares because the center is the 
mean 
## in each dimensions
kmMV4$withinss
## [1] 56.57548 21.88084 12.33399 32.95276
## total within-cluster sum of distances
kmMV4$tot.withinss
## [1] 123.7431
Conduct k-means with k equals to 5 from 100 different starting points 
for 100 times

## k-means with k = 5
## repeat k-means clustering for 100 times with different 
start points
totWithinSq <- vector()
for (i in 1:100){
        set.seed(i)
        kmMV5 <- kmeans(simMV, 5)
        totWithinSq <- c(kmMV5$tot.withinss, totWithinSq)
}
## find the result with the smallest within-group sum of 
squares
sed <- c(1:100)[totWithinSq == min(totWithinSq)][1]
## redo the one with the smallest within-group sum of 
squares
set.seed(sed)
kmMV5 <- kmeans(simMV, 5)
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Plot the result with the smallest within-group sum of squares

## plot the result with the smallest within-group sum of 
squares
clusplot(simMV, kmMV5$cluster, color=TRUE, shade=TRUE, 
labels=2, 
         lines=0, main = "Market division of Motor Vehicle 
while K = 5", 
         xlab = "Number of product categories available", 
         ylab = "Number of products in each category")


Other relevant aspects of the result

## label of clusters
kmMV5$cluster
##  [1] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 1 4 1 4 2 2 5 5 5 5 
5 2 5 2
## cordinates of centers
kmMV5$centers
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##    ctgrscore   nCtgrscore nBrndscore  nMdlscore 
pPrdctscore pCtgrscore
## 1  0.2815589  0.893585379  1.1751454  0.5806177  
0.98860783 -0.5184763
## 2  0.9389722  1.074717551 -1.2406279 -0.9498455  
0.80656082  1.0074191
## 3 -1.0669018 -0.969488385  0.4318305  0.6590242 
-0.03186524 -0.6366101
## 4  0.3531141 -0.008378903  0.6897153  0.5395477 
-0.12130590  0.2240793
## 5  0.8241858  0.772830598 -1.1609870 -1.3979922 
-0.66730000  0.4069054
##     pNpscore   pUtscore   pUpscore
## 1 -0.5126518  1.9039576  0.8862349
## 2 -0.8165955  1.9039576 -0.4932817
## 3  0.4406263 -0.3524934 -0.3108663
## 4  0.3427327 -0.5301823 -0.3141237
## 5 -0.4923888 -0.6391737  0.9698420
## total squared distance from data points to their centers
## it is equal to sum of squares because the center is the 
mean 
## in each dimensions
kmMV5$withinss
## [1]  6.943531 12.333986 28.328260 31.108963 32.952755
## total within-cluster sum of distances
kmMV5$tot.withinss
## [1] 111.6675
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K-means example 2: Example of Insurance Carriers 
and Related Activities

Industry Group: Car Insurance 
Genetic K-means clustering with two-steps approach 
Read in data. Adjust it into the required form. Normalize the data

cidata <- read.csv(file = "/Users/YanYang/code/
Car_Insurance_Example/2014 Auto Insurance Average Premium 
Data.csv")
lap <- sapply(1:nrow(cidata), function(x) 
mean(as.numeric(cidata[x, 3:7])))
cap <- sapply(1:nrow(cidata), function(x) 
mean(as.numeric(cidata[x, 8:12])))
cpap <- sapply(1:nrow(cidata), function(x) 
mean(as.numeric(cidata[x, 13:17])))
simCI <- scale(cbind(lap, cap, cpap))
Step 1: hierachical clustering to find a proper k. 
hcCI <- hclust(dist(simCI))
plot(hcCI, main = "Hierarchical Clustering to find K (CI)", 
     xlab = "State Numbers")
abline(h = 3.5, col = "red")
abline(h = 2.5, col = "blue")
!267
A New Solution to Market Definition                                  


Step 2: Genetic k-means clustering 
Conduct k-means with k equals to 4 from 100 different starting points 
for 100 times

## k-means clustering when k = 4
## repeat k-means clustering for 100 times with different 
start points
totWithinSq <- vector()
for (i in 1:100){
        set.seed(i)
        kmCI4 <- kmeans(simCI, 4)
        totWithinSq <- c(kmCI4$tot.withinss, totWithinSq)
}
## find the result with the smallest within-group sum of 
squares
sed <- c(1:100)[totWithinSq == min(totWithinSq)][1]
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## redo the one with the smallest within-group sum of 
squares
set.seed(sed)
kmCI4 <- kmeans(simCI, 4)
Plot the result with the smallest within-group sum of squares

## plot the result with the smallest within-group sum of 
squares
clusplot(simCI, kmCI4$cluster, color=TRUE, shade=TRUE, 
labels=2, 
         lines=0, main = "Market division of Car Insurance 
while K = 4", 
         xlab="Average Liablity Premium", ylab="Average 
Collision Premium")


Other relevant aspects of the result

## label of clusters
kmCI4$cluster
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##  [1] 1 4 1 1 2 1 4 4 4 4 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 4 2 4 4 4 3 1 1 
3 3 4 2 4 1 4 2 3
## [36] 2 1 2 2 4 1 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 3 1
## cordinates of centers
kmCI4$centers
##          lap        cap       cpap
## 1 -0.2162251  0.0671289  0.5416765
## 2 -0.4250923 -0.4167178 -0.9077268
## 3 -1.0233950 -1.0358827  1.3526659
## 4  1.4345960  1.1473312 -0.1172338
## total squared distance from data points to their centers
## it is equal to sum of squares because the center is the 
mean 
## in each dimensions
kmCI4$withinss
## [1]  7.330818 13.474020  4.984122 25.873355
## total within-cluster sum of distances
kmCI4$tot.withinss
## [1] 51.66232
Conduct k-means with k equals to 7 from 100 different starting points 
for 100 times

## k-means clustering when k = 7
## repeat k-means clustering for 100 times with different 
start points
totWithinSq <- vector()
for (i in 1:100){
        set.seed(i)
        kmCI7 <- kmeans(simCI, 7)
        totWithinSq <- c(kmCI7$tot.withinss, totWithinSq)
}
## find the result with the smallest within-group sum of 
squares
sed <- c(1:100)[totWithinSq == min(totWithinSq)][1]
## redo the one with the smallest within-group sum of 
squares
set.seed(sed)
kmCI7 <- kmeans(simCI, 7)
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Plot the result with the smallest within-group sum of squares

## plot the result with the smallest within-group sum of 
squares
clusplot(simCI, kmCI7$cluster, color=TRUE, shade=TRUE, 
labels=2, 
         lines=0, main = "Market division of Car Insurance 
while K = 7", 
         xlab="Average Liablity Premium", ylab="Average 
Collision Premium")


Other relevant aspects of the result

## label of clusters
kmCI7$cluster
##  [1] 2 4 1 2 4 1 4 6 3 6 2 5 5 5 5 7 7 5 3 5 4 4 4 1 2 1 
7 7 4 5 6 1 6 5 7
## [36] 5 2 5 4 4 1 7 5 2 5 5 5 5 2 5 7 4
## cordinates of centers
kmCI7$centers
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##          lap        cap       cpap
## 1 -0.2043081 -0.6370889  0.4854048
## 2 -0.3011256  0.4464633  0.7098097
## 3  1.3140978  2.4377592  1.8389374
## 4  0.7083975  0.9803677 -0.4775267
## 5 -0.4727496 -0.5727570 -0.9136164
## 6  2.2576671  0.5235082 -0.6085935
## 7 -1.1207312 -0.9874039  1.4669332
## total squared distance from data points to their centers
## it is equal to sum of squares because the center is the 
mean 
## in each dimensions
kmCI7$withinss
## [1] 1.5108276 2.8056016 0.8263802 7.0045401 8.8901085 
3.8771411 3.5907569
## total within-cluster sum of distances
kmCI7$tot.withinss
## [1] 28.50536  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Use Elbow Method and Gap Statistic to find K

Elbow Method Function 
For easier use later,we write a function to calculate Wk in 
elbow method with input, and the largest meaningful k 
The input “data” should be a dataframe. maxk is the largest k.

elbow <- function(data, maxk){
        vc <- vector()
        for(j in 1:maxk){
                km <- kmeans(data, j)
                datak <- cbind(data, km$cluster)
                v <- vector()
                for(i in 1:j){
                        count <- sum(datak[ ,ncol(datak)] 
== i)
                        if(count == 1){
                                sdgi == 0
                        }else{
                                dgi <- 
dist(datak[datak[ ,ncol(datak)] == i,
                                                  c(1:3)], 
                                                       
method = "euclidean",
                                                       diag 
= TRUE,
                                                       
upper = TRUE)^2
                                sdgi <- 
sum(as.numeric(dgi))/(2*count)
                        }
                        v <- c(v, sdgi)
                }
                vc <- c(vc, sum(v))
        }
        vc
}
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Example 1: whole seller dataset 
Use elbow method to find k 
Calculate Wk for from 100 different start points when k changes from 1 
to 20

Since the random start points will affect Wk we get, we use 100 sets of 
random numbers provided by R to avoid the effect of randomness.

vv <- vector()
for(i in 1:100){
        set.seed(i)
        wk <- elbow(simMV, 20)
        vv <- rbind(vv, wk)
}
meanWkMV <- colMeans(vv)
Observe the figure below to find the k where Wk decrease fastest.

cc <- as.data.frame(cbind(1:20, meanWkMV))
library(ggplot2)
g = ggplot(cc, aes(x = V1, y = meanWkMV))
g = g + geom_point(size = 5)
g = g + geom_line(size = 1)
g = g + labs(x = "k", y = "mean of 100 Wk", 
             title = "Example 1: Elbow Method to find k")
g = g + scale_color_gradient2(low = "purple", high = "red")
g
!274
A New Solution to Market Definition                                  
 
From the plot we know k should be 2.

Calculate Gap Statistic to determind K

Since R already has a package to calculate Gap Statistic, we will use the 
function from package cluster directly.

library(cluster)
gap_clust <- clusGap(simMV, kmeans, K.max = 20, B = 30)
gap_clust
## Clustering Gap statistic ["clusGap"] from call:
## clusGap(x = simMV, FUNcluster = kmeans, K.max = 20, B = 
30)
## B=30 simulated reference sets, k = 1..20; 
spaceH0="scaledPCA"
##  --> Number of clusters (method 'firstSEmax', 
SE.factor=1): 2
##           logW   E.logW       gap     SE.sim
##  [1,] 3.382692 3.519929 0.1372375 0.03233278
##  [2,] 3.172895 3.360477 0.1875819 0.04082617
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##  [3,] 3.089048 3.248258 0.1592098 0.03538789
##  [4,] 2.950934 3.154275 0.2033417 0.03680279
##  [5,] 2.878570 3.069781 0.1912115 0.03568238
##  [6,] 2.803485 2.986658 0.1831729 0.03518157
##  [7,] 2.674556 2.910726 0.2361702 0.04006084
##  [8,] 2.593718 2.834799 0.2410807 0.03378752
##  [9,] 2.492509 2.760599 0.2680900 0.03932611
## [10,] 2.442075 2.688316 0.2462415 0.04048860
## [11,] 2.351627 2.611193 0.2595656 0.03915989
## [12,] 2.284554 2.533258 0.2487041 0.04585996
## [13,] 2.191623 2.456227 0.2646039 0.04196856
## [14,] 2.188607 2.374776 0.1861685 0.03743426
## [15,] 2.034108 2.295494 0.2613855 0.05008610
## [16,] 1.912181 2.205446 0.2932655 0.03806879
## [17,] 1.887987 2.106953 0.2189663 0.04487602
## [18,] 1.743643 2.007366 0.2637225 0.04176051
## [19,] 1.580676 1.901965 0.3212900 0.04092718
## [20,] 1.554539 1.798900 0.2443611 0.05964913
From the result we know Gap statistic suggests the best k is 2

Both method suggests k to be 2 
k-means with k = 2 

repeat k-means clustering for 100 times with different start points

totWithinSq <- vector()
for (i in 1:100){
        set.seed(i)
        kmMV2 <- kmeans(simMV, 2)
        totWithinSq <- c(kmMV5$tot.withinss, totWithinSq)
}
## find the result with the smallest within-group sum of 
squares
sed <- c(1:100)[totWithinSq == min(totWithinSq)][1]
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## redo the one with the smallest within-group sum of 
squares
set.seed(sed)
kmMV2 <- kmeans(simMV, 2)
Plot the result with the smallest within-group sum of squares

clusplot(simMV, kmMV2$cluster, color=TRUE, shade=TRUE, 
labels=2, 
         lines=0, main = "Market division of Motor Vehicle 
while K = 2", 
         xlab = "Number of product categories available", 
         ylab = "Number of products in each category")
 
###Other relevant aspects of the result

## label of clusters
kmMV2$cluster
##  [1] 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
2 2 2 2
## cordinates of centers
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kmMV2$centers
##    ctgrscore nCtgrscore nBrndscore  nMdlscore 
pPrdctscore pCtgrscore
## 1 -0.4350502 -0.4467927  0.5964217  0.6093667  
0.03887784 -0.3235554
## 2  0.8701004  0.8935854 -1.1928434 -1.2187335 
-0.07775567  0.6471109
##     pNpscore   pUtscore   pUpscore
## 1  0.3110358 -0.1890394 -0.1922963
## 2 -0.6220715  0.3780789  0.3845925
## total squared distance from data points to their centers
## it is equal to sum of squares because the center is the 
mean 
## in each dimensions
kmMV2$withinss
## [1] 104.47897  73.02529
## total within-cluster sum of distances
kmMV2$tot.withinss
## [1] 177.5043
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Example 2: car insurance dataset 
Calculate Wk for from 100 different start points when k changes from 1 
to 20

vv <- vector()
for(i in 1:100){
        set.seed(i)
        wk <- elbow(simCI, 20)
        vv <- rbind(vv, wk)
}
meanWk <- colMeans(vv)
Observe the figure below to find the k where Wk decrease fastest

cc <- as.data.frame(cbind(1:20, meanWk))
library(ggplot2)
g = ggplot(cc, aes(x = V1, y = meanWk))
g = g + geom_point(size = 5)
g = g + geom_line(size = 1)
g = g + labs(x = "k", y = "mean of 100 Wk", 
             title = "Example 2: Elbow Method to find k")
g = g + scale_color_gradient2(low = "purple", high = "red")
g
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From the plot we know k should be 3

Calculate Gap Statistic to determind K

library(cluster)
gap_clust <- clusGap(simCI, kmeans, K.max = 20, B = 52)
gap_clust
## Clustering Gap statistic ["clusGap"] from call:
## clusGap(x = simCI, FUNcluster = kmeans, K.max = 20, B = 
52)
## B=52 simulated reference sets, k = 1..20; 
spaceH0="scaledPCA"
##  --> Number of clusters (method 'firstSEmax', 
SE.factor=1): 3
##           logW   E.logW       gap     SE.sim
##  [1,] 3.339359 3.615619 0.2762602 0.03735108
##  [2,] 3.086954 3.363500 0.2765454 0.04025360
##  [3,] 2.860584 3.194636 0.3340520 0.05045086
##  [4,] 2.764690 3.054210 0.2895200 0.04720784
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##  [5,] 2.691983 2.949296 0.2573135 0.05029899
##  [6,] 2.544050 2.855352 0.3113014 0.04983119
##  [7,] 2.526056 2.768268 0.2422118 0.04872225
##  [8,] 2.366667 2.688637 0.3219698 0.04943543
##  [9,] 2.284573 2.618430 0.3338567 0.05184171
## [10,] 2.230376 2.540910 0.3105346 0.05384160
## [11,] 2.142184 2.489855 0.3476711 0.05281161
## [12,] 2.090391 2.413626 0.3232352 0.05258721
## [13,] 2.045172 2.357836 0.3126637 0.06204036
## [14,] 1.962233 2.292731 0.3304978 0.05859114
## [15,] 1.927258 2.228948 0.3016906 0.06271220
## [16,] 1.877180 2.163823 0.2866432 0.05876341
## [17,] 1.796337 2.109715 0.3133781 0.06329356
## [18,] 1.763847 2.050724 0.2868765 0.06414906
## [19,] 1.681757 1.999434 0.3176773 0.06064812
## [20,] 1.692030 1.938623 0.2465932 0.07002069
From the result we know Gap statistic suggests the best k is 3

Both method suggests k to be 3 
k-means clustering when k = 3 
Repeat k-means clustering for 100 times with different start points

totWithinSq <- vector()
for (i in 1:100){
        set.seed(i)
        kmCI3 <- kmeans(simCI, 3)
        totWithinSq <- c(kmCI3$tot.withinss, totWithinSq)
}
## find the result with the smallest within-group sum of 
squares
sed <- c(1:100)[totWithinSq == min(totWithinSq)][1]
## redo the one with the smallest within-group sum of 
squares
set.seed(sed)
kmCI3 <- kmeans(simCI, 3)
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Plot the result with the smallest within-group sum of squares

clusplot(simCI, kmCI3$cluster, color=TRUE, shade=TRUE, 
labels=2, 
         lines=0, main = "Market division of Car Insurance 
while K = 3", 
         xlab="Average Liablity Premium", ylab="Average 
Collision Premium")
 
###Other relevant aspects of the result

## label of clusters
kmCI3$cluster
##  [1] 1 3 1 1 3 1 3 3 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 
1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 1
## [36] 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
## cordinates of centers
kmCI3$centers
##          lap        cap        cpap
## 1 -0.5193289 -0.4909840  0.02171412
## 2  0.7130070  1.5820433  1.40981372
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## 3  1.3203177  0.9456041 -0.53508027
## total squared distance from data points to their centers
## it is equal to sum of squares because the center is the 
mean 
## in each dimensions
kmCI3$withinss
## [1] 58.344648  6.037484 15.133394
## total within-cluster sum of distances
kmCI3$tot.withinss
## [1] 79.51553
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